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Rahim Mohamed: Strange Bedfellows: Conservative Governments and Family 
Policy in Canada and Germany, 2005 – 2015 
(Under the Direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on recent and ongoing family policy reforms 
in affluent countries by comparing the respective family policy agendas of right party-led 
governments in Canada and Germany between 2005 and 2015. My comparative assessment of 
reforms enacted by the governments of Stephen Harper and Angela Merkel, respectively, 
indicates that an increased cross-national salience of the financial and logistical challenges faced 
by modern (i.e.: dual-earner and single-parent) families presents right-of-center parties with an 
incentive to utilize family policy proposals instrumentally to broaden their electoral appeal. This 
gives vital context to large-n statistical research that indicates a weakening of partisanship as an 
explanatory variable for recent family policy developments. 
 The study also finds that differences in the specific policies implemented by each 
government can ultimately be traced back to the domestic discursive context. Germany presented 
the more favorable environment for comprehensive, women’s employment supporting reforms 
due to a widespread perception of the low domestic birth rate as a threat to intergenerational 
‘sustainability’. The cause was also helped by the presence of credible policy spokeswoman 
Ursula von der Leyen, who championed a progressive package of reforms while, at the same 
time, embodying a traditional image of maternity that appealed to conservatives. By contrast, the 
Canadian political environment favored a continuation of direct cash payments to families, as 
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exemplified by the Harper government’s signature Universal Child Care Benefit 
(UCCB). Harper later launched two children’s activity tax credits crafted to appeal to 
families in critical suburban ‘swing ridings’. Although both opposition parties proposed a 
national daycare strategy as an alternative to Harper’s agenda, the idea has only limited 
popular appeal due to the questionable record of the country’s only standalone provincial 
daycare program, based in Québec, and a silencing of feminist perspectives in the 
national policy dialogue. Lastly, I find that an ancillary discourse linking family policy to 
the cultural integration of migrants was visible in Germany but not in Canada. This 
finding is substantiated in Chapter 5 via a statistical topic analysis of over 450 relevant 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The late twentieth century was a time of great pessimism for the future of the welfare 
state. The turbulent 1970s—which saw commodities shocks, economic stagnation, and 
persistent inflation—motivated right-of-center governments in the United States and Britain to 
pursue vast liberalizing agendas, creating a template for like-minded reformers elsewhere. Such 
reforms hollowed out existing social safety nets and, through a “starve the beast” logic, 
reduced the number of revenue generating tools available to policymakers. A corresponding 
shift occurred in the ideational realm, where the interventionist macroeconomic philosophy of 
Keynesianism gave way to monetarism and other neo-classical dogma. These developments led 
to a broad academic consensus that the conventional welfare state had reached its apex and 
that the new challenge for progressives would be to simply preserve existing social programs 
(Stephens, 2015, p. 274). One leading scholar characterized the prevailing social policy 
environment as one of “permanent austerity” (Pierson, 1998).   
 But the rumors of the welfare state’s demise were in fact greatly exaggerated as broad 
demographic and cultural shifts have created a demand for new forms of social insurance. In 
fact, post-industrial governments are now beginning to spend substantially on policies designed 
to mitigate problems created by the process of welfare state maturation itself. Several of these 
“new social risks” stem from the steady decline of the high-wage male breadwinner 
manufacturing economy and concomitant rise of a dual earner services model of employment
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 (Taylor Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2005). The post-industrial shift to less well-compensated service 
employment and the coeval rise of feminist sentiments have led more women to pursue work 
outside of the home, often on a full-time basis. This has subsequently placed pressure on the 
state to provide extended support for aspects of child rearing that have historically been carried 
out by stay-at-home mothers.  
Accordingly, the past three decades have seen a broad, cross-national uptick—
particularly among the affluent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries—in spending in the domain of family policy, defined broadly here as state 
intervention intended to lower the financial and time burden of raising children, especially for 
women. Examples include publicly-subsidized daycare, parental leave entitlements, and family 
cash allowances. In fact, Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser (2015) identify, since the mid-1990s, an 
empirical trend of family policy expansion in all rich OECD countries—with the exception of the 
United States.1 “The [OECD-wide] changes in family policy have been remarkable and are 
grosso mondo in line with some of the demands feminist scholars made many decades ago,” 
write Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser. “This development is even more remarkable if we take into 
account the parallel retrenchment that is taking place in other social policy domains” (p. 18, 
italics in the original).  
Pivotally, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser uncover a declining partisan effect over the 2000s 
(p. 20), signifying broad-based political support for the new family policy programs. Their large-
n statistical findings are echoed in a number of recent qualitative studies, which argue that the 
                                                          
1 Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser measure growth in family allowances, parental leave durations, day care, and other 
cash benefits between 1980 and 2008 (p. 11). 
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de-alignment of traditional party cleavages has led both right and left parties to court ‘floating’ 
female voters, often using family policy concessions as an inducement (Wiliarty 2010; Morgan 
2013). These findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that stagnating birth rates have 
forced traditionally conservative regimes to begrudgingly implement policies designed to 
enable women to reconcile child rearing with labor force participation (Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen 2011; Oliver and Mätzke 2014). Nevertheless, much remains to be explained about 
the nature of the ongoing “silent revolution” of family policy expansion (Ferragina and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2015), especially in cases where new policies defy long-established welfare regime 
trajectories (see Esping Andersen 1990).  
I shed new light on this phenomenon here through a comparative analysis of family 
policy expansion in two unlikely cases, Canada and Germany. What makes this a worthwhile 
comparison is that, in both countries, substantial, path-shifting, and unforeseen family policy 
reforms have recently been pursued at the direction of right party led governments. These are 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-led government of Angela Merkel in Germany (2005 – 
present) and Canada’s recently unseated Conservative government, led by Stephen Harper 
(2006 – 2015).2 The German and Canadian reforms unfolded over a similar timeframe, roughly 
2005 through 2015, which facilitates a paired comparative assessment of the cases. 
 
                                                          
2 Between 2005 and 2009, Merkel’s CDU shared power with the rival Social Democrats (SDP) in a Grand Coalition 
government. However, as has been well-documented elsewhere (Mätzke and Ostner 2010b; Leitner 2010; 
Fleckenstein 2011), the CDU ultimately overtook the SDP in advocating family policy reform and made the 
programme the centerpiece of a major rebranding effort. Mätzke and Ostner (2010b, p. 472) write, “The formula 
of partisan politics fails to grasp the very recent major (‘post-industrial’) family policy change in Germany, proudly 




1.1. Project Outline and Contribution 
 This study utilizes a multi-method approach—consisting of qualitative causal process-
tracing, elite interview findings, and automated text analysis—to uncover the antecedents and 
motivations behind right government led family policy reform processes in Canada and 
Germany. It also seeks to explain the unique trajectory of each process: broadly, the Canadian 
reforms have followed a familial, transfer-based Christian Democratic path while the German 
ones embody a Nordic-style universalism (Esping Anderson 1990). To be precise, Harper’s 
‘refamilialization’ (see Findlay 2015) of family policy consisted of a flat-rate monthly child 
benefit,3 the introduction of spousal income tax splitting,4 and numerous boutique child tax 
credits. By contrast, the Merkel government more fully endorsed the dual earner model of 
employment by universalizing access to daycare (for children between the ages of one and 
three), tying maternity leave benefits to income, and introducing new, dual carer supporting 
provisions for paternal leave.5 
                                                          
3 Canada’s Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) was initially a payment of $100 per month per child available to all 
parents with children under the age of six. It was increased to $160 per month—with an additional $60 payment 
for each child between the age of six and seventeen—shorty before the 2015 federal election. 
 
4 Income splitting is a policy that allows the higher earning spouse in a household to transfer a certain amount of 
his or her income to the lower earning spouse for tax purposes. It differs from joint taxation as both partners are 
technically still taxed as individuals. 
 
5 The CDU-led coalition’s Elterngeld (“parental allowance”) replaced the pre-existing flat rate parental leave 
payments with more generous income-based ones (repaying 67% of pre-leave earnings up to a maximum of 1,800 
euros per month). The plan covered twelve months for the primary caregiver (usually the mother) as well as two 




To be clear, the historically Bismarckian6 CDU and the broadly neoliberal Conservative 
Party of Canada7 are not ideologically identical, nor would one expect them to approach family 
policy the same manner. This is nevertheless a worthwhile comparison as, over the past 
decade, both parties have implemented path-breaking family policy reforms in a manner that 
broke with national precedents. In fact, it could be argued that the implementation of a Nordic-
style family policy package may have been more likely in Canada, where universalistic social 
programs like single-payer health care have a stronger historical basis (Maioni 1997; Mahon 
2008). 
 I find that, in both cases, the family policy initiatives were part of a larger political 
rebranding process necessitated by periods of electoral failure. Time outside government in the 
1990s and early 2000s motivated both the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats to retool 
policy pitches to persuadable voters (see Hillygus and Shields 2008). In the case of Canada, 
party strategists used sophisticated microtargeting techniques imported from the United States 
to isolate and engage the ‘soft conservative’ families that populate the country’s burgeoning 
suburban and exurban communities. Further, the policy innovation of ‘boutique’ family tax 
credits allowed the Conservatives to craft targeted policy appeals to increasingly narrow 
segments of the population (Delacourt 2016).  
                                                          
6 Like other Christian democratic parties in Continental Europe the CDU has, since the 1990s, begun to shed its 
Bismarckian dogma and embrace various growth-promoting structural reforms (see Hinrichs 2010). 
 
7 The Conservative Party of Canada was formed in 2003 through the merger of the center-right Progressive 
Conservatives and the more socially conservative Canadian Alliance. Although Harper led the latter prior to 
becoming the leader of the unified Conservative Party, he subsequently sought to focus on economic issues and 
keep more polarizing social matters off the political agenda. 
6 
 
The efforts of Germany’s CDU were more expressly designed to appeal to modernized 
female voters who had been alienated over time by the party’s stubborn social conservatism 
(Clemens 2009; Seeleib-Kaiser 2010; Fleckenstein 2011; Morgan 2013). The Merkel 
Government emphasized the extent to which the new policies would allow women to reconcile 
work and family life, with the added bonus of boosting Germany’s long-stagnating domestic 
birth rate. The visibility of women in the party’s upper echelon gave credibility to this sales 
pitch (see: Wiliarty 2010; von Wahl 2011; Mohamed 2013).  
While these specific mobilizational strategies differed—owing primarily to the different 
incentives imbedded in each country’s respective electoral system—both stories reflect the de-
alignment of traditional partisan cleavages and the increasing importance of issue competition 
(Carmines and Stimson 1989; Green-Pedersen 2007; Morgan 2013; Hobolt and de Vries 2015; 
Schwander 2018) in mature democracies. As such, both cases are important examples of how 
modern parties (and especially right parties) can utilize new family policies instrumentally to 
build viable electoral coalitions.  
 While an important finding in itself, this leaves the ancillary puzzle of why family policy 
reforms followed different trajectories in each country. Answering this question necessitates a 
thorough examination of the timbre of each domestic policy discourse. Accordingly, I use a 
novel automated text analysis technique, topic modelling, in chapter five to parse out dominant 
frames in each country’s print media coverage of family policy over the past decade (2005 – 
2015). I focus in particular on the contrast between the respective debates surrounding two 
similar monthly benefit programs for parents with pre-primary school aged children: The 
Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) and Betreuungsgeld (care allowance), respectively. I choose 
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to emphasize these policies because doing so allows me to both simplify the data collection 
process (thereby minimizing the potential for error in my analysis) and succinctly illustrate the 
differing normative contexts in each country. To be precise, I believe that the tonal differences 
in the press coverage of Canada’s (popular) child benefit and Germany’s (polarizing) child 
allowance get at the heart of why family policy reforms ultimately followed different 
trajectories in each country. 
On the German side, two narratives in particular stand out. One is the construal of the 
Betreuungsgeld as a retrograde ‘stove bonus’ that ignored both evolving gender roles and a 
clear public demand for more employment-friendly family policies. Gender remained at the 
forefront of the discourse due, in part, to the visibility of Merkel and other prominent female 
politicians in the public sphere. A second persistent storyline presented the child allowance as a 
potential barrier to both the labor market participation of migrant women and the intercultural 
education of their toddler-aged children. Stories that embraced this narrative often emphasized 
the supposed ‘self-segregation’ of migrants from Turkey and other Muslim majority countries. 
  I find that such associations were rarely made in the Canadian print media. In general, 
journalists characterized the child benefit and related aspects of the Conservative government’s 
family tax relief agenda as ‘free money’ that the Harper Government shrewdly targeted at 
strategically important blocs of voters. There was some commentary on how Harper’s approach 
disadvantaged dual earner and single-parent families but, for the most part, scant attention 
was paid to the implications of Harper’s family policy agenda for the role of women in society. 
Moreover, despite Canada’s birth rate hovering well below replacement level, there was 
virtually no discussion of the link between family policy generosity and fertility. Finally, in stark 
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contrast to the German coverage, there was no perceptible discourse tying the issue to the 
socio-cultural integration of immigrants and their children. This despite Canada sustaining the 
sixth largest per capita immigrant population in the OECD (“Foreign Born Population” 2016) and 
arguably its most ethno-culturally diverse populace (Fearon 2003).8 
 The empirical results of my content analysis support my overarching argument that two 
factors were instrumental in shaping the discourse in Germany, and therein creating a public 
opinion environment that was more favorable to the employment-supporting family policy 
reforms (and more hostile to the continuation of a conservative trajectory). The first was the 
visibility of women—such as Chancellor Merkel and Family Ministers Ursula von der Leyen 
(2005 – 2009) and Kristina Schröder (2009 – 2013)—in the CDU leadership structure. News 
stories were often framed around the life experiences of these women, who themselves had 
experienced the trade-offs between work and family aspirations. This sparked a broader 
discourse about how to make such trade-offs less severe. Secondly, the efforts to tie the issue 
to the (non-)integration of migrant communities reflected an increasingly open ambivalence 
towards multiculturalism in the German zeitgeist. The salience of these themes tilted German 
public opinion even further against the Betreuungsgeld. By contrast, with such frames non-
existent in Canada, there was less of a groundswell for universal daycare9 and other maternal 
employment-supporting family policies. This allowed the Harper Government to proceed with 
                                                          
8 Canada ranks first among industrialized countries in Fearon’s (2003) index of ethnic diversity. The index measures 
diversity using a composite measure of the number of distinct ethnic groups comprising more than one percent of 
the population and linguistic heterogeneity.    
 
9 There’s some evidence that popular enthusiasm for universal daycare in fact waned as concerns surrounding the 
cost and quality of Québec’s long-running daycare program came to light (see: Baker et al 2015; Yglesias 2015) 
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an electorally advantageous strategy of doling out highly visible family benefits to pivotal ‘swing 
voters’, ultimately coaxing the other parties to follow its lead.  
 In sum, this project reaffirms pre-existing scholarship that emphasizes the significance 
of substantive women’s representation (particularly at the cabinet level) as a catalyst for the 
adoption of women-friendly family policies (Atchison and Down 2009; Mavisakalyan 2012; 
Morgan 2013) but also uncovers a heretofore underexplored relationship between the politics 
of migration and family policy.10 It is evident from my analysis that one of the most perceptible 
discourses in favor of the Nordic model (and, just as importantly, against the creation of a new 
direct payment to parents) in Germany involved the assimilation of migrant communities. Yet 
this frame was completely absent in Canada, where citizens are more broadly supportive of the 
notion of multiculturalism.  
 
1.2. A Note on Case Selection and Comparability  
Canada and Germany are a suitable pairing for this project because the two countries 
exhibit a number of parallels that are relevant to the topic at hand. Centrally, both were 
governed by strong conservative leaders through the time period in focus (2005-2015). Stephen 
Harper and Angela Merkel followed broadly similar political trajectories since each came to 
power in the mid-2000s. Through incremental gains forged via three electoral victories apiece, 
Harper and Merkel were each able to parlay precarious governing minorities into formidable 
ruling blocs. Harper’s final administration was a comfortable majority government, 
                                                          
10 Notwithstanding a sizeable literature on welfare chauvinism in present-day Europe. See Van Der Waal et al. 




commanding 54% of all seats in Canada’s Parliament. Similarly, Merkel’s CDU-CSU alliance fell 
just short of an outright legislative majority in Germany’s latest federal election (2013), netting 
slightly over 49% of total Bundestag seats (see Figure 1.1).11   
 
Figure 1.1 – Governing party seat share in Canada and Germany (2005-2013) 
 
Theoretically, one would not expect large-scale family policy reforms to rank high on a 
right-party’s governing agenda—especially when such reforms reflect a departure from past 
approaches. Issues like child care and family tax subsidies have the potential to divide the 
socially conservative and neoliberal wings of modern right parties and, as such, would be an 
area for leadership to avoid. Moreover, the strongest advocates of family policy expansion have 
historically been feminists and organized labor groups (Huber and Stephens 2001), two 
constituencies that would be unlikely to support a conservative political party under most 
circumstances. At face value, conservative governments would have little strategic incentive to 
prioritize and prime new social spending for families. It is therefore puzzling that Harper and 
Merkel governments would each devote considerable financial and political resources to both 
                                                          
11 Though not a nominal majority, the CDU-CSU’s 2013 margin of victory gave Merkel a strong popular mandate to 







Governing Party Seat Share
CPC (Harper) CDU/CSU (Merkel)
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expanding the scope of family policy and emphasizing their respective accomplishments in the 
area.  
The cases also share a number of core institutional similarities. Canada and Germany are 
both bicameral12 and highly-decentralized federal entities. The latter is especially significant as 
subnational governments in both countries retain significant jurisdiction over social policy, 
creating a potential veto point for the relevant reforms. Moreover, although Germany uses a 
proportional system of voting and Canada a majoritarian one, both countries have produced 
robust multiparty systems at the federal level. There are four electorally relevant political 
parties in Canada and five in Germany (see Figure 1.2 for an illustration). Both countries are also 
home to influential and well-respected constitutional courts (Vanberg 2004; Songer 2008).13 
Given the financial commitment associated with family policy expansion, it is also worth noting 
that Canada and Germany have been the two top-performing G-7 economies since the global 
financial crisis of 2007/08.14 This means that, unlike many of their neighbors, neither has faced 
overwhelming pressure to enact austerity measures, leaving the door open to at least modest 
increases in social spending. 
                                                          
12 Germany is more strongly bicameral than Canada, but this does not greatly complicate my research designs as 
family policy reforms have gone further in Germany, where they would theoretically be more difficult to 
implement. 
 
13 One court case of relevance to this study is The German Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision in June 2015 
to strike down the Betreuungsgeld, a controversial monthly subsidy to stay-at-home parents. The court ruled that 
Germany’s federal government lacked the spending authority to distribute the subsidy (Gesley 2015). 
 
14 Canada and Germany have been the only two G-7 countries to retain a Triple-A credit rating throughout the 




Figure 1.2 - Legislative Seat Share in Canada (2006) and Germany (2005) (Wikimedia Commons) 
 
Further, Canada and Germany each fall below cross-national benchmarks in the relevant 
domain of fertility, as Figure 1.3 illustrates. Canada lags all other liberal welfare states with a 
total fertility rate that has hovered around 1.6 births per woman (bpw) since 2000.15 Moreover, 
Germany’s demographic plight has been well documented as it recently supplanted Japan as 
home to the world’s lowest domestic birth rate (BBC 2015). As noted by Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen (2011), dwindling birth rates may push ideologically conservative governments into 
pursuing social policies that make it more practical for women to reconcile work with 
reproduction. While there is more evidence of this being the case in Germany than in Canada, it 
is nevertheless theoretically important to note that low domestic birth rates could be construed 
as a social problem in either country. 
 
                                                          




     Figure 1.3 – Fertility rate (bpw) by region, 2000-13 (World Bank) 
  
This stated, one notable asymmetry is the fact that Germany has historically lagged 
Canada in the category of female labor force participation—although it has caught up 
considerably over the 2000s (see Figure 1.4). This could affect the distribution of family policies 
in one of two ways: A preponderance of women in the workforce could motivate the Canadian 
government to pursue accommodating family policies or, conversely, German policymakers 
may be inclined to implement such policies in order to coax more women into working outside 
of home. The data indicate the latter as Germany’s female labor participation rate has 
increased by nearly 10% since 2000. This suggests that the recent family policy reforms have 
enabled more German women to pursue paid employment. However, one area where this 
trend is reversed is in the political realm, where Germany comes much closer to gender parity. 
Presently, 37% of German federal legislators and 26% of Canadian ones are female (World Bank 
2015).16 Accordingly, I argue here that some of the variation between the two cases can be 
                                                          
16 Two of Germany’s four largest parties, the SPD and Greens, have established formal quotas for the 
representation of women on electoral list (40% and 50%, respectively). The CDU has established a non-binding 
‘quorum’, advising that at least one-third of electoral list candidates be female (Davidson-Schmich 2006, p. 214).  
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explained by higher levels of participation and visibility of German women in both party 




                          Figure 1.4 – Female labor force participation (%) in Canada and Germany, 2000-2014  (OECD.stat) 
 
  
Lastly, and perhaps most pivotally, the respective narratives of family policy reform in 
Germany and Canada display a temporal symmetry, which makes them amenable to this type 
of research design. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the policy options of universal 
daycare and direct family cash transfers were each on the table in both countries. Yet it was 
daycare that ultimately won out in Germany and cash transfers that prevailed in Canada. In 
other words, the Merkel and Harper governments went in opposite directions. This symmetry 
provides me with a unique opportunity to go back to critical junctures in each country and trace 
out sources of variation. This, I contend, is the core strength of my chosen research design and 
















 In sum, Germany and Canada demonstrate a robust set of similarities that are relevant 
to the topic at hand. Critically, both were home to incumbent conservative governments that, 
over the observed timeframe, uncharacteristically pushed to expand family policy. This makes 
my cases a suitable paring for a comparative study of why, when, and how right governments 
may pursue social policy expansion. 
 
1.3. Plan of the Dissertation 
 The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter two I provide a review of the 
extant literature and more formally elucidate my puzzle and its theoretical significance. 
Chapters three and four, respectively, track the historical evolution of family policy in each 
country. My account of Canada in chapter three is heavily informed by a set of twenty-five elite 
interviews I conducted between 2016 and 2018. My pool of interviewees comprises a broad set 
of experts, based across the country, in the fields of policy, consulting, advocacy, and research. 
These include: strategists, policy advisors, former civil servants, non-profit executives, and a 
former federal cabinet minister. In chapter five I present my statistical topic model of print 
media coverage of family policy in each country, showing that frames involving gender and 
multiculturalism were significantly more prominent in the German debate.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE PUZZLE 
 Since the late twentieth century, some of the most substantial additions to the welfare 
state edifice have come in the form of new family policies. Yet the recent episodes of family 
policy expansion that have occurred across rich OECD countries have taken shape in a manner 
that cannot be fully accounted for by conventional theories of the welfare state. The 
partisanship-oriented theories that have elucidated other epochs of social policy expansion 
(Pierson 1995, 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001) provide only limited insight into how these new 
reforms have unfolded (see Mätzke and Ostner 2010a, 2010b). Gender-based explanations 
emanating from the feminist literature offer a similarly incomplete view (Lambert 2008; 
Atchison and Down 2009; Atchison 2010). The inability of existing approaches to fully grapple 
with this “silent revolution” of family policy expansion (see Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015) 
necessitates a focused examination of how this process has taken root in unlikely 
environments.  
 In this chapter, I illustrate the shortcomings of the existing mainstream and feminist 
social policy literatures in terms of explaining recent and ongoing family policy reform patterns. 
Accordingly, I introduce two newer literatures—namely, issue entrepreneurship and the 
migration/welfare state nexus—which provide for a greater amount of insight into this puzzle. I 
then more formally explicate the theoretical puzzle presented by the reforms observed in each 
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 of my country cases, present my research hypotheses, and outline the basic logic of my 
comparative analytical strategy. 
 
 2.1. The Extant Literature 
 The recent innovations in family policy are typically viewed as one aspect of the ongoing 
adaptation of mature welfare states to the emergence of new social risks (NSRs). (Taylor-Gooby 
2004; Bonoli 2005). In contrast to the “old” social risks that the first generation of welfare state 
institutions were built to address (i.e.: aging, sickness, and disability), NSRs are largely a product 
of state maturation itself. To be precise, NSRs stem from concurrent demographic, 
macroeconomic, and cultural transformations ongoing in most affluent countries. These include 
population aging, the phasing out of the male-breadwinner manufacturing economy in favor of 
a lower wage services-oriented jobs environment, and the breakdown of the traditional 
gendered division of labor.17 The last of these is arguably the primary catalyst for the recent 
changes to family policy. With women taking a more active role in all aspects of the formal 
economy—out of both choice and necessity—and subsequently devoting less time to 
household activities, post-industrial governments have come under increasing pressure to 
devise policies that make it easier for parents (mothers in particular) to balance paid work with 
their child rearing obligations. This is an especially strong policy imperative in countries that 
have seen declining birth rates and increasing financial strains on social supports for older 
citizens over the past several decades (See: Henninger et al. 2008; Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 
2011).  
                                                          
17 Between male industrial labor and female household labor.  
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The recent family policy reforms are also related to the advent of the social investment 
policy paradigm (itself a response to the increasing salience of NSRs). Proponents of the social 
investment approach advocate strategic investments in human capital aimed at generating 
better long-run economic outcomes. Many of them argue that investments in various family 
policies do just this as they simultaneously allow women to become fuller participants in the 
economy and may provide young children with healthier emotional and intellectual 
environments (for instance, through high quality, center-based daycare or subsidies to make 
extra-curricular activities more affordable),18 leading to better career opportunities later in life 
(Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003; Esping-Andersen 2009). Although it is important to note that 
not all of the recent family policy reforms are consistent with social investment objectives 
(Schwander 2018),19 the ideational shift (among both policymakers and experts) to the 
paradigm has undoubtedly promoted a more child and youth centered social policy discourse 
that favors family policy interventions over other forms of social spending (see: Jenson 2008, 
2009). 
 The project’s focus on family policy—a domain that, to feminists and other critical 
observers, is intrinsically linked to the liberation of mothers and other female caregivers from 
the “private sphere” of domestic exploitation—also necessitates proper engagement with the 
                                                          
18 There is some evidence of the opposite being the case in the Canadian context. Baker et al. (2015) find that the 
introduction of universal child care in the province of Québec generated a “sizeable negative shock in non-
cognitive skills” among young residents. Versus their contemporaries in other provinces, Québecois children who 
came of age following the introduction of the program in 1997 were found to have poorer health outcomes, lower 
life satisfaction, and a higher propensity for criminal activity later in life. The study, which was published just prior 
to Canada’s 2015 election, attracted significant media attention during the campaign (see: Gordon 2015). 
  
19 Schwander (2018, p. 25) identifies Germany’s Betreuungsgeld as a recent family policy reform that violates social 
investment principles. She states the same of measures instituted in France, during the 1980s and 1990s, to 
encourage low-skilled mothers to withdraw from the (oversupplied) labor force (p. 11). 
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long-running feminist20 literature on gender and the welfare state. While I do not anticipate my 
findings to bear significant implications for feminist scholars, it is nevertheless necessary for me 
to acknowledge the origins of this agenda within the gender studies tradition. As such, I begin 
with a review of gendered perspectives on the welfare state and their influence on how family 
policy has subsequently been studied. 
 
Gender and the welfare state 
 Feminist scholars have long approached the archetypal welfare state with a marked 
ambivalence. This unease is rooted in the observation that the bulk of mainstream welfare 
state theory has been built on an initially unstated assumption of the industrial male worker as 
its core microsocial unit of analysis. This, feminists argue, has led analysts of the welfare state—
especially those working within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “welfare regimes” paradigm—to 
focus too narrowly on the effects of social policies on the well-being of working class males, 
turning a blind-eye to their reverberating impacts on women, both within and outside of the 
labor force (Morgan 2001, p. 107). Relatedly, feminists have criticized the modern welfare state 
for generally reinforcing the traditional separation of the public and domestic spheres, 
essentially ceding the latter as off-limits to state intervention.21 This is especially problematic 
for feminists, who view the two realms as inherently connected by a patriarchal social structure 
                                                          
20 Following O’Connor et al. (1999, p. 10) I use the term “feminist” here to “describe scholarship that uses gender 
as an analytic category and/or focuses on the situation of women.”    
 
21 The obvious exception here is the Scandinavian welfare state, which has long embraced a dual earner household 
model characterized by generous parental leave policies and universal daycare. Some feminists have nevertheless 
criticized this model for making many parental benefits contingent on labor force participation, thereby 
disadvantaging mothers who choose to stay at home (Morgan 2001, p. 120). Scholars have also raised concerns 
about the high level of sex-segregation in the Scandinavian labor force (Estevez-Abe 2007).   
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that ascribes monetary value to male industrial labor but not female household labor (Pateman 
1988). 
 A second generation of feminist work perceived the welfare state more charitably as an 
imperfect yet potentially valuable resource for feminist reformers. This view was heavily 
shaped by Norwegian political scientist Helga Hernes’ (1987) conceptualization of the “women-
friendly state”, which Hernes defines as one that “would not force harder choices on women 
than on men, or permit unjust treatment on the basis of sex.” (p. 15). Central to this definition 
is the imperative of social policies that empower women to balance motherhood with labor 
market participation and other life aspirations: “In a woman-friendly state women will continue 
to have children, yet there will also be other roads to self-realization open to them.” (p. 15). 
Hernes saw her native Norway and its Scandinavian neighbours as the states that came closest 
to embodying this ideal, generally echoing the sentiment of “Nordic exceptionalism” espoused 
by some of her mainstream counterparts (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2002; Stephens 1995). Her 
pioneering work nevertheless launched a robust research agenda on the prospects for positive 
feminist engagement with the state. 
One offshoot is comparative state feminism, which focuses on the potential influence of 
sympathetic state institutions, especially those with a formal mandate to advance women’s 
causes. Analysts of state feminism (Stetson and Mazur 1995; McBride and Mazur 2010), or 
“feminism from above”, contend that women’s movements can strategically use such entry 
points to gain access to policy arenas and subsequently attain their policy objectives (McBride 
and Mazur 2010, p. 5). The framework has since been used more broadly to identify 
circumstances where the political opportunity structure is most favorable for would-be 
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reformers (McBride and Mazur 2010, pp. 5-6). Scholars of state feminism have accordingly 
identified periods of left government as crucial windows for would-be reformers (McBride and 
Mazur 2010; O’Connor 2015). Leading feminist scholar Julia O’Connor (2015) in fact uses the 
example of Canada under the Harper government to substantiate this point, writing: “the key 
influence [in developing gender equality structures] is the strength of left-parties, and, more 
broadly, non-right parties, as illustrated by the Canadian federal level” and “[t]he role of right-
wing parties in the retrenchment of women’s policy machinery is most strongly evident in 
Australia [under John Howard] and Canada.” (p. 494).  
 Though certainly no friend to state feminists, Harper nonetheless showed a desire to be 
perceived as attentive to the needs of at least a certain subset of Canadian women by making 
family policy a focal point of his governing agenda. Rather than sweep women’s issues under 
the rug entirely—as feminist theory would have predicted for a neoliberal right party—Harper 
chose instead to stake his political fortunes on his own vision of family-friendly social policy.22 
Interestingly, Harper and his surrogates frequently utilized a discourse of “choice” rooted in 
liberal feminism to frame the reforms (Richardson 2012; Rinehart 2008). The feminist view also 
clashes with the governing record of Germany’ Christian Democrats who, as I will discuss in 
further detail below, have assertively claimed credit for a sweeping set of universalistic family 
policy reforms implemented during their time at the helm of government.  
                                                          
22 Harper showed similar instincts by spearheading a major G8 initiative on maternal and child health. The 
Muskoka Initiative, announced at a 2010 G8 summit in Huntsville, Ontario, entailed a $7.3-billion [Canadian] 
investment in various maternal, newborn, and early childhood health programs concentrated in Africa and other 
parts of the developing world. Canada led the way with a $2.85-billion contribution to the initiative between 2010 
and 2015 (Global Affairs Canada 2014). The Harper government also hosted a 2014 global conference on maternal 
and child health issues held in Toronto. 
22 
 
 As mentioned above, scholars have also utilized overlapping literatures on NSRs and 
social investment to explain recent patterns of family policy reform. The latter concept, which 
posits a positive association between strategic social spending (especially early investments in 
human capital) and long run economic development, presents an especially strong logical basis 
for the utilization of various family policy instruments. It also gives politicians a powerful 
rhetoric of ‘common sense’ with which to frame new initiatives (Morel et al. 2012, pp. 8-9; 
Hemerijck 2015, p. 253). Accordingly, I now turn to the rise of the social investment paradigm 
and its relevance to my research topic. 
 
Social Investment and New Social Risks 
Although the concept of social investment can be traced back to the Nordic political 
thought of the interwar years (Myrdal and Myrdal 1934), the idea has enjoyed a renaissance 
over the past two decades due to widespread disillusionment with both neoliberal and 
Keynesian approaches to social policy.23 Social investment can be generally understood as a 
hybrid of the two schools, presenting a positive relationship between activation-oriented social 
spending and the long-run neoliberal objectives of economic growth and market efficiency.  
As its name indicates, social investment’s defining feature is its future-orientation. Its 
proponents argue accordingly that prudent investments in human capital—especially when 
directed to children and youth—will result in better socio-economic outcomes down the road 
(Morel et al. 2012, p. 11); for instance, that investments in better public education will 
                                                          
23 The term ‘social investment’ was formally coined by British sociologist Anthony Giddens, a principal architect of 
the ‘Third Way’ agenda pursued by Britain’s New Labour government (1997-2010).  
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ultimately produce a more highly-skilled and adaptable workforce. This view gives primacy to 
daycare and other social services for pre-primary aged children, particularly in light of recent 
scientific research that finds that a child’s earliest years are its most critical for cognitive and 
emotional development (National Scientific Council on the Developing Child 2004).24 Such 
interventions have the additional benefit of ‘activating’ female workers, whose child-rearing 
obligations would otherwise sideline them from the labor market. In all, social investment 
provides a powerful economic rationale for the implementation of child and family-supporting 
policies.         
Social investment is not without its detractors. In fact, some of the most trenchant 
criticisms of the paradigm come from feminist scholars, who object to its instrumentalization of 
gender equalization policies—centrally those that cater to working women—as a rather crude 
means to attain various economic ends, such as increasing the taxpayer base and boosting 
domestic birth rates. This gives second-billing to the more foundational social justice aspects of 
the feminist agenda (Morel et al. 2012, p.16). Some feminists have also argued that the child-
centric character of social investment essentially reduces women to their reproductive 
capacities (Jenson 2009). In other words, social investment prioritizes the function of women as 
mothers, caregivers, and workers over their personal needs as citizens. One more purely 
economic objection to social investment is that, in its emphasis on activation-oriented human 
capital building, it helps to normalize the low wage environment surrounding unskilled and 
semi-skilled jobs in the neoliberal economic paradigm (McKeen 2007, p. 60).  
                                                          
24 Since the late 1990s the OECD and other expert groups have increasingly used the term Early Childhood 
Education and Care (ECEC) to emphasize the educational component of daycare and other formal services for pre-
primary aged children (see White 2011, p. 10).  
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Such reservations have not slowed social investment’s momentum. In fact, the cross-
national diffusion of the social investment paradigm—promoted heavily by the EU and OECD—
(see White 2011), coupled with an increasing tendency for political parties to actively court 
female voters (Morgan 2013), has made family policy the site of much recent political activity. 
Reconciliation-oriented family policies like equitably compensated maternity leave and pre-
kindergarten programs have garnered broad-based political support. Some governments have 
also embraced the more contentious social investment oriented position that widely-available 
public daycare, accessible from infancy, constitutes vital ‘early childhood education’ that will 
ultimately help young children become more cognitively and emotionally equipped for formal 
schooling (Heckman 2006; Morgan 2012; cf. Baker et al. 2015). Others, acting on more 
conservative political motives, have reluctantly pursued generous family policies in an attempt 
to shore-up lagging domestic birth rates (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011; Oliver and Mätzke 
2014).  
Accordingly, a strong pattern of family policy expansion was traced out empirically in a 
recent study by Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2015). Using a statistical mapping technique 
called multiple correspondence analysis the authors found that all rich OECD countries, with 
the exception of the United States, have made significant investments in family policy between 
1980 and 2008 — precisely the time period when the welfare state was purportedly in retreat. 
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser call this ongoing phenomenon a “silent revolution”.    
 This OECD-wide wave of reforms has led a number of scholars to investigate the 
possibility of a cross-national convergence on family policy, driven by either the ideational 
diffusion of ‘best practices’ (Verloo 2005; Annesley 2007; Jenson 2010; White 2010), 
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globalization (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Olsen 2007), or common socio-economic and 
demographic pressures (i.e.: NSRs) (Bonoli 2005). However, efforts to test the convergence 
hypothesis empirically show that domestic political alignments and institutional legacies still 
condition country-specific responses to the external and internal pressures to create new family 
policies (Gauthier 2002; Schmidt and Starke 2011; Mahon et al. 2012; Kazepov and Ranci 2017). 
Partisan arrangements in particular can be pivotal in shaping family policy regimes. For 
instance, Rianne Mahon et al. (2012) find that, due to the continued influence of the agrarian, 
socially conservative Center Party, Finland has followed a more transfer-based, conservative 
family policy trajectory than the other Nordic countries (p. 425). 
In sum, despite the hype surrounding social investment as an ideologically unifying 
paradigm, the extant literature continues to present domestic politics as a key driver of family 
policy outcomes. Moreover, new social risks centered theories, which posit population aging, 
declining fertility rates, and other demographic pressures as the main drivers of family policy 
reform fail to explain the timing and composition of policy changes—which, again, shifts the 
analytical focus to domestic political contestation. Low birth rates, for instance, may persist for 
decades before being constructed as a political problem by policy elites (Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen 2011). 25  
 
 
                                                          
25 Despite a low domestic birth rate, Canada’s high intake of immigrants has allowed it to sustain an annual 
population growth rate of just over one percent [2010-2014]. This places it well above the OECD average of 
roughly 0.6% per year (OECD 2013). Natalist rhetoric was present in the German child care debate but natalism 





2.2. New Perspectives   
Issue Competition 
As a cross-national policy ‘convergence’ based on common ideational and structural 
pressures appears unlikely, scholars have consequently devoted significant attention to the 
within-country partisan politics of family policy. Much of this work focuses on the electoral 
incentives of office-seeking parties to deliver new family policies, especially as part of a broader 
strategy to attract younger female supporters (Annesley 2010; Williarty 2010; von Wahl 2011; 
Morgan 2013). The general argument here is that a cross-national rise in female labor force 
participation, coupled with the deterioration of traditional class and religion-based political 
cleavages (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967), has motivated parties to target politically unattached 
female voters—namely young and highly-educated women.26 They have done this through a 
two-pronged approach: first by recruiting more women as candidates and operatives and, 
secondly, by priming political issues calculated to appeal to working women. These mechanisms 
are, of course, interconnected as it is often the women within party organizations who identify 
and champion women-friendly policies (Williarty 2010; Morgan 2013). Female candidates 
themselves may benefit electorally from a heightened public salience of family policy as it has 
been shown, in the American political context, that voters often unconsciously perceive women 
as more competent at dealing with “feminine” issues relating to compassion and social welfare 
(Herrnson et al. 2003; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). 
                                                          
26 Older women and those who have remained outside of the labor force remain a core voting constituency for 
conservative and Christian-democratic parties in most mature democracies (Inglehart and Norris 2000; 




While left and center parties have generally been the more enthusiastic proponents of 
new family policies (Hemerijck 2015, p. 253),27 the literature on issue competition and family 
policy (see Schwander 2018 for a review) provides at least one important case study of a right 
party taking the lead: the reform agenda pursued in Germany by CDU-affiliated Family Minister 
Ursula von der Leyen. During her time at the helm of the family ministry between 2005 and 
2009, von der Leyen oversaw a ‘Swedification’ of Germany’s parental leave system and a 
sizeable expansion of the availability of publicly-subsidized child care for children under three—
becoming one of the country’s most visible political figures in the process. Though controversial 
within the CDU/CSU itself, the family policy agenda resonated with voters and helped the party 
regain its historical advantage among women in the 2009 election.28 
Given von der Leyen’s anomalous image as a married, conservative mother of seven 
who nevertheless championed the most progressive set of family policy reforms in Germany’s 
history, her performance as family minister has naturally been the focus of a number of recent 
scholarly accounts. This literature emphasizes the relevance of leadership (von Wahl 2011), the 
inclusion of women in internal party decision-making structures (Wiliarty 2010, 2013), and 
party competition (Fleckenstein 2011; Morgan 2013; Seeleib-Kaiser 2010), but also 
characterizes the German case as something of a ‘perfect storm’ made possible by the presence 
of a female (and Eastern) chancellor and an uncommonly skilled family minister (see von Wahl 
2011). These studies are important, and I echo several of their findings here, but I hope to offer 
                                                          
27 Schwander (2018, p. 9) argues that center-left parties have been quicker to embrace social investment-oriented 
family policy reforms due, in part, to increased electoral competition from “left-libertarian” (i.e.: Green) parties.  
 
28 Women were 0.2% less likely than men to vote for the CDU in the 2005 election and 4.8% more likely (versus 
men) to support the CDU at the polls in 2009 (Wiliarty 2013, p. 175). 
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further insight into the incipient phenomenon of ‘family policy reform from the right’ by 
juxtaposing the German narrative with Canada’s experience with family policy under the Harper 
Government (2006 – 2015).   
Although nowhere near as ‘female-friendly’ as the policy package delivered by von der 
Leyen, the family policies put in place by the Harper government still constituted a substantial 
investment of both financial and political capital and, collectively, meaningfully altered the 
trajectory of Canada’s family policy regime. Identifying child care as a potential weak spot for 
the then governing Liberal Party (Interviewee no. 1, 17 June 2016), the Harper Conservatives 
made their proposed universal child benefit a focal point of their first successful election 
campaign. They were rewarded for this strategy when an errant soundbite on the benefit from 
a top Liberal strategist29 proved to be one of the campaign’s major gaffes. Once in office, 
Harper continued to use family policies instrumentally to attract new voters, showing a special 
affinity for microtargeted ‘boutique’ family tax credits. The significance of family policy to 
Harper’s governing agenda was ultimately reflected in dollars as federal support for child care 
grew almost tenfold (Malanik 2015, p. 3) under Harper and total federal spending on child 
benefits reached approximately one percent of GDP (Malanik 2016, p. 6).  
In sum, the Canadian case presents a timely addition to the incipient issue competition 
literature as it provides a scenario in which a modern conservative party used family policy in a 
politically advantageous manner, yet without embracing an especially feminist political 
                                                          
29 This refers to Liberal Party communication director Scott Reid’s televised assertion that parents would blow the 
proposed child benefit on ‘beer and popcorn’ (see Section 3.8). 
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orientation. This indicates that there are a number of possible strategies and potential 
constituencies for parties that seek to utilize new family policies electorally.  
 
The Migration-Social Policy Nexus 
Some of the remaining gaps can be addressed by incorporating a final literature that 
explores how Western welfare states have responded to new pressures posed by non-Western 
immigration. Recent influxes of foreigners have challenged welfare states by complicating the 
historically language and ethnicity-based claims on shared community membership that have 
been used to justify redistributive social policies (Kymlicka 2015, p.4). Further, some migrant 
populations retain cultural values that are perceived to be inconsistent with the principles 
embodied in Western welfare regimes, for instance female participation in the full-time labor 
market. Some observers have also expressed concerns that generous social policies may 
produce an unintended “magnet effect”, attracting economically draining or otherwise socially 
undesirable benefit-seeking immigrants (Bauböck and Scholten 2016, p. 5). The specter of 
parasitic “free rider” migrants, although empirically dubious,30 is now a common trope in 
European political discourses and has been a boon to right wing populist parties throughout the 
continent. These parties, and increasingly the mainstream right parties that compete against 
them for votes, have embraced the philosophy of welfare chauvinism: a distinct form of welfare 
                                                          
30 Empirical studies show consistently that migrants to OECD countries pay more in taxes and social security 





state dualism that’s premised on systematically excluding immigrants from various welfare 
benefits and social services.  
At face value, this suggests that ethno-cultural diversification steadily erodes the social 
solidarity necessary to sustain a redistributive welfare state. However, while the notion of a 
“progressive’s dilemma” between multiculturalism and a functional welfare state is now 
ubiquitous in both academic and popular discourses, serious empirical work reveals a more 
complicated dynamic at play. Opinion surveys show that people consistently view immigrants 
as less deserving of welfare benefits than nationals (Van Oorschot 2000, 2006), but this anti-
immigrant sentiment appears to be strongest in the liberal31 and conservative welfare states 
(Van Der Waal et al. 2013, pp. 12, 15), where entitlements are already most meager and 
selective, respectively. Moreover, there doesn’t appear to be any stable empirical relationship 
between a given country’s ethnic heterogeneity and natives’ opinions on whether or not 
immigrants should be entitled to social benefits (Der Waal et al. 2013, p. 12). If the 
“progressive’s dilemma” hypothesis were valid, we would expect to see the most negative 
attitudes towards immigrant benefit-seekers in the most ethnically diverse and generous 
welfare states. 
As the opinion data indicate, immigration has generated more sophisticated feedback 
effects in the Nordic welfare states. The Nordic countries have, in particular, struggled to 
reconcile their universalistic, dual earner supporting welfare state institutions with the 
traditional male breadwinner/female caregiver norms held by various immigrant groups, most 
                                                          
31 One exception to this general pattern is Canada, where studies of public opinion have consistently “remarkably 
little tension between ethnic diversity and support for social programs” (Banting 2010, pp. 798-799). 
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visibly those who arrived from Muslim-majority countries (Langvasbråten 2008; Vuori 2009; 
Joppke 2014). This, paradoxically, may be pushing the Nordic welfare states in an even more 
universalistic direction as the imperative of ‘activating’ underemployed migrant women has 
been invoked in recent Scandinavian social policy debates (Langvasbråten 2008; Grødem 2016). 
There is, in fact, some evidence that this frame was used successfully by progressives to help 
roll back ‘cash for care’ schemes and other stay-at-home parent supporting initiatives 
introduced by the center-right governing coalitions that held power across the Nordic countries 
at various points in the late 1990s and 2000s (Bungum and Kvande 2013; Grødem 2016). At the 
same time, the gap between the enrollment of national and non-national children in daycare 
has narrowed significantly within the region (Andersen 2007, p. 261; Bremberg 2009, p. 679). 
 I’m aware of only one study that explores the precise effects of this new ambivalence 
over immigration on family-oriented social policies: Anne Skevik Grødem’s (2016) assessment 
of the effects of the international migration discourse on the trajectory of family policy reforms 
in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark through the 2000s. Grødem laments that “the welfare 
chauvinism debate has so far been remarkably silent on gender and family issues” as “[family] 
benefits embody certain normative tensions that other social policies do not.” (pp. 1-2). By this, 
she means that family policies are most often deliberately crafted to support specific ideal-
typical familial arrangements. For instance, the ‘dual earner’ focused Nordic family policy model 
caters to families where both parents work full time and rely on state-subsidized daycare and 
other public services for their children. Grødem in fact focuses on the Scandinavian countries 
because the gender egalitarian norms entrenched in the Nordic model clash most dramatically 
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with the traditional notions of defined gender roles that are putatively held within various 
migrant communities (p. 2).   
 Grødem finds that, in both Norway and Sweden, expert committees on integration 
played an important agenda setting role in highlighting the alienating effect that various family 
policies had on migrants (and especially migrant women). These committees also helped 
facilitate a cross-partisan, evidence-based consensus on relevant reforms, which ultimately 
took place rapidly and with “remarkably little debate” (p. 10).32 The situation is more 
complicated in Denmark, where immigration is more heavily politicized. However, even here 
welfare chauvinists, led by the right-populist Danish People’s Party, have focused on making it 
more difficult for migrants to qualify for conditional cash benefits (pp. 9-10).33 Access to more 
universalistic social services, such as daycare, has even been enhanced for most migrant 
families in Denmark (Andersen 2007, p. 262).  
Grødem’s observes that homemaker-supporting ‘cash-for-care’ allowances are a more 
contentious issue for both nativists and integrationists. She notes that the debate over whether 
to provide direct cash benefits to stay-at-home parents was “already heated” before questions 
                                                          
32 In Sweden, where the experts found that lengthy parental leave entitlements impeded the incorporation of 
migrant women into the labor force, the government and opposition parties agreed to reduce the number of leave 
days available following the child’s fourth birthday by 80% (from 480 days to 96 days) (Grødem 2016, p. 8). In 
Norway, the integration committee findings led to activation-oriented reforms of single parent and disability 
allowances (Grødem 2016, pp. 6-7).  
 
33 Most visibly, Denmark’s center-right governing coalition (2001 – 2011) introduced a diminished social assistance 
benefit called starthjælp (“start assistance”) for any claimant who had not lived in Denmark for at least seven of 
the preceding eight years (Grødem 2016, pp. 8-9). However, Andersen (2007) finds that starthjælp and other 
benefit tightening measures did not, in themselves, reflect a change in trajectory away from welfare universalism. 
Taking into account social spending as a whole, he concludes “if anything, the [Danish] welfare state has become 
even more inclusive in recent years.” (p. 262). Moreover, all of these measures were abolished when the center-





related to migrant integration were introduced, pitting feminists and social investment 
advocates against the libertarian and socially conservative proponents of parental “freedom of 
choice” (p. 10).34 Grødem nevertheless acknowledges that the increased visibility of migrant 
integration as a political issue has affected the rhetorical strategies that parties use to defend 
their respective positions on cash-for-care allowances. For instance, the leader of Sweden’s 
centrist Folkpartiet cited his concerns about a ‘poverty trap’ for immigrant women as a 
rationale for his party’s decision to withdraw its support from the cash-for-care alliance in 2016. 
This defection effectively killed the program (p. 9). 
  Grødem’s research presents a key point of departure for this study, as I effectively test 
whether her findings travel outside of the Scandinavian countries. As I will explain in further 
detail below, I find that integration was a non-trivial consideration in Germany’s family policy 
debate but was largely absent in the Canadian policy discourse. This explains, in part, why 
Germany’s ‘cash for care’ scheme (the Betreuungsgeld) failed while, in Canada, a similar 
program (the UCCB) not only survived but was embraced by the opposition parties and largely 
retained by the successor government. In all, my findings reaffirm the connection that Grødem 
makes between migration discourses and family policy. Moreover, like Grødem, I identify (in 
the German case) a dynamic wherein concerns over the integration of migrants are used to 
support universalistic family policy reforms—a direct contradiction of the welfare chauvinism 
hypothesis. This phenomenon is even more striking in Germany, which lacks Scandinavia’s long 
tradition of gender egalitarianism. 
 
                                                          
34 Populist right parties in Scandinavia have generally supported cash-for-care allowances (Grødem 2016, p. 9; 
Ellingsaetar 2012, p. 44). 
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2.3. Lacunae and Research Puzzle 
 As noted in the previous section, one particular shortcoming of both the feminist and 
social investment literatures on family policy is that they each have little to say about what 
specific circumstances may motivate mainstream conservative parties to take the lead on 
family policy expansion. While reforms have taken place across different regime types, the 
protagonists in these narratives are most often left and center parties. Merkel’s Christian 
Democratic government is generally presented as an outlier case, with perhaps too much credit 
ascribed to the presence of women in key elective and civil service positions (Williarty 2010; 
von Wahl 2011; Fleckenstein 2011; Morgan 2013). For instance, one prominent scholar calls 
Germany’s family policy paradigm shift “a women’s revolution from above” (von Wahl 2011).  
 Although I do not contest the well-supported assertion that women’s representation—
in both elective office and high-ranking civil service positions—fosters the development and 
implementation of women-friendly policies (Stetson and Mazur 1995; Childs and Krook 2009; 
Atchison and Down 2009), I believe that the effect of officeholder gender has been overstated 
in multiple scholarly accounts of the CDU’s reorientation towards family policy. Even without 
Chancellor Merkel and other women in high office, the CDU would have had significant 
electoral incentives to change its tone.  
The Christian Democrats’ perceived backwardness on social issues has been identified as 
a principal culprit for its slide at the polls in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Morgan 2013, pp. 
89-90). Moreover, it was around this period of time that Germany’s long stagnant fertility rate 
and underachieving track-record on children’s issues both became widely-acknowledged and 
highly-publicized social problems (Seeleib Kaiser and Toivenen 2011, p. 4; Müller and Wrohlich 
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2014, p. 2) that any electorally-viable party would ultimately have to address. Accordingly, 
Clemens (2009) traces the first stirrings of the CDU’s social policy modernization back to 1998, 
four years before Angela Merkel became the chair of the party. 
The women’s representation narrative is also inconsistent with the governing record of 
Merkel’s second administration, active from 2009 to 2013. The liberal-conservative coalition, 
which consisted of the CDU/CSU alliance and the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP), was 
generally ambivalent about work-family reconciliation policies and ultimately acceded to a 
widely-panned CSU proposal to subsidize stay-at-home mothers through a monthly cash 
transfer called the Betreuungsgeld35 (Henninger and von Wahl 2014). This despite once again 
having both a female chancellor and a female family minister.36 In sum, even if female 
leadership was a necessary condition for Germany’s observed family policy paradigm shift, it 
evidently was not a sufficient one. 
 The Harper government’s decisive action on family policy is an even more confounding 
puzzle, which fits none of the extant theoretical explanations. The usual suspects of women’s 
political mobilization and demographic challenges do not apply here. Women were noticeably 
absent from Harper’s inner circle, in terms of both his cabinet ministers and his leading advisors 
(Ditchburn 2013). This came as Canada’s national women’s movement, starved of public 
                                                          
35 The German Constitutional Court struck down the Betreuugsgeld in July 2015, ruling unanimously that the 
federal government did not have the spending authority to distribute the subsidy (Eddy 2015). 
 
36 The polarizing Kristina Schröder inherited the family portfolio from von der Leyen, who in turn went to the Labor 
ministry. Schröder’s tenure at Family Affairs drew poor reviews from both pundits and the public (Henninger and 





funding (O’Connor 2015, p. 290), sank to its lowest point in three decades (Collier 2015).37 The 
action cannot be explained by demographic push factors either. Despite its low domestic birth 
rate, Canada’s population is growing at a faster pace than that of many other industrial 
countries due to its high intake of immigrants.38 Harper appeared to be at peace with this trend 
as legal immigration increased by roughly fifteen percent per year during his time as prime 
minister (Gunter 2015).  
One other anomaly is that, despite being outwardly neoliberal in orientation, the Harper 
Conservatives pushed family policy into a neo-familial, Christian Democrat-type policy space 
characterized by direct family cash transfers, a universal family allowance, and various tax 
benefits (Ferragina and Seelieb-Kaiser 2014, p. 10). The centerpiece of Harper’s family policy 
package was the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB), a monthly $10039 per child subsidy 
available to all parents with children under the age of six.  The UCCB cost roughly three billion 
dollars (CAD) per year (approx. 0.15% of GDP)40 to administer and its cost was slated to more 
than double by 2017-18 if the conservatives had won the 2015 election (Malanik, p. 1).41 
                                                          
37 Plagued by infighting and financial difficulties, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) 
formally disbanded in 2007, leaving Canadian feminists without a consolidated national organization (Lambert and 
Anderson 2015). O’Connor (2015, p. 490) found that the Harper government either partially or totally defunded 
twenty separate women’s equality organizations. 
 
38 Canada’s current population growth rate of 1.07% per year (2010-2015) is about on par with the global average 
(1.18%). This puts it ahead of close relatives the United States (0.75%) and United Kingdom (0.63%). Germany falls 
near the bottom of global rankings at 0.06% (World Bank 2018).  
 
39 Unless otherwise specified, all monetary figures cited in this document are in (nominal) Canadian dollars (CAD). 
 
40Based on a total GDP of $2 trillion (CAD). See https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/nea/list/gdp. 
     
41 The UCCB was bumped up to $160 per child per month just prior to the 2015 federal election. At the same time, 





Another of the Harper government’s major legislative initiatives was a controversial spousal 
income tax splitting plan that would allow family breadwinners to transfer up to $50,000 to 
their lower-earning spouses for tax purposes. Income splitting came with a price-tag of $2.4 
billion (in forgone tax revenue) for its first year (“Income Splitting: What is it and who benefits” 
2014). 
This family policy push came at the expense of spending in other politically sensitive 
areas. For instance, despite Harper’s hawkish posturing on the Islamic State, Russia’s incursion 
into Ukraine, and other sources of global conflict (see Brewster 2014), he actually presided over 
a long stagnation in defense spending, which endured flat or negative growth over each of his 
last five years as prime minister. By the time Harper left office, the defense budget amounted 
to just one percent of total GDP, placing it in a tie for fifth from last among North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and a full percentage point below the NATO 
recommendation (Pavgi 2015). A similar torpor in the Veterans’ Affairs budget made Harper the 
target of politically damaging attacks about the inadequate treatment of wounded and 
mentally ill veterans (Chase 2015). Some of this criticism came from within his own party.42 
Health care is another area of the federal budget that suffered under Harper. The prime 
minister allowed a ten year, $41-billion Federal-Provincial Health Accord to expire in 2014 and 
subsequently moved forward with plans to reduce the annual rate of growth in federal health 
transfers to the provinces (Rennie 2014). This was an especially risky move given the centrality 
of universal health care to Canada’s national identity.  
                                                          
42 Widespread accusations of underfunding and mismanagement led to the reassignment of Veteran Affairs 




The family policy spending spree also placed the Harper government’s razor-thin 
projected budget surplus of $1.8-billion in jeopardy.43 In fact, shortly after the budget was 
unveiled, Parliamentary Budget Officer44 Jean-Denis Fréchette predicted that the federal 
government would actually run a one-billion-dollar deficit in 2015/16 due to lower than 
expected economic growth (Whittington 2015). Although Fréchette’s prediction proved false, 
and the outgoing Conservative government did in fact leave Canadians with a modest surplus 
(“Ottawa runs 400M surplus in November” 2016), the uncertainty surrounding the budget 
weakened Harper’s ability to credibly campaign on his economic record. This was highly 
inconvenient for Harper, who holds an advanced degree in economics, as he had long 
presented himself as a prudent manager of the national economy. 
In sum, Harper’s championing of such substantial family policy initiatives was 
inconsistent with the established theoretical notion that social policy expansion will not take 
place under neoliberal right governments (Huber and Stephens 2001, p. 4). It was especially 
puzzling given the fact that the Harper government seemingly prioritized family policy over 
several other vital and politically sensitive budgetary items—in the immediate run-up to a 
federal election, no less. This indicates that Harper and his advisors identified some strategic 
upside to priming family issues electorally. 
As a partial caveat I must note that, as in Germany,45 Canada’s family policy reforms 
were first initiated in the early 2000s by a more progressive government. This occurred when 
                                                          
43Total scheduled budget expenditures were an estimated $288.9 billion (Payton 2015)   
 
44 Established in 2006 in response to a major federal government spending scandal, the Parliamentary Budget 




Liberal prime minister Paul Martin [2003-06] sought to build a consolidated national child care 
system. Martin pledged $5-billion over five years for the initiative (on top of $900-million 
earmarked for child care by the previous government) with a goal of creating 250,000 
subsidized daycare spaces within that timeframe (White 2011, p. 12). He then undertook 
intense bilateral negotiations with each of Canada’s ten provinces in order to build an effective 
national framework for cost-sharing and service delivery. Martin’s fledging child care program, 
however, never got off the ground as it was one of the first items to be scrapped by Harper 
when he became prime minister in 2006. 
However, far from abandoning the child care file, Harper subsequently made the area 
an even larger federal budget priority. Child care spending in fact rose five-fold under Harper, 
from $600-million (2004-05) to $3.7-billion per year (2013-14). With the final round of 
enhancements to the UCCB and Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED),46 it was slated to reach 
$7.9-billion per year (0.4% of total GDP)47 by 2016-17 (Malanik 2015, p. 11); a sum that would 
have vastly overshadowed the maximum $1.2-billion per year for child care promised under 
Martin’s national child care program (Liberal Party of Canada 2005). This spending would have 
                                                          
45 Child care reform was first initiated by SPD family minister Renate Schmidt, who commissioned two separate 
reports on the matter (in 2002 and 2005, respectively). Her progress on the child care file was interrupted when 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called early legislative elections in the fall of 2005 (Saxonberg 2014, p. 244).  
 
46 First introduced in 1971, the Child Care Expense Deduction [CCED] allows parents to deduct various child care 
expenses from their income taxes. The CCED is available to the employed or in-training parents of children aged 16 
and under. It is claimed by the lower earning spouse, with an overall cap of two-thirds of his or her income. As of 
2013-14, the estimated annual value of the CCED was $0.8-billion, accounting for 14.5% of total household child 
care expenses (Malanik, pp.6-7). 
     




covered over 65% of aggregate child care expenses for families with children under the age of 
six (Malanik 2015, p. 11).  
The sheer magnitude of these expenditures, which increased steadily over Harper’s 
near-decade as prime minister (See Figure 2), indicates that Harper deserves the lions-share of 
the credit (or condemnation) for Canada’s drastic paradigm shift in family policy, regardless of 
where the new government chooses to go from here.48 Economist Andrew Jackson of the 
Broadbent Institute, a left-leaning Canadian think tank, in fact characterizes this spending as 
“Stephen Harper's Unintended Social Policy Legacy” writing, “The Conservative fiscal legacy to 
the new government was […] almost $9 Billion in annual spending on child benefits[.]” Jackson 
observes that a path to further reform has been opened “thanks in part to the Harper 
government’s decision to spend big on questionable programs for children.” As such, Canada, 
like Germany, is a curious case of conservative-initiated family policy expansion. 
 
                   Figure 2 – Federal Spending on Child Care (2004-05/2016-17) From Malanik, 3. 
                                                          
48 The Trudeau government folded the UCCB into its own Canada Child Benefit (CCB). Like the UCCB, the CCB is a 
monthly, per child benefit. However, unlike the UCCB, the CCB is paid out on a sliding scale. It’s worth up to $533 
per child per month for families in the lowest income category and diminishes steadily as household income 
increases. Families that bring in a net income of $180,000 per year or higher are ineligible. The new benefit will 
cost the federal government approximately $23-billion per year (Morneau 2016, p. 59).  
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 The incompatibility of my cases with the extant theoretical perspectives points to the 
need for a more viable account of the puzzle of conservative governments and family policy—
my titular ‘strange bedfellows’. Another conundrum is that of why Germany has pursued 
Nordic-style universalistic policies while Canada has pursued Christian Democratic-style family 
transfers and tax benefits. In the following section, I propose a multifaceted explanation based 
on political structure, issue framing, and underlying public sentiment. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
 The above comparison provokes two theoretically important questions: [1] why have 
both conservative governments chosen to pursue substantial and highly-publicized family policy 
reforms? And [2] why did the relevant reforms take shape differently in each country 
(continental Europe-style transfers and tax benefits in Canada, versus Nordic-style daycare and 
family leave entitlements in Germany)?  
The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward as it is readily apparent that 
both Harper’s Conservatives and Merkel’s CDU identified family policy expansion as an avenue 
through which to appeal to electorally important blocs of voters, a dynamic observed 
elsewhere (Morgan 2013). In the case of the Merkel Government, the family policy push was 
part of a larger project to modernize the Christian Democrats in response to the waning 
influence of organized religion and other traditional sources of its power (Clemens 2009; 
Morgan 2013). Harper, similarly, has used the child benefit and other family transfers to reach 




One archetype that has been targeted by Conservative strategists is “Mike and 
Theresa”, a hypothetical middle-income couple (Delacourt 2016, pp. 130-131). Mike and 
Theresa have two children and pay a mortgage on a modest home in the suburbs of Toronto. 
Mike must travel frequently for work, leaving Theresa with the bulk of the domestic 
responsibilities. This archetype fits the mold of what prominent feminist scholar Jane Lewis 
(2001) calls the “modified-industrial model”, where both spouses work but traditional gender 
roles still guide the division of household labor (see also: Taylor-Gooby 2004, p.16).  
Harper’s success in courting “Mike and Theresa” types49 has been identified as a key 
determinant of his rise to power (Flanagan 2007, p. 225). This type of microtargeting was also 
central to Harper’s longer-term strategy of transforming Canada’s historically regional (east 
versus west) political cleavage into a more values-driven ‘urban versus suburban’ schism, as 
seen in many parts of the United States (Wells 2006, pp. 213-214).50 While not identical to the 
dynamic identified by Morgan, this strategy nevertheless reflects the de-alignment of 
traditional political cleavages—which, in Canada, have historically been regionally delineated 
(Simeon 1975)—and new techniques modern parties must use to build electorally viable 
coalitions. This phenomenon has been called ‘boutique politics’ elsewhere (Delacourt 2016). 
This still leaves the question of why political circumstances have motivated these 
conservative actors to pursue vastly different visions of family policy. Why has the generally 
                                                          
49 This constituency is sometimes called the “Tim Horton’s voter” in reference to Canada’s iconic donut and coffee 
chain (See Delacourt 2013). 
 
50 Under Harper, the Conservative Party was able to make up significant ground in the seat-rich province of 
Ontario, which had been almost monolithically Liberal up to that point. The party’s gains were especially strong in 
the outer suburbs of Toronto; an area sometimes called “the 905” (for its area code) in the Canadian media. This 
spike in conservative sentiment across Southern Ontario was subsequently reflected in the rise of right-wing 
populist municipal politician Rob Ford, who became Toronto’s mayor in 2010. 
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neoliberal Harper government pursued a continental Europe-style familial policy package while 
the historically traditionalist Christian Democrats have championed a Nordic-style universalistic 
one? I argue here that this asymmetry can be traced back to multiple cultural, structural, and 
discursive  variables that have motivated each party to pursue a different political strategy. In 
other words, I attribute the observed variation to a combination of political institutions and the 
framing of the family policy debate in each country.  
First, I offer the following insights about Germany: (1) being in a Grand Coalition 
government with the SDP forced the governing CDU to moderate its position on family policy 
(which the CDU was subsequently able to capitalize on politically). (2) German family policy 
reforms have at times been framed in a natalist tone, which was only possible due to the 
presence of credible policy ‘spokeswomen’ (Mohamed 2013). Even though a steep decline in 
[West] Germany’s birth rate began towards the end of the 1960s and has persisted into the 
2000s (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011, p. 334), policymakers had been hesitant to address 
this decline (and its potential socio-economic consequences) due to lingering recollections of 
the centrality of natalism to family policy under the Third Reich. Given Germany’s unique 
historical baggage with respect to fertility, it was of paramount importance that two credible 
female family ministers—Renate Schmidt (SPD) and Ursula von der Leyen (CDU)—were able to 
raise the taboo subject in a manner that was palatable to the German public. (3) Clear efforts 
were made to tie the family policy discourse to the broader national debate surrounding 
migration and multiculturalism. Such linkages were especially evident in public commentary on 
the Betreuungsgeld, which critics argued would have negative consequences for both the labor 
market integration of migrant women (who would now be paid to stay at home) and the 
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intercultural education of their children (who would now be less likely to attend public daycare 
programs with toddlers from other ethnic backgrounds). Interestingly, these arguments were 
most commonly utilized by pro-immigration, left-of-center actors.      
By contrast, the Harper government was unencumbered by the strictures of a formal 
coalition and operated within a public opinion environment that is much more sanguine about 
the place of immigrants in society. This allowed the party to implement a more subsidy-based 
set of family policy reforms which generally fit with the policy preferences of its socially 
conservative wing (see Prince and Teghtsoonian 2007). Moreover, the Harper reforms have 
generally been framed in a populist, anti-intellectual manner, as characterized by the default 
Conservative talking point: “We all know childcare care decisions are best left to the real 
experts, mom and dad”—a clear rebuke of the ‘expert’ advocates of universal childcare in the 
academic and policy communities (Harper 2015). This communication strategy suggests a 
culturally-neutral approach to family policy that deliberately skirts potentially divisive notions 
of how parents ought to raise their children. I will survey each of the abovementioned variables 
below. 
 
Independent Variable #1: Partisanship and Coalitional Dynamics  
While the Christian Democrats—and specifically their media savvy family minister 
Ursula von der Leyen—were able to claim most of the credit for Germany’s transformative 
family policy reforms, the reforms pivotally took place within the context of a Grand Coalition 
government that included the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In fact, the coalition was 
characterized by a marked continuity in the family ministry as von der Leyen chose to retain a 
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number of SPD-affiliated staff. This group of holdovers included Malte Ristau-Winkler,51 who 
had been chief adviser to Renate Schmidt, von der Leyen’s immediate predecessor at Family 
Affairs (von Wahl 2011, p. 397). Schmidt herself has been widely acknowledged for her role in 
getting child care on the political agenda, as well as for her efforts in reframing family policy as 
a “hard issue” vital to shoring up Germany’s perilously low birth rate (Rüling 2010).  
Von der Leyen retained Schmidt’s natalist talking points but was perhaps in a better 
position to deliver them. Her conservative credentials were unassailable as she came from a 
prominent Christian Democrat political family and, prior to becoming a politician, she had 
raised seven children while also working as a medical doctor. As such, there was a “Nixon-goes-
to-China” feel to her rhetoric, suggesting that even the most strident conservative had to 
acknowledge the seriousness of Germany’s coming demographic crisis (von Wahl 2011, p. 396). 
Von der Leyen matched these words with a sweeping package of universalistic family policy 
reforms, which included medium-length, income-based parental leave (covering 67% of the 
claimant’s normal salary) and, critically, a universal guarantee of publicly-subsidized daycare for 
one and two-year-olds (von Wahl 2011, pp. 397-8).  
Coalition dynamics may also explain the falling off of family policy reforms during 
Merkel’s second government, a solidly right-wing bloc consisting of the CDU/CSU and FDP. 
Daycare was a tough sell to both junior coalition partners. The classically liberal FDP favored a 
voucher system that enabled greater choice in child care while the traditionalist CSU advocated 
a monthly transfer to stay-at home parents. The latter in fact threatened to leave the governing 
coalition if its proposed child care subsidy did not become law (Henninger and von Wahl 2014, 
                                                          
51 Ristau-Winkler is male. 
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pp. 390-2). Further, the global economic downturn left the family ministry saddled with a 4-
billion euro budget cut, forcing it to in fact pare away existing parental benefits for high earners 
and welfare recipients (Henninger and von Wahl 2014, p. 391) Kristina Schröder (CDU), von der 
Leyen’s successor at Family Affairs, showed neither the aptitude nor the inclination to fight for 
women-friendly policies, leaving a shrinking group of CDU modernizers—which included von 
der Leyen—in the lurch. 52 Perhaps sensing that this was a battle the modernizers could not 
win, Chancellor Merkel intervened repeatedly on the side of the CSU and traditionalists in the 
CDU (Henninger and von Wahl 2014, p. 392).  
As observed by Henninger and von Wahl (2014), the underwhelming performance of the 
CDU/CSU-FDP alliance on family policy is indicative the complex partisan dynamics engendered 
by Germany’s legislative norm of coalition governance. Although it was the CDU that took 
political credit for the sweeping family policy reforms passed during Merkel’s first government, 
it is unlikely that these reforms would have been implemented without the presence of the SPD 
in the governing coalition. As such, grand coalition governance with a left party appears to be a 
key determinant of the observed policy shift. 
No such tradition exists in Canada as, outside of the World Wars, the country has never 
seen a coalition government at the federal level. This despite the fact that it is fairly common in 
Canada for a single party to govern unilaterally without holding a majority of the seats in 
parliament, a scenario known as a minority government. This has happened thirteen times in 
                                                          
52 The Merkel government’s change of course on family policy drew tacit criticism from von der Leyen, who has 
since moved on to the labor (2009-13) and defense (2013-present). She publicly expressed concerns about the 
proposed stay-at-home parent subsidy in 2013, telling leading German newsmagazine Der Spiegel that “children 
need other children” to develop properly and, as such, should attend daycare (Caldwell 2013)   
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Canada’s history (Parliament of Canada 2011). Prime Minister Harper in fact presided over the 
country’s lengthiest ever stretch of minority governments, which lasted from 2006 to 2011, 
when Harper’s Conservative Party was finally able to attain an electoral majority. Throughout 
this period, Harper was known to play parliamentary brinkmanship with the opposition parties, 
at times daring them to trigger an election call over contentious legislative items.  
One such item was the controversial UCCB which, as mentioned earlier in the paper, 
Harper had initially devised as a replacement for a nascent federal-provincial accord to create 
more publicly subsidized daycare spaces. The child benefit was opposed by all three opposition 
parties and, initially, was just lukewarmly received by the public. In fact, a June 2006 study 
conducted by Environics Research, a leading Canadian polling house, found that the child care 
benefit had just a 35% approval rating among voters. Moreover, 40% of the survey’s 
respondents agreed with the statement that the opposition parties should trigger another 
election if the conservatives failed to back down on the issue of child care (pp. 7, 19). However, 
initiating a new election campaign over child care would have been a reckless gamble for the 
opposition parties and it was ultimately a risk that they were unwilling to take.53 
It’s easy to see how things may have gone differently if there were in fact a strong 
precedent of coalition government in Canada. The Harper Conservatives, who were at the time 
thirty-one seats short of the number necessary to form a parliamentary majority, would have 
                                                          
53 The UCCB was introduced as part of the Harper government’s first budget [2006/07], which passed with the 
support of the separatist Bloc Québecois (BQ). The Budget technically passed with unanimous consent due to a 
procedural mix-up, but this was largely irrelevant as the Liberals and NDP did not have sufficient votes to reject it 




been hard-pressed to find willing coalition partners. They may well have needed to sacrifice 
their child care agenda in order to obtain the requisite support from the other parties.54 
 
Independent Variable #2: The Presence/Absence of Policy “Spokeswomen”  
Although the CDU’s embrace of universal family policy was clearly motivated by 
electoral considerations and facilitated by the involvement of the SPD in Merkel’s first 
governing coalition, the presence of female leadership nevertheless helped the party from a 
credibility standpoint. Von der Leyen’s political rhetoric on family policy was pointedly natalist, 
as she characteristically made statements like, “The question is not whether women will work… 
the question is whether they will have children” (Landler 2006). Further, the popular German 
family minister did not hesitate to use her own image as a working mother of seven children to 
frame the reforms she planned to implement. This type of messaging helped von der Leyen and 
other advocates frame family policy as a ‘hard issue’ that was central to Germany’s very 
demographic survival (Rüling 2008). However, coming from a male politician, such rhetoric—
essentially imploring women to bear more children—would likely be perceived as paternalistic 
and overbearing, potentially offending the very female voters being targeted.  
This in fact echoes one popular interpretation of the failure of a similar child care 
strategy proposed in Canada under the Liberal government of Paul Martin [2003-06]. The 
Martin government’s promotion of its national child care plan was viewed widely by analysts as 
                                                          
54 Arguably the most dramatic moment of Harper’s time in office came shortly after his first re-election in 2008, 
when the opposition parties collectively threatened to form a governing coalition in response a Conservative 
proposal to cut public funding for political parties, among other contentious legislative initiatives. Together, the 
opposition parties held a slight majority (54%) of parliamentary seats (“Liberals, NDP, Bloc sign deal on proposed 
coalition” 2008). Harper was forced to hastily suspend parliament but was able to regroup and turn public opinion 
against the potential coalition, emphasizing that the hypothetical governing arrangement would include the BQ.   
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politically tone-deaf and ultimately ineffective. Despite being spearheaded by Social 
Development Minister Ken Dryden, a well-respected lawyer and former ice hockey great, the 
child care initiative was attacked by the Conservative opposition for being condescending to 
women. This sentiment was memorably encapsulated by Conservative Member of Parliament 
(MP) Rona Ambrose55 when she told Minister Dryden “working women want to make their own 
choices. We do not need old white guys telling us to do,” during a parliamentary debate 
(Ambrose 2005). Noted political commentator Chantel Hébert (2007, p. 81) later remarked that 
Ambrose’s barb “reinforced the image of the federal government as a meddling, paternalistic 
uncle.”  
 By contrast, overt gendered framing has not been perceptible in the Harper 
government’s promotion of its family policy package. The initiative has instead taken something 
of a populist, anti-intellectual tone, characterized by the refrain “we believe that the real child 
care experts are mom and dad” and a more general emphasis on parental choice. This 
statement is clearly directed at the many advocates of universal childcare in the academic and 
policy communities. It also serves to remind voters of what many commentators perceived to 
be a patronizing attitude from the Liberal advocates of Paul Martin’s national child care 
strategy.56 The Harper government’s “choice” discourse was also a subtle nod to themes of 
autonomy and self-determination often embedded in feminist rhetoric (Rinehart 2007, 2008).57 
                                                          
55 Ambrose became the interim leader of the Conservative Party shortly after the party’s unsuccessful 2015 re-
election campaign. She stayed in this role until Andrew Scheer became the party’s permanent leader in May 2017.  
 
56 A major turning point of the 2006 federal election campaign came when Liberal Party communications director 
Scott Reid stated on television that parents would “blow” the Conservative child care benefit on “beer and 
popcorn”. The statement reinforced the perception that the Liberals believed that parents could not be trusted to 




Due dearth of credible female voices in the opposition parties and the virtual collapse of 
organized women’s groups at the federal level, the feminist (i.e.: ‘equal opportunity’) case for 
child care and other female-friendly family policies (see Atchison and Down 2009) was largely 
ignored.  
 
Independent Variable #3: Societal Attitudes towards Migration 
 The natalist tone of Germany’s family policy push also brings to mind a conceivable link 
between this issue and immigration. The most straightforward way for policymakers to address 
the economic challenges created by labor shortages is to open the door to migrant workers. 
This was the general strategy pursued by a rapidly re-industrializing West Germany, which 
recruited upwards of 2.5 million Turkish guest workers over the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Triadafilopoulos 2012). However, it would be fair to say that the Turks and other non-European 
migrant communities have had significant challenges in integrating with the general 
population— an unfortunate matter that has led to a burgeoning political culture of xenophobia 
on the German right and; further, is a possible impetus for policies designed to boost the birth 
rate among native German women. Merkel herself has periodically voiced this nativist 
sentiment. For instance, in a widely-covered 2010 speech to the CDU youth wing, she made the 
following remarks: 
In the early 1960s we brought the guest workers to Germany, now they’re living with us. 
We lied to ourselves for a while, we said, ‘they won’t stay long. One day they’ll be gone.’ 
But this is not the case. Of ours the multicultural approach, living side by side and being 
happy with each other, has utterly failed.58 (Rowe 2011). 
                                                          
57 Most visibly in the moniker “pro choice” used by supporters of abortion rights.   
 




Anxieties over cultural integration also appeared to contribute to the failure of the 
polarizing Betreuungsgeld (care allowance). Similar in structure to Harper’s UCCB, the 
Betreuungsgeld was a monthly subsidy of 150 euros available to parents of one to three year 
olds who chose not to enroll their children in any form of public or publicly-subsidized daycare 
(Müller and Wrohlich 2014, p. 5). Devised as a measure to placate the socially-conservative 
CSU, the Betreuungsgeld began circulating in the summer of 2013 – the exact same time that 
the CDU’s universal guarantee of daycare came into effect (Müller and Wrohlich 2014, p.1). As 
of the spring of 2015, the Betreuungsgeld went out to 450,000 German families at a cost of 900 
million euros per year (“Betreuungsgeld für fast eine halbe Million Kinder gezahlt” 2015). 
The subsidy was controversial from the very start, raising questions about the sincerity 
of the CDU’s professed support for working women. Accordingly, the progressive opponents of 
the Betreuungsgeld derisively dubbed it the “kitchen bonus”. The child subsidy’s divisiveness 
soon made it the target of multiple political and legal attacks. Even Ursula von der Leyen, now 
Germany’s Minister of Defense, publicly expressed concerns about the Betreuungsgeld, telling 
leading newsmagazine Der Spiegel that “children need other children” and as such should not 
skip out on daycare (Caldwell 2013).59  
In July of 2015, the Betreuungsgeld was struck down by the German constitutional court 
in a unanimous ruling. The court decreed that federal government did not have the spending 
authority to circulate the subsidy (Gesley 2015). The case’s plaintiff was the SPD-controlled 
                                                          





government of Hamburg, which held that the subsidies reinforced inequalities towards low-
income families and that the funds allocated to it would be better directed at improving 
daycare infrastructure. While many on the Canadian left would agree with this viewpoint, it is 
entirely inconceivable that any mainstream Canadian opposition party would go to court to 
have the UCCB checks rescinded. Doing so would be political suicide.60  
I hypothesize that Betreuungsgeld’s political fragility stems in part from its perceived 
association with immigrants. A disproportionate number of the child care checks have gone to 
migrant families, especially those based in major urban centers. For instance, 22.4% of 
applicants based in Berlin were identified as foreigners, despite just 13.4% of the city’s 
population not holding a German passport (Knapp 2015). Accordingly, much of the anti-
Betreuungsgeld rhetoric has been assimilationist in tone. Specifically, critics have argued that 
the subsidy enables the children of migrants to self-segregate, when they should be learning 
the German language and cultural customs at public daycares. These critics drew ammunition 
from 2012 OECD report (“Jobs for Immigrants”) which concluded that direct-to-parent child 
subsidies could be “highly detrimental” to the well-being of both migrant women and their 
children. Although Germany was not one of the countries included in the study, 61 the German 
media nevertheless used these findings to cast doubt on the Betreuungsgeld’s effectiveness 
(see, e.g., Bolzen 2012).    
                                                          
60 During the 2015 federal election campaign, NDP leader Thomas Mulcair pledged to preserve the UCCB if elected 
prime minister, despite also promising to implement a $15 per day national daycare program (Bonoguore 2015). 
Current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has replaced the UCCB with the income-tested Canada Child Benefit (CCB), 
which provides most Canadian parents with monthly, per child subsidies.  
 
61 The study examined the labor market integration of immigrants in Austria, Norway, and Switzerland. 
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 Canada, by contrast, has proven to be a more hospitable environment for non-white 
immigrants. In 1971, Canada became the first ever country to adopt an official policy of 
multiculturalism. This declaration came on the heels of the formalization of a color-blind, ‘skill 
based’ immigration system through the 1960s (Triadafilopoulos 2012, Chap. 4). The concept of 
‘multiculturalism’ has since become central to the inchoate Canadian national identity and, 
critically, a part of how many Canadians now distinguish themselves from their American 
neighbors – who inhabit an assimilationist ‘melting pot’. Accordingly, the most recent Social 
Progress Index (2017), a joint project of leading consulting firm DeLoitte and the non-profit 
Social Progress Imperative, ranks Canada second in the category of tolerance towards 
immigrants. By contrast, Germany places just seventeenth in the same category. This 
uncommon openness toward outsiders has been referred to as “Canadian exceptionalism” by a 
number of migration scholars (see, e.g.: Kazemipur 2006; Bloemraad 2012).   
Over time, Canada’s warm embrace of multiculturalism has catalyzed a major 
demographic shift. Immigrants now comprise just over twenty percent of Canada’s population, 
which is the highest proportion among the G7 countries, and immigration presently accounts 
for two-thirds of Canada’s annual population growth (Statistics Canada 2017). Critically, Canada 
has highest naturalization rate of any OECD country, as nearly 90% of landed immigrants62 
ultimately attain Canadian citizenship (OECD and European Union 2015, Figure 11.A1.1).  
The propensity of Canadian immigrants to become citizens and, subsequently, engaged 
and organized voting blocs, has made them a critical constituency for all major parties. This 
includes the Conservative Party, whose 2011 majority-government breakthrough was powered 
                                                          
62 Those who have established residency for at least a decade. 
54 
 
by a strong showing in immigrant-heavy suburban communities surrounding Toronto and 
Vancouver (Friesen and Sher 2011). Harper had a chance to articulate the party’s conciliatory 
approach to multiculturalism at that year’s party leaders’ debate: 
We favor multiculturalism [and] what Canadians need to understand… is that people who 
make the hard decision to leave countries where they have established for centuries or 
millenni[a] come here first and foremost want to belong to this country... They also at the 
same time will change our country and we show through multiculturalism our willingness 
to accommodate the differences so they’re more comfortable. That’s why we’re so 
successful integrating people as a country. I think we’re probably one of the most 
successful countries in the world in that regard (Siddiqui 2011). 
 
 The contrast between the Harper and Merkel rhetoric on multiculturalism is jarring, and 
perhaps explains why overtly natalist overtones have been absent from Canada’s family policy 
discourse. Given the continued willingness of Canadians to accept immigration as a stopgap 
measure to stave off demographic stagnation, it’s unsurprising that increasing Canada’s low 
domestic birth rate is not a priority item on the political agenda.  
One potential qualifier to this argument is that German and Canadian immigrant 
populations are very different in composition. Roughly 30% of the 18.5 million German 
residents with a ‘migration background’63 have ancestral roots in Muslim majority countries and 
an additional 30% have roots in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, or the former Soviet Union. Turks 
comprise by far the largest diaspora population as nearly three million inhabitants of Germany 
claim Turkish ancestry (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). Berlin alone is home to over 175,000 
residents with Turkish origins, comprising the single largest Turkish community outside of 
                                                          
63 The German Federal Office of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) counts, as ‘persons with a migrant 
background’: “all persons who have immigrated into [Germany] after 1949” and “all persons born in Germany who 
have at least one parent who immigrated into the country or was born as a foreigner in Germany.” (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2018).   
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Turkey (Statistischer Bericht 2012, p. 19). With the prevalence of Muslims (and Turks in 
particular) within the German migrant stock, anti-immigrant discourses have often centered on 
a perceived incompatibility between Western liberalism and various Islamic cultural practices—
a tendency most recently exemplified in the rhetoric of the fledgling Alternativ für Deutschland 
(AfD) 
Canada’s immigrant population, by contrast, embodies a true cultural mosaic. No one 
ethnic community constitutes more than ten percent of the total immigrant population and 
fifteen diaspora groups number 100,000 or more (Statistics Canada 2017). The religious 
diversity of Canadian immigrants is also worth noting. Nearly half of recent immigrants claim 
Christian religious affiliation. Muslims, by comparison, make up only 17.5 percent of recent 
immigrants and just over three percent of the country’s total population. Hindus and Sikhs are 
also prominent migrant communities, which each comprise over five percent of all recent 
immigrants (Press 2013). The religious heterogeneity of Canadian immigrants and, specifically, 
the relative paucity of the country’s Muslim population is relevant here given the strong 
undercurrent of Islamophobia that underpins much of the anti-immigrant sentiment in 
Germany and elsewhere in Europe.  
These compositional differences can be traced back to incongruities in each country’s 
respective history with immigration (particularly since the end of World War II) which have, in 
turn, produced two vastly divergent citizenship regimes.64 To be precise, Germany’s 
immigration system, which developed in the context of a booming postwar West German 
                                                          
64 The holding of dual citizenship is permitted in Canada but, in Germany, is restricted to citizens of other European 
Union countries (plus Switzerland) in most cases.   
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manufacturing economy and pressure on multiple fronts to facilitate cross-national labor 
mobility, has historically attracted migrants from nearby Eurasian countries with more 
rudimentary skill sets and lower levels of education (Triadafilopoulos 2012, pp. 75-79). By 
contrast, Canada’s immigration system—largely the product of a progressive moment in the 
1960s and 1970s—is built around an ethnically neutral ‘points system’ designed to bring in 
immigrants with the most sought after professional and vocational credentials (Triadafilopoulos 
2012, pp. 101-103). The latter regime has unsurprisingly produced a better integrated and more 
economically successful population of immigrants.  The point here being that I am not 
attempting to imply that ‘Germans are more racist/xenophobic than Canadians’, but instead to 
underscore that Germany has had the more troublesome history, of the two countries, with 
immigration. This, I will argue, is perceptible in how family policy has been discussed in the 
German public sphere.   
 




 Given the temporal symmetry of my cases outlined above, I will frame this project as a 
Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA). CHA can be described crudely as a historically-rooted and 
primarily qualitative form of causal analysis that characteristically employs a process-tracing 
strategy to tease causal process observations (Collier 2010) out of juxtaposed case narratives. 
Formally, CHA includes three core components: a focus on causal analysis, an emphasis on the 
properties of time and sequence, and the development of systematic and contextualized 
comparisons (Mahoney and Rueshemeyer 2003, p.6).  
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One core strength of CHA is that it enables researchers to “take time seriously” (Pierson 
2004) and place an analytical focus on causal sequence. Policy choices are rarely made in a 
vacuum, especially when it comes to a topic as contentious and culturally-loaded as the 
demarcation of the relationship between the state and the family. As such, any viable analysis of 
a change in family policy must account for the historical factors that have sustained a given policy 
legacy, as well as the temporally anomalous circumstances that enable a break from the past 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
This dexterity has made CHA a leading approach social policy studies. The success of CHA 
in social policy is evidenced by a number of ground-breaking CHA-driven studies of the origins of 
social policy (Skocpol 1992; Amenta 2000), its maturation (Pierson 1994; Huber and Stephens 
2001), and its adaption to major cultural and demographic changes (O’Connor et al. 1999; Taylor-
Gooby 2004). Above all, CHA has enabled social policy scholars to develop and refine “middle-
range” theories, derived from applying general theoretical frameworks to specific cases. For this 
reason, Amenta (2003) concludes “comparative and historical work in social policy has… made 
great theoretical contributions – probably more extensive than [CHA] in other subject areas” (p. 
99).  
 Given CHA’s proven track record in the domain of social policy, as well as the 
comparability of my chosen cases with one another, I view CHA as the appropriate 
methodological approach for this study. Specifically, I contend that, in utilizing a CHA framework, 
I will be able to isolate causally relevant variables by placing my coeval family policy narratives 





 This study draws from a multitude of firsthand and secondary accounts of the history and 
trajectory of family policy reform agendas in each of my country cases. Wherever possible, I 
incorporate primary evidence from parliamentary debates, legislative proceedings, and the like. 
In my retelling of the Canadian narrative (Chapter 3), I draw from twenty-five extended telephone 
and in-person interviews I conducted between 2016 and 2018. The interviews were given on the 
basis of anonymity, with participants including: a former cabinet minister, a high-level policy aide 
to Prime Minister Harper, a onetime ministerial chief-of-staff, a party spokesperson, a 
Conservative Party affiliated pollster, and a number of prominent academics, journalists, and 
political activists.  
 I also compiled a set of over 450 relevant newspaper articles published in each country 
between 2005 and 2015. These articles comprise the essential input data for my statistical text 
analysis of the framing of family policy in each country (Chapter 5). In all, I have gathered an 




CHAPTER 3: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY POLICY IN CANADA  
A “NEVER-ENDING STORY”65 
 This chapter provides a historical overview of the evolution of family policy in 
Canada and etches out the political opportunity structure facing the Harper government as it 
crafted its own family policy agenda. My primary observation is that, due to a confluence of 
reinforcing historical, institutional, and discursive dynamics, federal policymakers have 
consistently favored demand-side supports to parents with children, such as tax credits and 
direct cash payments. This pattern has held despite the best efforts of feminists and their allies 
to recast family policy (and especially child care) as a crucial mechanism for securing equal 
opportunity for women in the labor force. The bias in favor of direct payments to parents was, 
in fact, reinforced by the then governing Liberal Party’s anti-poverty framing of family policy in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (see: Dobrowolsky 2004; McKeen 2007). Subsequent efforts to 
emphasize the developmental benefits of early childhood educational interventions have fallen 
flat as the data from Canada’s only comprehensive daycare program, based in the province of 
Québec, fails to definitively validate this premise (see: Baker et al. 2015; Geloso and Eisen 2017; 
Haeck et al. 2015).  
In short, by the time the Harper Government took office in 2006, gender equity, and 
with it the most compelling rationale for the Nordic model, had been steadily “written out” of
                                                          
65 Chapter title a reference to Mahon 2000.  
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 the family policy discourse (Jenson 2009; McKeen 2000). Moreover, Canada’s peculiar 
form offederalism has had a variable effect on the evolution of family policy, at times 
incentivizing the provinces to experiment with innovative new delivery schemes and, at other 
times, stymieing the development of national policy solutions. This is best exemplified by 
Québec’s stand-alone daycare program, which represented a substantial departure from the 
national status-quo and has since been presented alternatively as a potential policy template 
and cautionary tale for the other provinces.   
 I shed more light on both the historical context and the immediate strategic 
environment facing the Harper government by incorporating the insights of twenty-five experts 
from the policy, consulting, advocacy, and academic communities, who I interviewed between 
2016 and 2018 (see APPENDIX 1 for a complete list of interviewees).66    
 
3.1. Early History 
 As had been the case in the United States (Skocpol 1992), Canada’s earliest public 
supports to mothers and children grew out of major war efforts. The earliest vestige of 
Canada’s family policy milieu can in fact be traced back to 1918, when a children’s tax 
exemption was appended to Canada’s first ever income tax act, conceived at the time as a 
temporary measure to help finance Canada’s participation in the First World War (Employment 
and Social Development Canada 2017). The child tax exemption was effectively regressive, 
increasing steadily with taxable household income (Battle 2008, p. 5). Moreover, the exemption 
                                                          
66 The interviews were semi-structured and lasted an average of forty-five minutes to an hour each in duration. 
Apart from one in-person interview (Vancouver, January 3, 2018), the interviews were conducted remotely via 
either telephone or Skype (see Appendix 1). 
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was inaccessible to most Canadian families, who did not earn sufficient income to be required 
to pay income tax.67 The initial child tax exemption nevertheless enshrined the notion of 
parenting as a socially beneficial activity and the concomitant collective societal obligation to 
offset at least some of the costs that parents incurred through child-rearing (Battle 2008, p. 5). 
 
Wartime Day Nurseries  
 Unsurprisingly, the next significant innovation in family policy occurred in the midst of 
the Second World War, when an exponential increase in the number of working women, who 
staffed munitions factories and other essential wartime facilities, necessitated the expansion of 
day nurseries for the now inadequately supervised children of working mothers.68 This led the 
federal government and Canada’s two most populous provinces of Ontario and Québec (where 
the majority of wartime munitions factories were located) to launch a cost-shared Wartime Day 
Nursery program in 1942.69 The costs of operating the new day nurseries were split fifty-fifty 
between the federal government and the participating provinces (Friendly 1994, p. 129). 
Parental fees were limited to thirty-five cents (worth around five dollars today) 70 per child per 
day (Scott 1998). The agreement ultimately funded thirty-four child care centers (twenty-eight 
                                                          
67 Canada’s Income War Tax Act of 1917 gave families a $3,000 tax exemption (Burns 1917, p.24). The average 
annual manufacturing sector salary at the time was $1,315 (Statistics Canada 2009). 
 
68 Between 1939 and 1945, the number of wage earning women in Canada increased fivefold, from 200,000 to 
1,000,000 (Prochner 2000; p. 51). 
  
69 The program was set in motion by a parliamentary order-in-council titled, “Authorization of agreements with 
provinces for the care of children” (1942). 
 
70 All estimates of inflation presented in this chapter were generated by the author using the Bank of Canada’s 
online inflation calculator, available at: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/  
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in Ontario and six in Québec), which provided spaces for approximately 1,700 children between 
the ages of two and six years old.71  
The federal-provincial day nursery agreements were terminated at the war’s conclusion 
in 194572 but left a mark at the municipal level. Thanks to a dedicated group of parents and 
social activists, the Toronto metro area was able to keep twelve of its eighteen wartime day 
nurseries open (Prentice 1993; Mahon 2007). In 1946, Toronto and the Ontario provincial 
government came to terms on their own cost-sharing agreement, the Day Nurseries Act. The 
legislation gave Ontario’s other municipalities the option to select-in to the same 
arrangement—although only Ottawa, the province’s second-largest city, used this provision to 
develop substantial child care infrastructure of its own (Mahon 2007, p. 59). In sum, the 
wartime day nursery program left a limited policy legacy in the province of Ontario but was 
ultimately too narrow in scope (catering primarily to a few major cities) to have any perceptible 
effect on the national policy trajectory.   
 
3.2. The Universal Family Allowance 
More consequentially, the Canadian federal government introduced a universal family 
allowance in 1944, ostensibly in anticipation of a labor glut that would be created by the 
imminent return of armed servicemen from abroad.73 The new family allowance—which 
                                                          
71 Figure calculated by the author by multiplying the number of day nurseries by fifty (the recommended capacity 
for each center) (“The Place of Day Nurseries in the War Effort” 1943, pp. 175-6). 
 
72 Québec’s socially conservative political elite perceived the wartime day nursery program as a threat to the 
caregiving primacy of the Catholic Church. The provincial government shuttered all of the Québec nurseries 




offered parents a monthly payment of up to $8 (roughly $115 in 2017 dollars) for each child 
under the age of sixteen74 and was conservatively estimated to consume $250 million (over 
$3.5 billion today and about two percent of total GNP)  from the federal budget annually 
(Whitton 1944, pp. 416, 420; Statistics Canada 2014, Table F1-16)—was announced with little 
prior consultation or evidence of forethought. The opposition parties, press, and provinces 
were all caught off guard (Breul 1953, p. 271).  
Critics of the proposed family allowance voiced concerns about its exorbitant cost and 
questioned then prime minister Mackenzie King’s true motivations for unveiling such a big-
ticket social spending item so close to Canada’s next general election, which was to be held at 
some point in the following year.75 Many saw King’s family allowance plan as a shameless 
attempt to buy back the support of the voters of Québec (Breul 1953, p. 276), who the prime 
minister had alienated by reneging on his initial promise not to conscript Canadian soldiers 
during the First World War .76 Québec, which had by far the country’s highest birth rate at the 
time, stood to gain the most financially from the proposed family allowance, at least in absolute 
                                                          
73 The family allowance was also conceived as a mechanism to transition the women employed in wartime 
industries out of the labor force (Blake 2009, p. 2). 
 
74 Parents were required to enroll their children in school in order to qualify for family allowance payments 
(Moscovitch and Falvo 2017). 
 
75 As in other countries that use the Westminster parliamentary model, Canada's elections do not occur on fixed 
dates, yet they must be held at least once every five years. King had promised to hold an election by July 1945 
(Blake 2009, p. 90). 
 
76 King initially promised that there would be no overseas conscription but reversed course after a 1942 national 
plebiscite found strong support for conscription across English Canada (although seventy-two percent of Québec’s 




terms. 77 The family allowance was also viewed as an attempt by the Liberals to blunt the 
momentum of the social democrat Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), which 
claimed a decisive victory in Saskatchewan’s 1944 provincial election and was surging across 
the country (McHenry 1949, p. 372).78  
In spite of these controversies, the Liberal government’s Family Allowances Act was 
passed in August of 1944 with the unanimous approval of the parliamentarians present in the 
House of Commons. 79 In the end, none of the opposition parties wished to be perceived by 
voters as miserly so close to election time.80 The family allowances were conveniently slated to 
come into effect the following July, immediately following Canada’s next federal election (Breul 
1953, pp. 271, 277).81  
In their conceptualization of the program, Canadian officials were heavily influenced by 
the ideas of British social architect William Beveridge, who championed a system of universal, 
non-contributory family allowances as a vital step to securing “freedom from want” (1942, 
                                                          
77 As of 1941 the average French-Canadian family had 4.28 children living at home. By comparison, the average 
Anglo-Canadian family had just 2.86 children in the household. Moreover, over half of all Canadian families with 
seven or more children lived in Québec (Whitten 1944, p. 417). 
  
78 Led by the popular Tommy Douglas, the CCF won forty-seven of fifty-two seats in the Saskatchewan legislature, 
despite holding just ten seats going into the 1944 election. This marked the first time that a social democrat 
government was elected anywhere in Canada.  
 
79 Over 40% of all Members of Parliament were absent for the family allowances vote, reflecting the lingering 
controversy that surrounded the proposal (Usher 1951, p. 127).  
 
80 Reflecting the collectivist ethos of the time, the opposition Conservative party rebranded itself the Progressive 
Conservative Party in 1942, seeking to emphasize its moderated positions on various social and labor issues.  
 
81 The Liberal Party retained government in the 1945 election but fell five seats short of the number necessary to 




Assumption A).82 However, the Canadian family allowance system ultimately deviated 
significantly from the model pioneered by Beveridge, reflecting longstanding regional and 
ethnic tensions within the Canadian populace.  
For instance, whereas the Beveridge-designed family allowances introduced in the 
United Kingdom reflected an ethos of natalism—beginning only as a given couple’s second child 
was born and rising steadily (per child) with each subsequent birth—Canada’s allowances 
kicked in immediately after the birth of a couple’s first child and per child payments began to 
taper off with the birth of the fifth. This hinted at elite anxieties about Canada’s demographic 
balance, as the country’s socio-economically privileged Anglo-Saxon population had a 
significantly lower birth rate than the French-speaking population at the time and was 
beginning lose ground to Canada’s burgeoning Eastern European and Slavic diaspora 
communities.83 The design of the family allowances suggested an unstated aim to preserve the 
number of English Canadians relative to other groups—or at the very least, to not reward 
members of less prized ethnic communities for having more children than they could support 
financially. Charlotte Whitton, the head of the Canadian Council on Child Welfare and a leading 
critic of the allowances, commented at the time: “The dexterous balancing of these [ethno-
linguistic] disparities is the probable raison d’être of the downward scale.” (1944, p. 417, italics 
in the original).  
                                                          
82 Leonard Marsh, who served as research director to Canada’s Advisory Committee on (Postwar) Reconstruction, 
studied under Beveridge at the London School of Economics in the late 1920s. 
 
83 The average Anglo-Canadian household had 2.8 children living at home, versus 4.2 children in the average 
French-Canadian household. All other European ethnic groups had birth rates of between 3 and 3.5 children per 
family (Whitten 1944, pp. 416-417). 
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Another important distinction came from the constraints placed on the federal 
government by the vertical division of powers specified in Canada’s constitution. Section 92 of 
the British North America Act (BNA), then Canada’s primary constitutional document,84 gave 
the provinces formal authority over the administration of most social services, as well as 
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (Clause 13) and “Generally all Matters of a merely 
local or private Nature in the Province” (Clause 16). The London-based Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (JCPC), which at the time served as the final arbiter for all disputes relating to 
the BNA, had historically favored a broad interpretation of these enumerated provincial rights 
(Breul 1953, p. 278). 
The JCPC had earlier rebuffed the efforts of the federal government to establish a 
nationwide system of compulsory unemployment insurance at the height of the Great 
Depression; ruling that the enabling legislation (The Employment and Social Insurance Act of 
1935) encroached on provincial jurisdiction, specifically vis-à-vis the civil rights of employers 
and employees (Privy Council 1937, p. 4). The JCPC decision forced the federal government and 
the provinces to adopt a new constitutional amendment that placed unemployment insurance 
within the federal competencies (Section 91) under the subheading of “the regulation of trade 
and commerce”. 
Seeking to minimize the threat of another successful constitutional challenge85 to a 
major federal spending bill, the King government went to great lengths to emphasize the fiscal 
                                                          
84 The British North America Act (BNA), enacted by the parliament of the United Kingdom in 1867, served as 
Canada’s de facto constitution until 1982, when it was folded into Canada’s repatriated Constitution Act. The 
repatriation of the BNA did not alter any of its content, although a Charter of Rights and Freedoms (analogous to 




dimensions of the family allowance and downplay its social content. Minister of Justice Louis St. 
Laurent,86 for example, offered the following defense:  
In principle, [the family allowances] allocate to every child maintained by a parent, up to 
the age of sixteen years, a certain monthly benefit the only condition attached being that 
the person to whom the money is paid shall apply it for the maintenance and better 
upbringing of that child. There is nothing else whatever; no obligation of any kind is 
imposed… This is merely a declaration by the Canadian government, authorized by the 
Canadia Parliament, that the Canadian people wish to contribute so much a month for 
the upkeep of each child (St. Laurent 1944).  
 
The portrayal of the family allowance as a fiscal measure (versus a social one) had 
important ramifications on the policy’s design, implementation, and ultimate legacy. Critically, 
it gave economists in the federal Ministry of Finance and Bank of Canada substantial control 
over the details of the program (Weaver 2000, pp. 19-20). Government economists were, at the 
time, wedded to the Keynesian dogma that steady monetary transfers to the lower economic 
classes are necessary to sustain consumer demand and, by extension, economic output. 
Maintaining domestic demand was of particular concern to policymakers as Canada’s exports 
slumped near the end of World War II (Usher 1951, p. 132). This was accordingly presented as a 
key rationale for the family allowance, as the disbursement of allowances would enable the 
federal government to indirectly transfer wealth from rich households to poorer ones, which 
tended to contain more children (Usher 1951, pp. 27-28). A 1947 cross-national study of family 
allowances published by the International Labour Organization in fact singled out Canada’s 
                                                          
85 The constitutionality of the child allowance was upheld in 1957 by Canada’s Exchequer Court (Angers v. Minister 
of National Revenue 1957 found in Blake 2007, p. 208). 
 
86 St. Laurent went on to succeed King, becoming Canada’s new prime minister in the winter of 1948. 
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allowance scheme for its explicit emphasis on “the maintenance of domestic purchasing power, 
particularly that of lower income families,” (pp. 322-323).    
This approach went against the advice of several domestic social policy experts. 
Specialists in the field of social work, citing Beveridge, held that family allowances alone would 
do little to enhance public welfare in the absence of other, complementary social policies. The 
aforementioned Whitton, for instance, argued for an integrated system of “social utilities” such 
as schools, hospitals, daycare centers and affordable family housing (Blake 2009, p. 99). Critics 
also expressed concerns that, with a lofty price tag of $250 million per year—a monetary 
commitment which was likely to increase over time as Canada’s population grew—the family 
allowance would greatly limit the amount of federal funding available for other social programs 
(Blake 2009, p. 102). Such criticisms fell on deaf ears at the time, but similar arguments would 
later be used to much greater effect. 
 
Family Allowances and the Québec Nationalist Movement 
With nationalism steadily seeping into Québec’s political climate through the 1960s and 
1970s, provincial policy entrepreneurs sought to exploit the shortcomings of the federal family 
allowance program as a tactic to win Québec more autonomy over social policy. Echoing the 
concerns articulated by Whitton and others, Québec’s landmark Castonguay-Nepveu 
Commission report on health and social welfare, released in 1971, called for a comprehensive, 
provincially administered system of social and income security policies. Such a framework, the 
report argued, ought to be geared to providing a universal guaranteed income sufficient to 
cover one’s essential needs—an objective that necessitated the complete harmonization of 
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federal and provincial social programs. The blueprint proposed in the Castonguay-Nepveu 
report thus relegated the federal government to a secondary role as financier of provincially 
run programs (Blake 2007, p. 216). 
Québec’s political leaders saw the Castonguay-Nepveu commission’s findings as an 
opportunity to tie social policy to the ongoing multilevel dialogue surrounding the potential 
patriation87 of Canada’s constitution, a grand ambition of then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. 
Trudeau’s desperation to strike a deal with the provinces (and to placate Québec in particular) 
was palpable, giving Québécois negotiators leverage to extract a multitude of concessions on 
the family allowance and other social programs.  Led by reformist Premier Robert Bourassa (in 
office between 1970 and 1976), Québec lobbied to have family allowances added to Section 
94A of the then British North America Act, which empowered the provinces to create their own 
old age pension and supplementary benefit programs (Blake 2007, p. 222).  
Trudeau was not willing to go this far but, as an act of appeasement, he agreed to 
launch a major study centered on how to integrate federal and provincial social security 
policies. This review, conducted in the early part of 1973, resulted in significant changes in both 
the composition and the administration of family allowances (Blake 2007, p. 234). The reforms, 
which made their way through parliament in the fall of 1973, included a tripling of payouts, the 
indexation of allowances to the cost of living, and making allowances taxable on a progressive 
scale—calculated based on the income of the higher earning parent (Blake 2007, pp. 236-237; 
Battle 2008, p. 5). More consequentially, the family allowance overhaul empowered individual 
                                                          
87 At this point the British North America Act, a statute enacted by the British Parliament in 1867, was Canada’s de-
facto constitution. The patriation movement involved efforts on the part of federal and provincial politicians to 
forge a blueprint for a new ‘made in Canada’ constitution—a feat that was ultimately accomplished in 1982.  
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provinces to determine the amount paid out per child (beyond a floor mandated by the federal 
government) and variations in amount based on the age of the child or the size of a given family 
(Blake 2007, pp. 235-236). This marked the first time in Canadian history that a federally 
financed and administered program was subject to adjustment at the provincial level, signaling 
the beginning of a new era in intergovernmental relations (Blake, p. 230). 
Predictably, Québec was one of three provinces that elected to exercise its newly-won 
right to modify the family allowance. 88 Correcting the federal family allowance’s perceived bias 
against larger families, Québec’s new benefit was to increase with each child, plateauing at the 
fourth. The family allowance concession was perceived as a major policy victory for Bourassa’s 
Liberal government, which was re-elected with a strong mandate one month after announcing 
the new program; gaining 30 seats in Québec’s National Assembly to control 102 of its 110 total 
seats. The triumph inspired subsequent provincial governments—of both federalist and 
independentist orientations—to push for further policy autonomy (see Béland and Lecours 
2006).    
The 1973 family allowance expansion ultimately marked the acme of universal federal 
income supports for families with children. The oil shocks that commenced that fall ushered in 
a long period of austerity politics in Canada, as in and much of the industrialized world. The 
family allowance was, in fact, an early casualty of the times as policymakers could no longer 
justify sending monthly checks to middle and upper-income families while the new economic 
realities placed severe strains on even the most essential of social services (Bercuson et al. 
1986, p. 103). Federal funding for family allowances was steadily rerouted to income targeted 
                                                          
88 The provinces of Alberta and Prince Edward Island also adopted their own family allowance schemes.  
71 
 
family assistance programs through the late 1970s and 1980s (McKeen 2007, p. 154). These 
curtailments were generally carried out through stealthy, technocratic, and incremental tactics 
that evaded detection by the Canadian public—namely the de-indexation of benefits and 
clawbacks of payments to higher earners (See Battle 1993). The (by then greatly diminished) 
federal Family Allowance was scrapped all together by the Conservative government in 1993 
and replaced with an income-tested Child Tax Benefit (CTB) (Pierson and Myles 1997, p. 448).89    
Although largely overlooked by social policy scholars today (Blake 2009, p. 2), Canada’s 
universal family allowance program nevertheless left a significant policy legacy in that it 
provided Québec’s nationalist vanguard with a convenient focal point in their bid for greater 
policy autonomy. By wresting a measure of control over family allowances, Québec established 
an important precedent of pursuing a unilateral family policy. This would prove consequential 
as Québec later built North America’s most comprehensive system of child care and family 
benefits (see Section 3.6 of this chapter), a move which itself had significant ramifications for 
the national policy debate. 
 
3.3. The Canada Assistance Plan and its Policy Legacy 
 Multiple scholars point to the consolidation of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) as a 
critical juncture in setting the future trajectory of Canada’s family policy regime (see, e.g., 
Mahon 2000; Pasolli 2015). CAP, finalized in 1966, was the ultimate product of over two years 
of sustained federal-provincial negotiations aimed at developing a comprehensive, cross-
                                                          
89 Québec’s stand-alone universal family allowance continued through 1997, when it and several other programs 
were folded into the new, income-based Integrated Child Allowance (Baril et al. 2000).  
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national framework for the delivery of social services for those in need (Bella 1979, p. 451). The 
CAP agreements essentially represented a commitment, on the part of the federal government, 
to cover half the cost of most provincially-administered welfare and social assistance programs 
(Moscovitch 1988).   
The project was loosely patterned after the War on Poverty agenda that was being 
pursued at the time in the United States. Lester Pearson, then Canada’s prime minister, also 
sought to use CAP strategically to coopt the social policy agendas of multiple regionally-rooted 
political movements (Bella 1979, p. 440). Pearson was especially wary of two prairie-based 
parties: the collectivist New Democratic Party (NDP) (a successor party to the CCF), and the 
agrarian-populist Social Credit Party. Both parties had enjoyed long stretches in government at 
the provincial level (in Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively) and a federal breakthrough for 
either would likely have come at the expense of Pearson’s Liberal Party.  
 The Pearson government initially attempted to limit the scope of CAP to income 
maintenance and skill training programs for adults. However, led by Ontario—which by this 
point had by far the country’s most robust child advocacy network (see Mahon 2007; Section 
3.1 of this chapter)—the provinces made a successful push to have child welfare included under 
the CAP umbrella (Bella 1979, p. 449). Ottawa and the provinces ultimately agreed to a fifty-
fifty cost sharing arrangement for the provision of daycare services for the children of those 
deemed to be ‘in need’90 by provincial authorities (Hum 1983, p. 51). This was just one of 
                                                          
90 Under CAP a ‘person in need’ was defined as: “(a) a person who, by reason of inability to obtain employment, 
loss of the principal family, provider, illness, disability, age or other cause of any kind acceptable to the provincial 
authority, is found to be unable…to provide for himself, or for himself and his dependents or any of them, or (b) a 
person under the age of twenty-one years who is in the care or custody or under the control or supervision of a 
child welfare authority, or a person who is a foster-child[.]” (Hum 1983, p. 29). 
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several joint financing programs initiated under CAP. Others included subsidies for the blind, 
elderly, and disabled. All told, child welfare related spending comprised five percent of all 
federal CAP expenditures, totaling roughly twenty million dollars per year (about $150 million 
today) (Hum 1983, p. 37).   
 While undoubtedly conceived with the best interests of children in mind, CAP had the 
unanticipated consequence of limiting the scope of future reform efforts. As observed by 
Pasolli (2015, p. 48), CAP effectively embedded child welfare in the national social assistance 
framework, creating institutional resistance to subsequent efforts to universalize access to child 
care and other essential children’s services.  
The first of such efforts came just a few years later, when the landmark 1970 report of 
Canada’s Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) presented a link between 
modernizing Canada’s family policy regime and securing the equality of opportunity for women 
in the professional realm. The report’s findings gave feminist groups and their allies an opening 
to agitate for a national daycare program and other maternal employment supporting social 
policies. However, the feminist push saw only limited success as, by this point, CAP was already 
politically entrenched. I describe this episode in greater detail in the next section. 
 
3.4. The Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
 Influenced by a strong cross-national gender equality movement associated with 
‘second wave’ feminism,91 Canada’s Liberal government established the RCSW in 1967 
                                                          
91 Canada, at the time, was under pressure to ratify two separate gender equality conventions, which were being 
circulated by the United Nations and International Labour Organization, respectively (O’Connor et al. 1999, p. 208). 
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(O’Connor et al. 1999, p. 208). The commission, chaired by journalist Florence Bird, was given a 
mandate to “report upon the status of women in Canada, and to recommend what steps might 
be taken by the Federal Government to ensure for women equal opportunities with men in all 
aspects of Canadian society.” One central focus of the commission was “the present and 
potential role of women in the Canadian Labour force, including the special problem of married 
women in employment and measures that might be taken under federal jurisdiction to help in 
meeting them[.]” (Bird et al. 1970, vii). 
 After hearing the testimony of 890 witnesses and receiving over a thousand more 
written submissions (Bird et al. 1970, ix-x), the commission released its final report in the fall of 
1970. The report offered 167 recommendations for policymakers, the majority of which dealt 
with either the role of women in the labor force or the economic and social rights of women 
within the family structure.  
One major theme to come out of the report was the inadequacy of the extant CAP 
framework in providing the proper level of support for working mothers. For instance, the 
report found that “existing day-care services can serve only a fraction of [working] mothers” 
and that the CAP mandated needs test “discourages mothers from applying” for subsidized 
daycare spaces (p. 266). The authors also observed that “federal financial assistance to day-care 
centres through the Canada Assistance Plan ha[d] been ineffectual partly because it [was] 
limited to a share of operating costs only” and failed to provide adequate support for the 
capital costs incurred through the construction of new centers—a design flaw that exacerbated 
the chronic shortage of daycare spaces and other essential daycare infrastructure nationwide 
(pp. 269-270).  
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The report concluded that “private initiatives cannot cope with so large of a problem” 
and that “[the state] alone can plan and direct a well-ordered network of [daycare] services 
which will avoid the duplication of facilities in some areas to the neglect of other communities.” 
(p. 267). The commission accordingly recommended that “the federal government immediately 
take steps to enter into agreement with the provinces leading to the adoption of a national 
Day-Care Act.”  They suggested that the federal government pay half of operating costs and, 
during an initial start-up period, seventy percent of capital costs under this new national 
framework (p. 271). 
The authors estimated that an adequate national daycare system—covering one-tenth 
of all Canadian children under three and one-quarter of children between the ages of three and 
six—would cost $500 million (about $3.2 billion today and roughly 0.5% of GDP) per year to 
administer and proposed that the cost burden to government be defrayed by parental user fees 
levied on an income-based sliding scale. The report stated that an expanded, user fee 
supported daycare regime would “ensure that clients are drawn from all levels of society and 
would lift daycare out of the context of poverty.” The authors calculated that “[d]aily 
operational costs for a good day-care amount to approximately $4.60 [$29.50 in 2017 dollars] 
per child” but made no formal suggestion of what the standard parental user fee should be.  
The report also recommended that relevant federal and provincial employment laws be 
updated to grant all employed women the right to claim eighteen weeks of paid maternity 
leave without risk of losing their jobs during their time away from work (p. 87). At this point, 
only two Canadian provinces, British Columbia and New Brunswick, had mandatory maternity 
leave policies in place and leave times across the rest of the country varied widely from 
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employer to employer (p. 86). The commission suggested that the new maternity leave scheme 
be financed through the existing, contribution-based national unemployment assistance 
framework, which entitled workers to fifty-five percent of previous earnings during temporary 
periods outside of the labor force (pp. 87-88). The report made a passing reference the 
paternity leave model found in parts of Scandinavia but did not go so far as to recommend the 
creation of any new formal laws to entitle new fathers to paid leave from work (p. 273). 
  The RCSW and their feminist allies found a sympathetic ear in then Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau.92 The forward-thinking Trudeau had initiated a number of socially progressive 
reforms during an earlier stint as Canada’s Minister of Justice (1967-1968). This included 
legalizing both abortion and the use of pill form contraceptives, as well as significantly easing 
legal restrictions on divorce. As such, the RCSW agenda resonated ideationally with the 
forward-thinking prime minister and he stood to bolster his reputation as a social reformer by 
implementing the commission’s recommendations. Trudeau also saw the pan-Canadian 
women’s movement, which brought together francophone and Anglophone feminist groups, as 
a potential bulwark for national unity (Vickers et al. 1993, p. 82). Trudeau, who at this point 
controlled a comfortable majority of the seats in Canada’s parliament, acted quickly on several 
of the RCSW recommendations. 
Within a year of the report’s publication, the Trudeau government passed a federal 
maternity leave law that entitled all new mothers with twenty or more insurable weeks of work 
experience to claim fifteen weeks of cash benefits through the unemployment assistance 
system (Statistics Canada 2003). Though this fell short of the eighteen-week period suggested 
                                                          
92 Pierre Trudeau was the father of incumbent Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau. 
77 
 
by the RCSW, it was nevertheless a vital step in making Canada’s employment regime more 
family friendly. Other significant changes stemming from the RCSW report included new federal 
legislation mandating pay equity in the public service and prohibiting hiring discrimination on 
the grounds of gender or family status (p. 45). Institutionally, the report led to the creation of a 
cabinet-level Minister for the Status of Women in Canada (SWC) portfolio and women’s offices 
in both the federal public service and the Privy Council of Canada (O’Connor et al. 1999, p. 209). 
These institutional reforms were later replicated by most of the provinces (Brodie 2008, p. 153).  
Another important consequence of the RCSW was the formation of the National Action 
Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). NAC—an umbrella organization comprised of over 
thirty allied feminist groups—was established in 1972 with the objective of sustaining pressure 
on policymakers to implement the remainder of the commission’s recommendations (Vickers et 
al. 1993, p. 4). NAC soon became Canada’s preeminent women’s advocacy network and 
anointed itself the “legitimate [national] parliament of women” (Vickers et al. 1993, p. 69). Its 
ranks swelled to 140 constituent groups by the end of the decade and would reach nearly 600 
by the late 1980s – with a combined membership of approximately five million Canadian 
women (Bashevkin 1996, p. 220; Vickers et al. 1993, pp. 4, 107). Critically, NAC managed to 
secure the inclusion of language endorsing gender equality in Canada’s constitutionally-
enshrined Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was promulgated in 1982; coincidentally the 
same year that the Equal Rights Amendment was defeated south of the border (Hosek 1983).  
Progress was more slow-going on the RCSW’s recommendations pertaining to daycare 
as Prime Minister Trudeau expressed a hesitancy to encroach on what he viewed as provincial 
terrain—especially as sovereigntist sentiment had begun to foment in Québec. Trudeau 
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reaffirmed this trepidation in a direct correspondence with NAC President Doris Anderson, 
writing: “The delivery of social services is a provincial jurisdiction, with the federal government 
having no authority to deliver child care services directly, except in its own limited jurisdiction 
[under CAP],” (29 June 1982, found in Timpson 2002, p. 57). One notable concession Trudeau 
did make was to extend federal CAP payments to offset daycare infrastructure and capital costs 
(White 2017, p. 204). The Trudeau government also provided funding for a NAC organized 
national daycare conference, convened in Winnipeg in the fall of 1982. One month prior to his 
retirement from politics in the summer of 1984, Trudeau announced the creation of a new, 
four-person task force on child care.93   
One final, unintended reverberation of the RCSW was the ensuing proliferation of a 
countervailing organized anti-feminist movement. This cause has been championed most visibly 
by the Toronto-based REAL (Realistic, Equal and Active for Life) Women of Canada, established 
in 1983. As the acronym ‘REAL.’ indicates, the organization was founded on the premise that 
Canada’s official women’s movement had been highjacked by feminist ideologues and purports 
to be a voice for the ‘silent majority’ of Canadian women who support traditional family values 
(“About REAL Women of Canada” 2016). REAL. was further galvanized by the controversial R. 
vs. Morgentaler Supreme Court decision of 1987, which struck down all legal restrictions on the 
procurement of abortions in Canada. Having now cultivated a strong donor base and allies at 
various levels of government, REAL is arguably the most influential women’s organization in 
Canada today, with a grassroots membership base of 50,000 across over one hundred affiliate 
groups (Interviewee no. 12, 6 March 2018). 
                                                          




3.5. The Push for a National Daycare Program: Take One 
 Canada’s women’s movement remained mobilized and relatively influential through the 
early-to-mid 1980s, in fact comparing favorably to counterparts in the other liberal welfare 
states (Bashevkin 1996; Brodie 2008; Rodgers and Knight 2011). The high-water mark for 
organized feminism in Canada arguably came during the fall 1984 federal election campaign, 
when the leaders of all three major parties participated in a televised debate on women’s 
issues. The debate, organized by NAC, is to date the only event of its kind in Canadian history 
(Richardson 2014, p. 23).  
 Progressive Conservative (PC) Brian Mulroney, who emerged from the 1984 election 
with a sizeable parliamentary majority, was greeted with a cautious optimism by NAC and other 
advocacy groups. Straining to differentiate himself from hardliner contemporaries Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Mulroney had pleasantly surprised many feminists with his 
conciliatory campaign pitches; promising to, for instance, combat ongoing injustices 
perpetrated against Aboriginal women and fight for greater representation of women in 
executive and elective positions (Bashevkin 1996, p. 219). 
 Leading by example, Mulroney appointed six women to his first cabinet of forty 
parliamentarians. Two – Flora MacDonald and Patricia Carney – received senior cabinet posts 
(“Twenty-Fourth Ministry”, 2018).94 Prior to this point in Canada’s history, no more than three 
women had ever served concurrently in a federal cabinet, making Mulroney’s sextet a 
meaningful departure from the status quo (Chappell 2003, p. 80). Mulroney subsequently 
                                                          
94 Employment and Immigration and Energy, Mines, and Resources, respectively (“Twenty-Fourth Ministry, 2018).  
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appointed an unprecedented number of women to federal agencies, the senior civil service, the 
Senate, and the Supreme Court of Canada (Bashekvin 1998, p. 123). These personnel moves 
reflected a desire on the part of Mulroney to placate, and potentially even coopt, organized 
feminists.  
 As a further putative gesture of good faith toward women’s groups, Mulroney soon 
turned his attention to Canada’s still unresolved daycare question. The child care task force that 
had been set up by Trudeau released its final report in the spring of 1986, calling for a 
nationwide universal system of child care to be co-financed through federal and provincial 
monies, as well as modest parental user fees (Friendly 2006). Mulroney quickly endorsed the 
task force’s mission and set up his own special committee, composed of elected members of 
parliament from all parties, to develop an appropriate child care strategy.  
 Mulroney’s child care committee released its own report one year later. The 
committee’s report, titled Sharing the Responsibility, recommended $700 million per year 
(0.14% of GDP)95 in new federal spending for child care. This proposed federal funding package 
comprised: a new child care expense credit worth a maximum of $900 annually per child; a 
yearly tax refund of up to $200 per child for parents who utilized unlicensed care; new capital 
and operating grants for daycare centers; and tax incentives to encourage private businesses to 
set up on-site daycare centers. All told, roughly sixty percent of the proposed spending was 
earmarked for parental tax credits and direct payments (reported in “Day-care Proposals Called 
Backward Step” 1987). The parliamentary report was greeted with immediate skepticism by 
                                                          
95 Based on an estimated GDP of $500 billion (Department of Finance Canada 1987, Annex 2) 
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women’s groups, who held that the proposed system would do little to shore up the country’s 
severe shortage of daycare spaces (“Report on Day-care Condemned” 1987). 96  
The report nevertheless provided a basic template for the Mulroney government’s 
subsequent $6.4 billion national child care strategy, unveiled in December 1987 by then 
Minister of Health and Welfare Jake Epp. Ceding some ground to the critics, the national 
strategy reduced the scope of parental tax credits and deductions (which would now comprise 
just over one-third of federal child care spending), and also established a target of 200,000 new 
child care spaces over seven years—roughly one-quarter of the number needed to keep pace 
with the long-run goal (endorsed by both the Mulroney government and Child Care Task Force) 
of making affordable child care available to all families in need by the early-2000s (Friendly 
2006).97 The strategy earmarked four billion dollars in federal funds over seven years (about 
0.1% of GDP)98 in support of the new spaces, which would be delivered through a to-be-
determined federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangement.     
 Pursuant to the child care strategy announcement, the Mulroney government 
introduced Bill C-144, The Canada Child Care Act, in the House of Commons in June of 1988. Bill 
C-144 dealt primarily with the obligations of the federal government under the forthcoming 
cost-sharing arrangement with the provinces, as the concomitant tax measures had already 
been appended to the federal Income Tax Act. Under the proposed child care act, the federal 
                                                          
96 According to one estimate of the state of child care in 1987, Canada’s existing supply of 243,545 licensed spaces 
met only thirteen percent of the need from children aged twelve and under (Phillips 1989, p. 166).  
 
97 Figure calculated by the author using the estimated shortage of child care spaces (1.65 million) (Corroborated in 
“Bill C-144: A Critique of the Proposed Child Care Act” 1988).  
 
98 Figure calculated by the author using a baseline GDP of $500 billion per year. 
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government would share operating costs on a fifty-fifty basis and cover seventy-five percent of 
capital costs, up to a maximum of the previously announced four billion over seven years 
(Philips 1989, pp. 166-7).  
 While a definite improvement on the framework presented in the first committee 
report, Bill C-144 was still opposed by NAC and over twenty allied groups (Lind and Prentice 
1991, 106). Child care advocates found the complete absence of provisions for national 
standards, caregiver qualifications, and quality benchmarks to be especially problematic (“Bill C-
144: A Critique of the Proposed Canada Childcare Act” 1988). The relevant sections of the draft 
legislation, written in a nearly indecipherable legalese, stated only that Ottawa would jointly 
deliberate with each province: “the aspects of child care services in respect of which standards 
are required to be implemented in the province and the time within which they are to be 
implemented” (Sections 4.1. (c) and (d), found in Teghtsoonian 1993, p. 108). Moreover, while 
the four billion dollars promised by the federal government was a good start, it ultimately 
placed a hard cap on child care related transfers to the provinces, which up to this point had 
been delivered through the open-ended CAP system (Timpson 2001, p. 152). The federal 
government’s decision to extend funding eligibility under the child care act to commercial 
operators was also controversial, although the acceptability of for-profit providers was already 
an issue that split child care advocates along both ideological and regional lines (Rebick 2005, 
Chap. 5; Interviewee no. 16)  
 There were legitimate reasons for the Mulroney government to tread lightly on each of 
the abovementioned areas. With child care already established as an area of provincial 
jurisdiction, strict federal standards for program delivery would rest on shaky constitutional 
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footing—although some advocates pointed out that federal lawmakers had sidestepped this 
problem earlier by orienting Canada’s national health care legislation around a more flexible set 
of ‘objectives’ (Teghtsoonian 1993, p. 108). Further, roughly forty percent of Canada’s existing 
child care spaces at the time were commercially operated, which made the wholesale exclusion 
of for-profit providers from the federal program a political non-starter (Timpson 2001, p. 152). 
Bill C-144 also included an ‘opt-out’ clause that gave individual provinces an option to decline 
the new federal funding and continue to receive support for child care under the pre-existing, 
open-ended CAP arrangement (“Bill C-144: A Critique of the Proposed Child Care Act” 1988). 
 Bill C-144 made its way through the House of Commons before the summer was out, 
but then got held up in the Senate, which still held a sizeable Liberal majority. Concerned by 
what they perceived as a lack of due diligence by the Progressive Conservative majority in the 
lower house—who appeared to be eager for a quick win on social policy in the lead-up to the 
expected fall election campaign—members of the Senate elected to strike up their own 
Subcommittee on Child Care (Friendly 2000, p. 14). The Senate committee moved at a more 
deliberate pace, soliciting testimony from a wide range of stakeholders, including several of the 
abovementioned opponents of the bill (Phillips 1989, pp. 171-2). The detour in the Senate 
caused the clock to run out on the child care bill, which was shelved when Mulroney moved to 
dissolve parliament in early October.  
 Child care received a fair deal of attention at the outset of the fall 1988 federal election 
campaign,99 but the race ultimately broke down into a de facto referendum on free trade with 
                                                          
99 The Liberal Party promised to create 400,000 new spaces over seven years, at a cost of $7.8 billion. The NDP did 
not pledge any more money for child care but promised to deliver the promised 200,000 spaces in just 3.5 years 
(Phillips 1989, p. 172). 
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the United States (see Brodie 1989). Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives lost thirty-four seats 
and seven percent of the popular vote in the November 21st ballot, yet nevertheless returned 
to Ottawa with an intact parliamentary majority and a mandate to move forward with the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Mulroney’s second and final term (1988-1993) was 
subsequently dominated by the mammoth agendas of continental free trade and constitutional 
reform—and often sidetracked by a steady drip of scandals—leaving insufficient time, 
resources, and political will for another substantial social policy initiative. 
 The collapse of Bill C-144 ultimately marked a significant turning point for advocacy 
groups and effectively set off a “decades-long erosion and delegitimization of [Canada’s] 
women’s movement” (Rodgers and Knight 2011, p. 570). NAC’s standing with the federal 
government suffered an immediate and precipitous decline; so much so that the minister 
responsible for the status of women, Barbara McDougall, refused to even meet with members 
of the NAC lobby during their 1989 conference at Parliament Hill (Bashevkin 1995, p. 233).  
Lamented one NAC activist: “We had no [child care] bill because we killed it. The government 
sure was mad at us.” (Quoted in Bashevkin 1995, p. 237). NAC’s vocal opposition to continental 
free trade and the Mulroney government’s constitutional reform agenda created further strains 
with Ottawa (Lambert and Anderson 2006). 
 The falling-out was reflected in a steady loss of federal monetary support. NAC’s core 
operating grant of $600,000 per year was reduced by twenty percent in the 1989 budget and 
was halved by 1991 (Bashevkin 1996, p. 232; Pal 1993, p. 228). Funding also dried up for the 
Women’s Program, a grant issuing body maintained within the federal Department of the 
Secretary of State. The Women’s Program, which had distributed nearly $12.5 million in grant 
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monies over the 1987-88 fiscal year, was an indispensable patron for multiple federal and 
provincial advocacy groups, including NAC and the Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association 
(Pal 1993, p. 224). Federal support for women’s groups continued to decline through the 
1990s—this despite the election of a more ideologically friendly Liberal government in 1993 
(See Figure 3.1). The loss of government patronage caused long-simmering tensions within NAC 
to boil over, leaving the organization in disarray.100 
 
                   From Rogers and Knight 2011, p. 572 
  
While the deteriorating economic climate of the time meant that federal funding for 
women’s groups would likely have been slated for cuts anyways, it’s worth noting that 1989 
was also the year that REAL Women first obtained federal grant money through the Women’s 
Program, receiving a modest payment of $21,212 to help put together their annual general 
                                                          
100 Chaviva M. Hošek, who served as president of NAC between 1983 and 1986 before going on to serve a number 
of senior posts in politics, academia, and business, spoke of her time with NAC as “the harshest political experience 
[she] ever had,” remarking that she was “shocked by the divisiveness” of the organization (Goar 2005).  
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meeting in Ottawa. The pro-family organization had filed three unsuccessful applications with 
the Women’s Program in the years prior (Steuter 1992, p. 300). The Women’s Program’s about-
face on REAL broke from a longstanding internal policy of only issuing grants to ‘equality-
seeking’ entities (Pal 1993, p. 147). 
 As has been observed elsewhere (see: Collier 2015; Rodgers and Knight 2011), one irony 
about the Canadian women’s movement is that was, to some degree, a victim of its own early 
success in engaging the federal government. NAC’s initially cozy relationship with Ottawa 
meant that it did not need to develop much of a grassroots fundraising structure. However, as 
the organization would soon find out the hard way, being so heavily reliant on the federal 
government’s patronage made it highly vulnerable to changes in the political climate. 
Moreover, early wins on constitutional reform and abortion created heightened expectations 
among members that proved unrealistic as NAC took on more complex, multi-jurisdictional 
issues like child care.101 With the national women’s movement down-and-out and the federal 
government preoccupied, for the time being, with slashing deficits and getting back into the 
good graces of creditors, the next significant family policy innovation would be pursued at the 
provincial level. 
   
3.6. Québec’s Family Policy ‘Breakthrough’ 
 Starting with the release of the abovementioned Castonguay-Nepveu report in 1971, 
the province of Québec has followed a quasi-autonomous course on public health and social 
                                                          




welfare policies (Jenson 2013, p. 631).102 While Québec’s ‘go-it-alone’ approach has at times 
been merely symbolic, with provincial social programs being almost identical to the 
corresponding federally-administered ones found in the other provinces (McRoberts 1993, p. 
141), family policy is one area where the differences have been meaningful. Such deviations 
from the national current have reflected logics of pronatalism, feminism, and solidarism at 
various points in time. This has resulted in an anomalous long-run policy trajectory that 
combines elements of the conservative, liberal, and social democratic policy paradigms (see 
Jenson 2013). I focus on two substantial reforms—the 1988 baby bonus and the new family 
policy agenda initiated in 1997—as well as the legacy that the later has left for the rest of the 
country.  
 
The Baby Bonus  
 Owing to the steady decline in birth rates over the two decades prior, Québécois 
policymakers embraced a new paradigm of “demographic pronatalism” in the 1980s (Maroney 
1992, p. 7). The pronatalist narrative, constructed by nationalists in both major provincial 
parties and an influential cadre of academic demographers,103 cast Québec’s fertility slump as 
an existential threat to the province’s continued survival as a culturally and linguistically distinct 
entity within a “sea of North American Englishness.” (Maroney 1992, p. 8). After two 
provincewide consultations on family policy (conducted in 1982 and 1987, respectively) and a 
                                                          
102 Québec also developed province-specific programs for social assistance and pensions (cite) 
 
103 As observed by Maroney (1992), most of Québec’s professional demographers had received training at the 
French Institute of Demographic Studies (INED), which was well-known for its positivist and pronatalist curriculum, 
particularly under founding director Alfred Sauvy (1945-62). 
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series of high-profile provincial Cultural Commission hearings (1984-5), the then governing 
Liberals unveiled a new ‘baby bonus’ scheme in the spring of 1988.   
 Reflecting a long-standing cultural veneration of la famille nombreuse (Maroney 1992, 
p. 21), the new, non-taxable baby bonuses escalated with birth order. The payments, delivered 
in the form of an advance on income tax credits, were initially set at $500 for the first and 
second child and then $3,000 for the third child and each additional child. Following two rounds 
of increases, the payouts plateaued in 1992 at: $500 for the first child, $1,000 for the second 
child, and $7,500104 for each additional child (Levesque 1991, p. 61). Adding to what was 
already the most generous family benefits regime in North America, the baby bonuses reflected 
a modern pronatalism “based not on religious exhortation but on the monetary incentives of 
the market-driven new family economics” (Maroney 1992, p. 26).  
 Although followed by a perceptible bump in the provincial birth rate (Kay 1990), the 
baby bonus was not universally celebrated. Feminists, who constituted a critical swing 
demographic in both provincial elections and the sovereignty debate (see Jenson 2013, p. 644), 
criticized the policy for perpetuating a ‘biological-reductionist’ worldview that made 
motherhood the centerpiece of feminine identity (Maroney 1992, p. 12). One more pragmatic 
line of objection related to the advisability of making payments escalate with birth order as a 
family’s major capital investment typically comes following the birth of the first child—the 
marginal cost decreasing with each additional birth (Maroney 1992, p. 27). Fortunately for the 
critics, they would not have to wait long to challenge the primacy of the baby bonus. 
                                                          
104 This sum was paid out in quarterly installments, through the child’s fourth birthday, so as to discourage the 




The 1997 Reforms 
The mid-1990s provided a suitable opening for a change of direction due to several 
accommodating factors, paramount among which was a dire need for the then governing Parti 
Québécois (PQ) to refurbish its political brand. A polarizing fall 1995 referendum on Québec’s 
independence saw the proposed motion to secede from Canada fail by a margin of just over 
one percent. Narrow though it was, the defeat of the sovereignty bid nevertheless triggered the 
immediate resignation of then Premier Jacques Parizeau, the de facto leader of the pro-
secession camp. On his way out, Parizeau publicly attributed the referendum result to “money 
and the ethnic vote” (Farnsworth 1995).  
Parizeau’s parting shot, an escalation of the ‘leave’ side’s already charged rhetoric, 
cemented widespread perceptions of the PQ as reactionary, xenophobic, and downright racist. 
The persistent characterization of the party as an ethno-nationalist entity was especially 
problematic given the ambiguous international law surrounding secession and the spate of 
ethnic violence that had accompanied the then ongoing secessionist claims-making in the 
former Yugoslavia and elsewhere (Hebert 2008, pp. 151-2). In short, any viable future claim to 
Québec’s political autonomy (from both a domestic and global perspective) would need to be 
built on more than just language and ethnicity (Beland and Lecours 2006, p. 82).  
With sovereignty off the table for the time being, the PQ government looked to re-
embrace its social democratic roots. In an effort to formalize this change in tone and establish 
the appropriate set of policy objectives, the party convened a Summit on the Economy and 
Employment in October of 1996. The Summit marked the first time in the province’s history 
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that the government opened formal ‘quadripartite’ policy consultations with representatives 
from labor, business, and civil society groups (Lévesque and Mendell 1999, p. 17). Despite 
differing motivations and agendas heading into the summit, the parties ultimately forged a 
consensus around the new paradigm of Social Economy, which proposed a synergistic 
relationship between public, voluntary, and for-profit entities acting jointly in pursuit of the 
collective well-being. The model specified a critical role for cooperatives, mutual benefit 
societies, and civic associations (Bouchard 2013).  
One of the key substantive items to come out of the summit was a new blueprint for 
family policy as feminists, child development experts, and other participants were able to sell 
then premier Lucien Bouchard on the necessity (and potential political upside) of a complete 
overhaul (Jenson 2013, p. 628). A government white paper released two months after the 
summit’s conclusion (Les enfants au cœur de nos choix) outlined the core priorities that would 
shape the government’s new approach to family policy and unveiled a corresponding set of 
planned reforms. Placing a distinct—and, to this point in the province’s history, 
unprecedented—emphasis on promoting employment and the equality of opportunity, the 
document proposed: a new targeted family allowance (available to all low-income parents with 
dependents under the age of eighteen), a new paid parental leave scheme (delinked from 
unemployment insurance), various child-friendly modifications of the provincial tax code, full 
and half-day kindergarten for five and four year-olds (respectively), and, most prominently, five 
dollar per day child care for children aged four and under (Jenson 2013, p. 646).105 
                                                          
105 The program was scheduled to begin, in September 1997, with four-year olds and then incrementally expand to 
younger ages until all children were eligible by the fall of 2001 (Gouvernement du Québec 1997, p. 21). This target 
was reached in September 2000, one year ahead of schedule (Jenson 2013, p. 652-3).  
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The new direction in family policy signified a critical defeat for pronatalists, who lost 
their favored escalating ‘baby bonus’. In fact, the newly-integrated family allowance paid out a 
higher sum for first-borns than it did for later-borns, reserving the highest payouts ($3,900 
annually) for the first-born children of single parents (Gouvernement du Québec 1997, p. 15). 
Moreover, increasing the birth rate was formally removed from the province’s list of family 
policy objectives (Jenson 2013, p. 625). The shift away from pronatalism was astute politics, as 
the PQ sought to avoid any action that could draw accusations of nativism from elsewhere in 
Canada (see Beland and Lecours 2010, pp. 82-3). However, one downside of this de-emphasis 
of reproduction (and the role of mothers therein) was a concomitant de-gendering of family 
policy as a whole. Jenson (2013) observes a “discernible decline in the rhetoric of gender 
equality in the post-1997 Family Policy as compared to its predecessors,” (p. 660).   
In keeping with the Social Economy concept, and in particular its emphasis on the 
inclusion of ‘third sector’ civil society actors, the new child care services would be delivered 
through a network of non-profit ‘Centres de la Petite Enfance’ (CPEs) and smaller home-based 
daycares.106 Each CPE was to be governed by a board of directors composed of at least seven 
persons, with a requirement that at least two-thirds of board members be the parents of 
program enrollees (Friendly et al. 2007, p. 65). The CPEs were authorized to accommodate 
between eight and eighty children, subject to provincially established space requirements and 
staff-to-child ratios (“Types of childcare services” 2018).  
While the CPEs managed day-to-day administration, the provincial government’s role 
would be to provide requisite financing to cover the gap between the mandated five dollar a 
                                                          
106 Home-based daycares in Québec may only serve a maximum of six children (Friendly et al 2018, p. 50).  
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day user fee and program operating costs, primarily through direct grants to individual centers 
(Jenson 2013, p. 652). The Province, which had placed a moratorium on new licenses for 
commercial daycare centers in 1995, initially envisioned that the remaining for-profit centers 
would be absorbed into the CPE structure. However, facing an unexpected level of organized 
resistance from commercial operators and a desperate need for the spaces they could 
contribute to the system, officials begrudgingly made the new subsidies available to select for-
profit providers, although at a less generous level than what the non-profits received. The 
moratorium on new commercial licenses was lifted 2002, leading to a steady increase in the 
amount of for-profit daycare spaces as a percentage of the total (Jenson 2006, pp. 12, 14).107   
Even with the continued involvement of for-profit operators, Québec’s new daycare 
program was a complete game-changer. Starting from a baseline of around 54,000 total spaces 
in 1997 (Senkiw 2003, p. 16), the program generated an average of 15,000 new subsidized 
spaces per year over the first eight years of its existence. Although the rate of growth slowed 
somewhat from there, Québec accumulated a total stock of over 215,000 subsidized spaces by 
the early 2010s (Fortin et al. 2012, p. 3)—enough to serve roughly half of all children aged four 
and under. The number has since surpassed 230,000 (Friendly et al 2018, pp. 44, 51). While 
parental fees have increased over the years—now starting at a baseline of $8.05 per day and 
rising incrementally for parents who earn more than $50,000 per year (see “Daily daycare 
costs” 2018)—Québec still offers parents, by a wide margin, Canada’s most affordable daycare 
services. The per space cost of daycare is, in fact, three times higher in Manitoba, the province 
                                                          
107 Longitudinal studies of daycare services in Québec have produced substantial evidence that commercial 
operators systematically provide lower quality care than non-profit ones (see Japel et al 2007) 
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that comes closest, and over six times higher in neighboring Ontario (see Table 1). The program 
is also relatively cost-effective with an annual budget of roughly $2.5 billion, approximately 
0.6% of provincial GDP (Fortin 2017). This actually puts Québec slightly below the average, 
among OECD members, of 0.7% GDP spent on early childhood education and care (“Public 
spending on childcare and early childhood education” 2016). 
 
             Table 1 – Cost of center-based child care by province 
Province 
Median annual parent fee per space, 
combined infant, toddler, preschooler (2015) 






New Brunswick $8,052 
Nova Scotia $8,816 
Prince Edward Island $7,224 
Newfoundland-Labrador $9,336 
National Average $8,544 
              Source: Press and Leung 2015 
 
 Just as their architects had hoped, Québec’s 1997 family policy reforms laid the 
groundwork for a new claim to cultural distinctiveness based on social solidarity. The province’s 
consistently popular daycare program has, in particular, become a focal point of this self-styled 
‘solidarism’ (See Beland and Lecours 2010, pp. 83-6).  However, it would be a mistake to 
overstate the magnitude of the changes as Québec’s family policy regime has retained both 
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neoliberal and familial elements. In addition to the growth of the for-profit child care sector and 
the shift to income-targeted family benefits discussed above, Québec has preserved Canada’s 
only universal tax credit for families with children—in conformity with the long-running familial 
tradition of direct, flat-rate parental subsidies (Jenson 2013, p. 648).108 Making note of such 
aberrations, Jenson (2013) classifies Québec as a “mixed regime… falling more on the market 
performance side,” (p. 627). 
 
Criticisms of the Québec Model 
Although justifiably celebrated, Québec’s daycare program has not been immune from 
criticism—much of which is valid. Observers have been especially critical of the uneven 
distribution of spaces, leading to excess capacity in some parts of the province and multiyear 
wait-times in less well-served areas (Campbell 2006, pp. 210-11; Jenson 2013, pp. 655-56). 
Moreover, serious concerns have been raised with regards to the fairness of the system, as 
higher-income parents have been shown to receive preferential access to in-demand spaces 
(“Quebec’s unfair lottery” 2009). Perhaps most troublingly, lingering fears about the general 
quality of care provided through the system, and the potential long-run developmental 
consequences therein, have been validated in recent studies (see Baker et al. 2015; Haeck et al. 
2015). These shortcomings are widely acknowledged by proponents and detractors of universal 
child care alike. In fact, multiple advocates with whom I spoke cited the legacy of Québec’s 
program as a mixed one for other provinces. 
                                                          
108 The non-refundable tax credit is, at present, worth a minimum of $676 for the first child and $625 for each 
additional child (“Child Assistant Payments – Quebec” 2018). 
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 “The issues with Québec’s program are long-standing,” remarked one of my 
interviewees, a former chief-of-staff to a federal minister; noting that the government of 
Québec has knowingly sacrificed program quality in order to keep daily user fees in the single-
digits, thereby encouraging advocates elsewhere to emphasize unrealistic price targets 
(Interviewee no. 4, 24 August 2017). For instance, child care activists in the province of British 
Columbia have made the price point of ten dollars per day central to their branding (see: 
10aday.ca).  
 Other interviewees expressed similar sentiments. One, a Montréal-based academic who 
has done extensive longitudinal research on the quality of daycare services in Québec, 
lamented that misinformed observers in other provinces cling to an idealized vision of the 
‘Québec Model’: “People don’t really understand what’s going on here. They think that we have 
this great system when, in reality, the quality is just not that good,” noting, in particular, the 
proliferation of substandard for-profit care and the most lopsided staff-to-child ratios in the 
country (Interviewee no. 14, 29 March 2018). 
 Evidence of negative developmental outcomes stemming from questionable program 
quality is beginning to come to light as the program’s earliest cohorts reach adulthood. A 
controversial 2015 working paper, co-authored by economists from the University of British 
Columbia, University of Toronto, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, linked the 
introduction of Québec’s subsidized daycare program in the fall of 1997 to a “sizeable negative 
shock in non-cognitive skills… with little impact on cognitive test scores”, finding that “cohorts 
with increased child care access subsequently had worse health, lower life satisfaction, and [for 
boys] higher crime rates later in life,” (Baker et al. 2015, abstract). Although the authors utilized 
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a dubious methodology that grouped program enrollees and non-enrollees together (See 
Gordon 2015), the study nevertheless received substantial media attention due to the 
proximity of its release to Canada’s fall 2015 general election.109 Another 2015 study, published 
in the journal Labor Economics, found evidence of a negative effect on school readiness for 
daycare attendees from low-income households (Haeck et al. 2015). 
 The excessive focus on Québec has fostered an insular national discourse, giving 
neoliberal critics pretense to use these acknowledged shortcomings as an indictment of the 
general concept of universal child care. One recent example is a March 2017 bulletin put out by 
the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute, arguably Canada’s most influential think tank,110 which 
characterized Québec’s daycare program as “a flawed policy model” and claimed that “the 
evidence from a number of jurisdictions, but especially Québec, casts major doubt on the 
notion that there are important [developmental and labor market] returns that can be 
expected from current spending on daycare programs of the Québec model,” (Geloso and Eisen 
2017, p. 7).  
Such commentary is both malicious and ironic as several of the defects of Québec’s 
daycare program can be traced back to residual neoliberal components. For instance, 
commercial daycare centers, which have been shown to provide a consistently inferior quality 
of care versus CPEs and family daycare (see Japel et al. 2005), have expanded steadily and now 
provide just over twenty percent of all subsidized spaces (see Figure 3.2). One child care expert 
                                                          
109 One of the study’s co-authors, Kevin Milligan, has expressed regret that the paper was released so close to the 
2015 election (personal correspondence, 3 January 2018).  
 
110 “The Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”, published annually by the University of Pennsylvania, has ranked 
the Fraser Institute as the top think tank in Canada over each of the past ten years. The Fraser Institute was ranked 
twenty-first overall and fourth in social policy in the most recent set of rankings (see: McGann 2018, pp. 62, 126).  
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whom I interviewed went so far as to characterize the ideologically-tinged attacks on the 
Québec model as the product of a “concerted conservative campaign” to delegitimize the 
Canadian child care movement (Interviewee no. 15, 29 March 2018).  
 
        Source: Friendly et al. 2007; 2018 
 
Be that as it may, there is some limited evidence that the continued negative press 
surrounding Québec’s daycare program could be dampening support for universal child care 
elsewhere in the country. While public opinion polls on child care have been all over the map 
(see Environics 2006; Vanier Institute 2003), the 2015 edition of the Canadian National Election 
Study—the country’s most comprehensive and reliable public opinion dataset—recorded a ten 
percent decline in the proportion of respondents who agreed that the government should 












Figure 3.2  - Regulated Daycare Spaces 




                             Table 2 – “What should the government do?” (Survey Question)  
 2008 2011 2015 
 
Fund public daycare    63.4% 63.2% 53.4% 
 
Give money directly to parents 29.5% 29.0% 32.8% 
 
Don't know/no response 7.1% 7.8% 13.7% 
    
Respondents: 2451 3362 7288 
      Source: Canadian National Election Study 
 
3.7. The ‘Children’s Agenda’ Pivot 
 While the fallout from Québec’s 1995 referendum gave provincial activists an opening 
to pursue an ambitious new social agenda, it had much the opposite effect on federal 
policymakers. Caught off-guard by the closeness of the vote, the federal government promised, 
in its 1996 Speech from the Throne,111 to limit federal involvement in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction and to compensate provinces that elected to ‘opt-out’ of coordinated initiatives in 
favor of their own, comparable stand-alone programs. This was a clear effort to preempt future 
accusations of its meddling in Québec’s internal affairs (Harmes 2007, p. 421). Ottawa’s self-
imposed exile from provincial matters closed the door, for the time being, on the prospect of 
any major new pan-Canadian social policy initiatives.  
Yet one power that Ottawa retained—and which the provinces were more than happy 
for it to exercise—was its capacity to compensate certain families directly through the income 
tax system (Mahon and Phillips 2013, p. 422). This explains why the parties were able to reach a 
consensus in favor of a new National Child Benefit (NCB) system in 1997. 
                                                          
111 Broadly similar to the State of the Union Address in the United States, the Speech from the Throne—delivered 
at the opening of each parliamentary session by the Governor General—outlines the federal government’s core 
legislative priorities for the year. 
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Created in response to a concerning national trend of worsening child poverty,112 the 
NCB was premised around the reconfiguration of the existing federal child tax benefit, which 
was substantially increased (by around $650 million per year) and had its prior cap of $500 per 
family removed. Announced in the 1997 federal budget, the new Canada Child Tax Benefit 
(CCTB) was worth a maximum of $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, and $330 for each 
additional child. In response to the increased financial support from Ottawa, the provinces 
agreed to reallocate monies previously earmarked for their own social assistance payments to 
frontline services for low-income families with children (Battle 1997, pp. 2-3).113  
Policymakers hoped that the NCB would “take children off welfare” by replacing the 
preexisting matrix of multilevel child welfare payments with a single consolidated child benefit 
available to all low-income households with children, irrespective of parental employment 
status. This essentially gave all Canadian children a basic minimum income (Pierson and Myles 
1997, p. 448). The policy was a major win for the provinces, which gained fiscal breathing room 
from the higher federal transfers to low-income families without having to sacrifice policy 
autonomy. Québec nevertheless exercised its recently established right to opt-out, declining to 
participate in the program (Noël 2012, p. 425). 
As memories of the 1995 referendum faded and federal budget surpluses accumulated, 
Canada’s Liberal government tepidly reasserted itself into a position of leadership on family 
policy. On the heels of the NCB, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signaled his intention to develop 
                                                          
112 By 1995, the national child poverty rate sat at twenty-one percent, having increased by just under six percent 
since the beginning of the decade. The rate remained stubbornly high despite a recovering economy and falling 
unemployment through the mid-1990s (Battle 1997, p. 2).  
 
113 On average, around 39% of provincial revenues saved through the NCB were rerouted to child care subsidies 
(Mahon and Phillips 2013, p. 425). 
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a more comprehensive national framework for child well-being. This led to the adoption, in the 
spring of 1999, of the National Children’s Agenda (NCA): a joint federal-provincial statement of 
intent to work cooperatively towards the health, safety, and future success of all Canadian 
children. The parties specified six associated goals, which included “improv[ing] economic 
security for families to help maximize child well-being” and “enhance[ing] early childhood 
development because the first few years are important for children’s lifelong abilities, health, 
and well-being,” (Health Canada 1999). The Government of Québec once again chose to stay on 
the sidelines but endorsed the objectives of the NCA. 
The NCA provided a framework for the financing and administration of a myriad 
programs, targeting areas like pre-natal care, nutrition, parenting strategies, early childhood 
learning, and community supports. Services were generally delivered in a ‘trickle-down’ 
manner, with the federal government transferring seed-money to the provinces (at a rate of 
around $450 million per year) which, in turn, issued grants to the community-based 
organizations that worked directly with children and families. The arrangement left the 
provinces free to decide, within limits, what specific programs to fund (McKeen 2007, p. 155). 
Between the CCTB and NCA, the federal government contributed roughly $2.85 billion per year 
(0.3% of GDP) to family subsidies (McKeen 2007, p. 159; White 2011, p. 7).114 
Although more the product of jurisdictional wrangling than ideological machinations, 
the NCA nevertheless perpetuated a neoliberal perception of child development and the role of 
the state therein. In particular, the agenda’s deemphasis of the structural inequities 
underpinning child poverty in favor of direct caseworker interventions catered to individual ‘at-
                                                          
114 Figure calculated by author by adding figures found in McKeen 2007 (p. 159) and White 2011 (p. 6). 
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risk’ families betrayed an implicit assumption that child poverty occurred as a result of the 
personal failings of parents. Accordingly, the services offered under the NCA umbrella (while 
varying somewhat from province to province) tended to be individualized and corrective. For 
instance, the NCA sponsored numerous home visitation and counselling programs. This 
microlevel focus left little room for more collective solutions like universal child care (McKeen 
2007, pp. 157-8). 
 
3.8. Child Care Goes Federal, Yet Again 
 Following Jean Chrétien’s retirement from politics in 2003, Paul Martin took his long-
awaited turn as prime minister. Martin, who held a high-profile as Chrétien’s minister of finance 
for nearly a decade (1993 – 2002),115 received much of the credit for Canada’s dramatic 
economic turnaround through the mid-to-late 1990s (see Mohamed 2017, pp. 547-50), making 
him quite popular with the pro-business ‘Bay Street’ community. However, Martin carried a 
more dubious reputation with social advocates owing to the perception that the cuts to social 
spending that he implemented as finance minister were more dramatic and mean-spirited than 
was necessary (see Stanford 2003). 
 In an effort to soften the ‘deficit-hawk’ persona he had cultivated as minister of finance, 
Martin immediately turned his attention to social policy. He quickly determined that there 
would be a significant political upside in making a renewed push for a pan-Canadian child care 
program (See White 2011, p. 8). Child care checked multiple boxes for Martin as, by improving 
                                                          
115 Martin was unceremoniously removed from the post in June 2002 amidst accusations that he and supporters 
had been secretly plotting to oust Prime Minister Chrétien (“The Chrétien-Martin feud boils over” 2002).  
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the availability and quality of educational daycare programs across the country, he stood to 
bolster his progressive bona fides and reverse a current of negative international attention 
Canada was beginning to receive for the existing patchwork system (see Philip 2004). 
Campaigning for better child care would also give Martin an angle to reengage with Québec 
voters, who were at the time abandoning the Liberals in droves as scandalous details continued 
to emerge surrounding the administration of a federal sponsorship program based in the 
province.116 Through a new child care initiative, Martin sought to communicate to Québécois 
that, despite the party’s transgressions, it still presented a vision of social justice that was 
attuned to the province’s core values (Interviewee no. 4, 24 August 2017). 
 Child care was accordingly the primary social policy plank in Martin’s first reelection 
campaign, called just six months into his tenure as prime minister. Martin and his co-partisans 
campaigned heavily on the merits of a five-year, five billion-dollar plan to create 250,000 
regulated child care spaces across Canada—enough for approximately eighteen percent of 
children in need under the age of five (Wells 2004). At multiple points in the campaign, the 
Martin Liberals cited Québec’s stand-alone daycare program as a source of inspiration. For 
instance, an excerpt in the party’s official platform read: 
Québec provides the exceptional example. It is the North American leader in early 
learning and care. In Québec’s system, community-based organizations provide child care 
at a moderate fee. This is a standard to which early learning and care across Canada 
should be lifted. Learning from each other and embracing what has worked elsewhere in 
Canada, makes us stronger as a nation and as a people. That’s what our federation is all 
about (Moving Canada Forward 2004, p. 29).  
                                                          
116 The sponsorship scandal, also known as AdScam, involved a series of revelations relating to the 
mismanagement of the Liberal government’s Québec-based sponsorship program, active between 1996 and 2004. 
Established shortly after the 1995 referendum in an effort to boost the federal government’s tarnished brand in 
Québec, the program essentially became a slush fund that paid Liberal-friendly advertising firms for little to no 
work, with much of this money being funneled back to the party via campaign contributions. The scandal was 




Having been chosen to lead the newly-unified Conservative Party of Canada just two 
months prior, Opposition Leader Stephen Harper was caught off guard by Martin’s snap 
election call.117 Harper’s fledgling Conservative Party was forced to go into the campaign 
without having even established a formal platform. This meant that Harper was unable to 
present a detailed alternative to Martin’s child care proposal—or to offer much beyond 
generalities on most policy areas. Harper nevertheless impressed many voters with his 
tenacious, disciplined approach to campaigning, giving Martin an unexpectedly strong fight. As 
such, the summer 2004 election was much closer than most pundits expected it to be. Yet 
Martin still returned to Ottawa in the fall with what he termed a “stable minority” government 
(Krauss 2004). 
 Martin signaled that child care would be a top priority of his first electoral mandate by 
tapping Ken Dryden, his new minister of social development, to lead the effort. Although a 
political newcomer, Dryden boasted a pristine reputation and substantial name recognition. 
Widely-respected among social activists following decades of recognized community leadership 
and well-known across Canada for his Hall of Fame career as a professional ice hockey player, 
Dryden appeared to be the ideal candidate for the assignment. His involvement gave new 
found hope to beleaguered child care advocates. For instance, one write-up published in the 
Toronto Star read, “With a marquee name like Ken Dryden, there’s the best chance in a long 
while that Ottawa will not just listen, but act,” (Wells 2004). 
                                                          
117 Following the collapse of the Progressive Conservative (PC) party in the 1993 federal election, a split occurred in 
the country’s right, pitting the weakened PC against the upstart Reform Party/Canadian Alliance based in Western 
Canada. After seeing the right-of-center vote split in the next two federal elections, the parties came to terms on a 
merger in the fall of 2003. Stephen Harper became the first leader of the newly-unified Conservative Party of 
Canada after winning almost seventy percent of the popular vote in the party’s March 2004 leadership election. 
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In their statements on the plan, Martin, Dryden, and their surrogates placed a heavy 
emphasis on the developmental aspects of educational child care. This was part of a deliberate 
framing strategy informed by the prime minister’s personal interactions with domestic research 
elites (White 2011, p. 10).118 This discursive shift was instrumental, at the time, in elevating 
child care beyond mere ‘babysitting’ and establishing early childhood education as a legitimate 
national policy priority (see White 2004). 
 Dryden struggled to adapt to the cut and thrust of politics119 but was ultimately able to 
secure bilateral agreements on early learning and child care with all ten provinces by the end of 
2005. Perennial non-joiner Québec was, in fact, the first province to finalize a funding 
agreement with Ottawa, accepting $1.125 billion over five years to bolster its daycare program 
(“Governments of Canada and Québec Sign Funding Agreement” 2005). Altogether, the federal 
government committed a sum that was just under the advertised five billion dollars over five 
years, with the provinces receiving between $27 million (Prince Edward Island) and $2.5 billion 
(Ontario) (“Early Learning and Child Care Agreements” 2005). The provinces were given 
substantial flexibility over how to distribute these funds. For instance, they could decide for 
themselves whether to subsidize commercial operators within their respective borders.120 The 
                                                          
118 Several of my interviewees singled out medical researcher Dr. Fraser Mustard, founding president of the 
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, as an instrumental player in linking the early childhood development 
research community to Prime Minister Martin’s inner-circle.  
 
119 In a widely-covered February 2005 parliamentary exchange, Minister Dryden was left flabbergasted when 
opposition critic Rona Ambrose remarked that Canadian women “don’t need old white guys telling us what to do.” 
One prominent journalist wrote of the interaction: “[Dryden’s] well-meaning but wooden responses to his 
articulate critic reinforced the image of the government as a meddling, paternalistic uncle,” (Hebert 2008, p. 81).   
 
120 A source who took part in the bilateral negotiations informed me that the parties agreed going in to leave the 





provinces were also left alone to determine what mix of the funding would go to universal and 
income-targeted programs (McKeen 2007, p. 161). This stated, all parties agreed to respect the 
principles of “quality, universality, accessibility, and developmental services” (QUAD) in 
program delivery (White et al. 2016). The last of these agreements were finalized just days prior 
to the Martin government’s defeat in a late November vote of confidence, which immediately 
triggered a new election campaign.121 
  
The ‘Child Care Election’ of 2006 
 While the framework established by Martin and Dryden fell well short of anything that 
approached ‘universal child care’, the plan still attracted a great deal of coverage in the 
2005/06 federal election campaign—arguably framing the race more than any other issue (see 
Coyne 2007). Child care presented a useful contrast for both major parties. For the Liberals, the 
early learning agreements were one of scant few policy victories that the Martin minority 
government could point to over its year-and-a-half lifespan. The Liberals sought to leverage the 
child care promise to press their advantage on compassion issues over the Conservatives who, 
as Martin was keen to point out, had recently dropped the qualifier “Progressive” from their 
party name.  
 This time the Harper Conservatives were prepared, releasing, at the outset of the 
campaign, a child care platform that surprised many in terms of both its generosity and level of 
                                                          
121 Hoping to capitalize on the release of the Gomery Commission Report, which documented the gross 
mismanagement of the Québec-based federal sponsorship program between 1996 and 2004; opposition MPs 
issued a motion of no confidence against the Martin government on November 28. The motion passed by a margin 
of 177 votes to 133, with the support of all three opposition parties (“Liberals lose confidence of the house” 2005).  
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detail. The Conservative child care package, coming with a total price tag of $10.9 billion over 
five years (0.15% of GDP), included: $1.4 billion to honor the federal-provincial early learning 
agreements through 2006-07; $1.25 billion in grants and tax incentives to enable businesses 
and community organizations to create 125,000 new daycare spaces over five years; and, 
centrally, a new universal annual cash benefit of $1,200 per child (paid in monthly installments 
of $100) available to all parents with children aged five and under. The taxable child benefit 
would help some two million children at an annual cost of $1.6 billion (Rinehart 2007, p. 47).  
Caught off-guard by the scale and specificity of Harper’s newly unveiled child care 
platform, Martin hastily announced, less than twenty-four hours later, that a re-elected Liberal 
government would spend at least an additional six billion dollars to finance the child care 
agreements through 2015 (“Liberal Child Care Commitment will be Made Permanent” 2005). 
The third-party NDP soon joined the fray, promising a total of $16 billion over four years to 
subsidize 200,000 new daycare spaces, increase the Child Tax Benefit by a thousand dollars per 
child, and create a new federal children’s commissioner (“NDP Policy Platform includes $71B in 
spending” 2006). Reflecting on the peculiarity of the chain of events, one journalist remarked, 
“The Conservative Party seemed to have designed an entire election campaign around an issue 
traditionally of more concern to women than to men—and the other parties followed suit,” 
(Rinehart 2007, p. 48). Initial polling found a slight overall preference for Harper’s child care 
plan (48% to 45%), although women still preferred the Liberal plan by a margin of seven points 
(50% to 43%) (Strategic Counsel, 8 December 2005 found in Rinehart, p. 49). 
A catastrophic glitch in Liberal messaging less than a week into the campaign would 
serve to tilt the momentum on child care permanently in the Conservatives’ favor. Appearing in 
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a televised panel discussion broadcast on Sunday, December 10th, Liberal Party communications 
director Scott Reid122 seemed to suggest that, left to their own devices, parents would spend 
the Conservative child benefit irresponsibly: “Don’t give people twenty-five bucks a [week] to 
blow on beer and popcorn,” Reid remarked. “Give them child care spaces that work.”  
  Reid’s comments understandably provoked an immediate backlash, forcing him to 
apologize one day later and prompting Prime Minister Martin to give the child benefit a partial 
endorsement.  When questioned on Reid’s remarks by reporters, Martin responded, “There’s 
no doubt in my mind that parents are going to use [child benefit payments] for the benefit of 
their families. Let there be no doubt about that,” (“Liberal apologizes” 2005). Reid’s gaffe has 
since been widely identified as one of the major turning points in the campaign, as the ‘beer 
and popcorn’ slight cemented the public’s perception of the Liberals as arrogant, elitist, and out 
of touch.  
 Going in for the kill as the Liberals faltered, Harper foreshadowed the language that he 
would consistently use to frame his party’s approach to family policy. “I say there are already 
millions of child care experts in this country,” Harper told the media in a rebuke of Reid’s 
comments. “Their names are mom and dad and that’s who we’re going to work with,” (Taber 
2006 found in Snow and Moffitt 2012, p. 282). This framing was highly effective as both a 
repudiation of the Liberal Party’s perceived air of superiority and a preemptive strike against 
the professional child care researchers and advocates he would later marginalize as prime 
minister.123  
                                                          





 Capitalizing on further unforced errors and a pervasive desire for change on the part of 
voters, Harper’s Conservatives put an end to the Liberal Party’s thirteen-year run in power. 
After winning 124 of 308 seats and improving his party’s vote share by nearly seven percent, 
Harper returned to Ottawa in early February to lead a new Conservative minority government. 
Tellingly, one of Harper’s first actions as prime minister was to cancel the Liberal Party’s child 
care agreements. The new Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) was costed into the Harper 
government’s inaugural budget and checks began to circulate in July.124 
While it would be virtually impossible to pinpoint the precise effect of the child care 
debate on the election’s outcome, it’s undeniable that it provided the campaign with one of its 
principal storylines. This was reflected in column inches as, over the forty-nine-day campaign 
period, child care was mentioned in fifty-three pieces in the right-leaning National Post and 
twenty-seven in the center-left Globe and Mail (Rinehart 2008, p. 5).125 The election result was 
thus a vindication of the Conservative Party’s unconventional stratagem to place child care at 
the forefront of the policy discussion. I accordingly explore how party insiders formulated this 




                                                          
123 The Harper government made several enemies in the research community but was especially hostile to child 
care research and advocacy groups. During the Harper years, pro-child care groups lost access to funding through 
the Women’s Program on the grounds that they engaged in partisan ‘lobbying’ activity that should not be 
subsidized by taxpayer money (Interviewee no. 18, 17 April 2017).  
 
124 The Harper government also cut part of the CCTB to help finance the UCCB (Battle et al. 2006, p. 1). 
 
125 The Post and Globe, respectively, are Canada’s only two English-language national newspapers.  
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3.9. The Genesis of the Child Benefit 
 As with much of Harper’s policy agenda, the origins of the UCCB can be traced back to 
the interim period of eighteen months between the 2004 and 2006 elections (see Paré and 
Berger 2008). The closer than expected 2004 vote was cause for optimism, but there was also a 
general agreement that Martin had managed to survive by raising the specter of Harper’s 
hidden right-wing agenda. Party insiders understood that, if the Conservatives were to have a 
shot at emerging victorious from the next federal election, the party would have to present a 
moderate, but nevertheless clear, alternative to the Liberals (see Flanagan 2007, esp. chap. 7). 
 Child care was quickly identified as a potential soft spot for the Liberals as, despite the 
enthusiasm with which Martin and Dryden trumpeted their new framework, Conservative MPs 
found more lukewarm sentiments among their constituents. This ambivalence was especially 
marked in suburban and exurban settings, where the demand for regulated daycare spaces did 
not generally match the level that existed in the more densely-populated major cities. One 
interviewee, who was first elected to the House of Commons in 2004 to represent a riding in 
the suburbs of Ottawa, reflected: “My constituents were concerned that they would end up 
getting the worst of both worlds – having to pay taxes to subsidize daycare programs that they 
were not even planning to use,” (Interviewee no. 1, 17 June 2016). Conservative strategists 
were especially attuned to these voices as the party’s overarching strategy for the 2006 
election was to tap into “soft conservative” attitudes among suburban voters—with medium 
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density communities in Southern and Eastern Ontario being an especially high priority 
(Interviewee no. 3, 15 November 2016).126  
 The solution was to develop a child care strategy that acknowledged the reality of dual 
earner families and escalating daycare fees, yet nevertheless gave voters a semblance of choice 
over how to care for their children. Harper had initially favored a new, per child income tax 
deduction but was ultimately sold on the visibility of a universal child benefit (Flanagan 2007, p. 
226). A monthly child care check was easy to explain to voters and, once it was received, could 
be directly traced back to the federal government (see Figure 3.3). This was in keeping with the 
party’s broader philosophy of crafting marquee policies that had “the virtue of being hands-on, 
personally identifiable, and good for consumers” (Ellis and Woolstencraft 2006, p. 72).127 
Internal party polling also found that the child benefit played well with a few unexpected niche 
demographics, such as single mothers. One party pollster told me, “The sample size was quite 
small, but we found that single mothers appreciated having real, tangible money that they 
could use to help with their short-term expenses,” (Interviewee no. 2, 8 November 2016).  
 
   Figure 3.3 – A standard UCCB check 
                                                          
126 Marketing expert turned Conservative Party strategist Patrick Muttart is generally credited with developing the 
party’s voter targeting strategy in the run-up to the 2006 election (see Flanagan 2007, chap. 7; Paré and Berger). 
Muttart has since returned to the private sector and presently works as a corporate affairs director for tobacco 
giant Philip-Morris. He did not respond to a request to be interviewed for this project.  
 
127 Another exemplar of this philosophy was Harper’s decision to cut the national consumer sales tax, called the 
Goods and Services Tax (GST), by two percent.  
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3.10. Family Policy and the Harper Agenda 
 Once in government, the Harper Conservatives continued to utilize family policy 
innovation as a tool to engage key demographics, signal political virtues, and fill the news cycle. 
Three initiatives—pursued near the beginning, middle, and end, respectively, of the 
Conservative government’s lifespan—truly exemplified this strategy: Child Fitness/Art Tax 
Credits; The Muskoka Initiative on Maternal and Newborn Health; and, more controversially, 
spousal income splitting for tax purposes. 
  
Children’s Fitness/Art Tax Credits 
 Three months into his tenure as prime minister, Harper set up an expert panel to 
consider a federal tax intervention to fight childhood obesity.128 The panel reported back to the 
prime minister in October, calling for the creation of a new tax credit to help offset parental 
fees for qualifying physical activity programs (Leitch et al. 2006). The panel’s recommendations 
formed the basis of the Harper government’s subsequent Children’s Fitness Tax Credit (CFTC), 
introduced at the beginning of 2007.  
 The CFTC allowed parents of children aged fifteen and under to claim up to $500 in 
eligible program enrollment and registration costs, amounting to tax savings of up to $75 per 
child (Spence et al. 2010).129 Uptake was strong from the outset as the tax credit was claimed 
by 1.3 million taxpayers in its first year and 1.5 million in 2008 (Reach 2012, p. 363)—
                                                          
128 The panel was chaired by pediatric surgeon Kellie Leitch. Dr. Leitch was later elected as a Conservative MP for 
the Southern Ontario riding of Simcoe-Grey. 
 
129 The creditable component of the CFTC, which reduced taxes owed by parents on a dollar-for-dollar basis, was 
calculated by multiplying total (per child) expenses incurred by the lowest marginal tax rate ($500 * 15%). See 
Reach 2012, p. 363.  
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comprising over a quarter of eligible families.130 In keeping with the successful 2006 campaign 
strategy, the CFTC provided a direct, tangible good to the suburban parents (‘hockey dads’, 
‘soccer moms’) who were most aggressively courted by the party. The CFTC is notable as the 
first, and thus far only, child fitness related national income tax credit in the world (Sauder 
2014, pp. 75-6). It has since been studied as a potential policy template for several jurisdictions 
(see Reacher 2012).  
Following up on the success of the CFTC, Harper proposed a companion tax credit for 
music, art, and drama lessons in the fall of 2008 (Taber 2008). This idea was put on hold due to 
the ensuing global financial crisis, but the promised Children’s Art Tax Credit (CATC) eventually 
materialized in the Conservatives’ 2011 budget, allowing parents to claim an additional $500 in 
program fees. At their height, the child activity tax credits cost the federal government a 
combined $153 million in forsaken tax revenue (Goar 2015).   
The CFTC and CATC made for good optics as they gave the prime minister and his caucus 
an opportunity to organize a near endless stream of photo opportunities at hockey rinks, 
community centers, and art studios.131 Hoping to generate similar streams of positive press, 
provincial governments rapidly began to introduce their own child tax credits.132 By the time 
Harper left government, six of Canada’s ten provinces and one of its three northern territories 
had each implemented some combination of children’s fitness and art tax credits (Sauder 2014, 
                                                          
130 At this time, there were approximately 5.5 million Canadians aged fourteen and under (Statistics Canada 2007). 
 
131 Prime Minister Harper made a sustained effort to make ice hockey central to his political brand, going so far as 
to write a non-fiction book on the sport’s history while in office (see Scherer and McDermott 2011). 
 
132 The province of Nova Scotia introduced a physical activity tax credit prior to the federal government (Sauder 
2014, pp. 78-80).  
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p. 84). What’s especially interesting about this pattern of diffusion is that such tax credits were 
introduced by Liberal, conservative, and NDP governments—representing an impressive cross-
partisan consensus on their favorability (or at least their electoral upside). This despite research 
indicating that the credits were most commonly claimed by upper-income Canadians and had 
little to no influence on whether parents chose to enroll their children in extra-curricular 
activities (Spence et al. 2010). 
Interestingly, the CFTC and CATC are both prime examples of the type of tax policies 
that Harper campaigned vigorously against in his former career with the National Citizen’s 
Coalition (NCC), a prominent taxpayer advocacy group based in Toronto. Harper served as 
president of the NCC between 1998 and 2002 and, in this capacity, sought to shift Canadian 
public opinion in favor of broad-based tax relief, tax code simplification and other standard 
fiscal conservative agenda items. The CFTC, CATC, and other ‘boutique’ tax credits introduced 
by the Conservative government in fact drew sharp criticisms from several of Harper’s former 
allies at right-leaning think tanks and advocacy groups (see Gollom 2015). One source who I 
spoke to, who served as a regional director for the likeminded Canadian Taxpayers Federation 
during Harper’s time as NCC president, told me: “I was familiar enough with Harper’s views to 
know that he’s sold out his former principles,” adding that boutique tax credits are “nothing 
more than a cheap and pointless way of being able to signal common virtues to a targeted 
group [and] fill space in the media cycle,” (Interviewee no. 25, 28 May 2018).  
Rebukes like this one signify that the Harper government’s approach to family policy 
was driven primarily by electoral considerations and, if anything, represented a departure from 
the prime minister’s established ideological convictions. Moreover, while nuclear suburban 
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families were the obvious target audience for the child tax credits, it would be a stretch to 
characterize these measures as narrowly ‘socially conservative’—noting, once again, the drive 
of provincial governments (of each partisan stripe) to emulate the federal tax credits. This 
reaffirms the broader thesis that the Harper Conservatives utilized family policy in an 
anomalous and at times counter-intuitive manner that defies conventional expectations of right 
party governance.  
 
The Muskoka Initiative 
 One Harper-era project that is somewhat more difficult to pin down is the former prime 
minister’s championing of maternal and newborn health in the global arena. In a move that 
surprised many (see Caplan 2010), Harper utilized Canada’s turn in hosting the annual Group of 
Eight (G8) Summit in 2010 as a launching pad for what became the $40 billion multilateral 
Muskoka Initiative on Maternal Newborn and Child Health (MI-MNCH). Although not falling 
within the purview of (domestic) family policy, MI-MNCH is nevertheless worth examining here 
because the initiative was crafted, in part, to appeal to a domestic political audience (see Brown 
2018).  
About a year-and-a-half prior to the event, Harper was approached by a coalition of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hoping to persuade the prime minister to use the 
upcoming summit to spearhead a major global humanitarian venture (Vandenberg 2017). At 
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this point, Harper had just won his first re-election bid133 but was looking to soften his “nasty 
brand” after a bruising, attack filled election campaign (Marland 2016, p. xiv).  
The prime minister and his staff heard several pitches but were ultimately swayed to 
make maternal and child health the summit’s core theme. Advocates sold Harper on this 
position by pointing to the lack of global progress on United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) pertaining to child mortality and maternal health (MDGs 4 and 5, respectively). 
MDG 5 was, at the time, the worst performing indicator as maternal mortality rates had not 
improved appreciably since the early 1990s (Kirton et al. 2014). This was a source of significant 
anxiety in the global development community as the 2015 deadline for the fulfillment of the 
MDGs loomed. 
According to a source who was a senior executive with the Canadian chapter of a 
leading global anti-poverty NGO at the time and, in this capacity, had multiple face-to-face 
interactions with the prime minister in the lead up to the G8 summit, Harper was converted by 
“the evidence-base we were able to provide in support of maternal and early childhood 
interventions, as well as the [relative] cost effectiveness of such interventions.” My source also 
observed Harper and his advisors in the PMO appreciated that a potential maternal and child 
health campaign lent itself to a straightforward policy narrative (‘saving women and children’) 
that could be “understood by soccer moms across the country,” (Interviewee no. 24, 14 May 
2018).  
                                                          
133 The Conservatives gained sixteen seats in the 2008 federal election but still fell a dozen short of the number 
needed to attain a parliamentary majority.  
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Three weeks after formally assuming the G8 Chair in January 2010, Prime Minister 
Harper indicated that “aid for mothers and children in poor countries” and “child and maternal 
health” would be the two major themes of the upcoming summit (Scoffield 2010). Interestingly, 
the prime minister’s formal declaration came in the form of editorial published in the left-
leaning Toronto Star, where he wrote:  
As president of the G8 in 2010, Canada will champion a major initiative to improve the 
health of women and children in the world's poorest regions. Members of the G8 can 
make a tangible difference in maternal and child health and Canada will be making this 
the top priority in June. Far too many lives and unexplored futures have already been 
lost for want of relatively simple health-care solutions (Harper 2010).  
 
 Harper was able to obtain financial pledges from several of his fellow G8 heads-of-
government in the months leading up to the June summit. At the summit itself, the parties 
announced a combined package of $7.3 billion over five years to kick-start the MI-MNCH, with 
Canada providing roughly forty percent of this funding.134 With the subsequent involvement of 
the UN and major civil society actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, a total of $40 
billion was raised in support of the initiative by the end of the year (Kirton et al. 2014, p. 194). 
This funding had an immediate and substantial effect on targeted populations as, in the four 
years that followed the 2010 summit, global child and maternal death rates declined at the 
fastest pace ever recorded (Kirton et al. 2014, p. 197).     
 Though a clear victory from a global development perspective, the MI-MNCH was 
largely overshadowed at home by the proxy debate over abortion that it triggered. The 
opposition Liberal Party immediately questioned why the plan lacked details on family planning 
                                                          




and insisted that funding for abortions be included in the final package (Kirton et al. 2014, p. 
191). Liberal Foreign Affairs Critic Bob Rae later put forth an Opposition Motion in the House of 
Commons calling on the government to “include the full range of family planning, sexual, and 
reproductive health options, including contraception” in the initiative and, more provocatively, 
to “refrain from [globally] advancing the failed right-wing ideologies previously imposed by the 
George W. Bush administration in the United States,”135 (“Ignatieff takes blame for motion 
defeat” 2010). Harper administration officials sought to dodge this issue for as long as possible 
but, with exactly two months to go before the summit was scheduled to begin, then Minister of 
Development Bev Oda announced that the initiative would not provide funding for abortion 
under any circumstances (“No Abortion in Canada’s G8 Maternal Health Plan” 2010).  
 The chain of events led some observers to suspect that Harper had purposefully baited 
the opposition into raising the issue of funding for abortions. The premise here is that, given 
the political untenability of reopening the abortion debate domestically, Harper instead chose 
to signal his common virtues with the pro-life segment of his base through the MI-MNCH. For 
instance, Jex (2017, p. 45) writes: “[I]n order to satisfy the socially conservative demands of his 
evangelical constituency… Harper had to move the [abortion] debate overseas,” (see also: 
Tiessen 2015).  
 However, such claims likely overstate the political acumen of Prime Minister Harper. 
“The notion that Harper used Muskoka as some sort of Machiavellian ploy is totally bogus,” 
stated one source who was a key player in the coalition of NGOs attempting to sway Harper on 
                                                          
135 A reference to the Bush (II) administration’s policy of restricting public funding to foreign NGOs that perform or 
advocate abortion.  
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maternal and child health; noting that the coalition had decided early in the consultation 
process to keep abortion services out of the discussion (Interviewee no. 24, 14 May 2018). This 
narrative is also rejected by the University of Toronto based G8 Research Group, the entity that 
has produced the most detailed and comprehensive study to date of the political process 
leading to MI-MNCH (Kirton et al. 2014, p. 191).  
 Although somewhat tangential to the rest of the chapter’s focus on domestic family 
policy, the MI-MNCH in nevertheless significant as an exemplar of Stephen Harper’s sustained 
strategy of leveraging humanitarian issues that vulnerable populations (an issue area that has 
historically favored progressive actors) to broaden his political appeal. By choosing to devote 
substantial political capital to a meaningful global humanitarian initiative targeting vulnerable 
women and children abroad, Harper continued to tread a path that baffled observers and 
challenged existing perspectives on the behavior of right-of-center political leaders.  
 
Income Splitting 
 Harper appeared to tack closer to his base in the lead up to the fall 2015 federal election 
when he moved on a long-delayed promise to initiate spousal income splitting for married 
couples with children. A favored policy of the former Reform Party/Canadian Alliance—who 
held that Canada’s individualized income tax structure discriminated against families where one 
parent stays at home—income splitting was one of just a few social conservative friendly 
proposals to be included in the first policy declaration of the post-amalgamation Conservative 
Party of Canada (2005, p. 8). However, the global financial crisis that began two years into the 
Harper mandate moved the prime minister to delay the introduction of income splitting until 
such time as the federal budget returned to a surplus position (Lahey 2017, p. 51).  
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 The appropriate economic conditions for income splitting materialized around a year 
prior to the federal election anticipated for the fall of 2015. Although long a core party family 
policy plank, income splitting provoked an unexpected degree of public bickering within the 
usually ‘on-message’ Conservative Party ranks.  
The first sign of trouble appeared in February 2014, when then Finance Minister Jim 
Flaherty appeared at a press conference promoting that year’s federal budget. As the budget 
indicated that the government was headed for a surplus in 2015, Flaherty was asked by 
reporters about the party’s income splitting promise. Flaherty answered candidly: “I’m not sure 
that overall [income splitting] benefits our society,” noting that “[i]t benefits some parts of the 
Canadian population a lot and other parts… virtually not at all.” Flaherty concluded that the 
proposal needed a “long, hard analytical look,” (Curry and Wingrove 2014). 
Although Flaherty tragically passed away just two month later, without having an 
opportunity to fully clarify his position, his comments nevertheless exposed a rift over the 
policy between fiscal and social conservatives in the party caucus. Slated to cost the federal 
government $2.2 billion per year in foregone tax revenue and expected to benefit just fifteen 
percent of Canadian households—with high income single-earner families gaining the most 
(Scholz and Shaw 2015)—income splitting presented questionable optics going into the 
upcoming federal election campaign. The infighting ultimately led to the defection of a Toronto-
area MP, Eve Adams, who cited the prime minister’s insistence of moving forward with income 
splitting as part of her rationale for crossing the floor in early 2015 to join the opposition Liberal 
Party (O’Malley 2015). 
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The backlash against income splitting vexed party strategists, who scrambled to find a 
compromise. As one interviewee, who worked as a senior policy advisor to the prime minister 
at the time, explained: “Income splitting was a policy initiative that was grassroots driven [but 
became] a point of contention internally due to its regressive aspects.” She added, “We did our 
best to try to smooth out some of its flaws,” referring to the government’s concession of 
capping the maximum benefit to families at $2,000 (Interviewee no. 23, 4 May 2018). The party 
also moved to increase universal child benefit payouts (discussed further in the next section), 
so as to be able to credibly campaign on “helping one-hundred percent of parents with 
children” (Interviewee no. 1, 17 June 2016).  The income splitting episode nevertheless 
underscored the inherent fragility of Harper’s ‘big blue tent’ and showed just how politically 
sensitive of a domain family policy can be for modern conservative political coalitions.  
 
The 2015 Campaign: Going ‘All-in’ on the Child Benefit 
 Facing his toughest challenge yet due to voter fatigue, scandals, and a revitalized 
opposition, Harper dipped into his successful 2006 playbook at the outset of the 2015 
campaign—placing the child benefit once again at the center of the policy discussion. In fact, 
the prime minister took the unusual step on the eve of the campaign of circulating a 
confidential letter urging Conservative MPs to emphasize recent UCCB enhancements to their 




Figure 3.4 – Confidential Letter sent from Harper to Conservative caucus, 20 July 2015. 
 
Starting in July of 2015 and compensating families retroactively from January of that 
year, the UCCB expansion boosted payouts to $160 per month for each child under six and 
offered a new monthly stipend of $60 for each dependent aged between six and seventeen. 
The UCCB boost was budgeted to cost four billion dollars per year, bringing total annual federal 
spending on children benefits to eighteen billion (1% of GDP) (Department of Finance Canada 
2015, Table 5.2.6). This reflected an aggregate increase of over sixty percent in children’s 




Figure 3.5 – Children’s benefit expenditures under the Harper government. (Malanik 2016, p. 6)  
 
 Analysts warned that, coming on the heels of the $2.2 billion income splitting pledge, 
the new child benefit would obliterate the federal government’s scheduled surplus (Fekete 
2015a). The UCCB announcement nonetheless gave the Conservatives a short-term poll bump 
and put the opposition parties on the defensive (West 2015). 
 Recognizing that the tide had turned irreversibly towards direct payments to families, 
the Liberal Party, now led by Justin Trudeau, upped the ante—proposing its own (more costly 
and progressive) child benefit. Trudeau’s means-tested, tax-free Canada Child Benefit (CCB) 
would deliver monthly payments to parents on a sliding scale, providing as much as $533.33 per 
month for each child under six and $450 per month for dependents between six and seventeen 
(“Canada Child Benefit (CCB) Payment Amounts” 2018).136 This comprised a four billion dollar 
increase over the plan proposed by Harper, which would bring total federal spending on child 
                                                          
136 Households earning $30,000 per year or less are eligible for the maximum benefit. Payouts decrease in 
proportion to income and reach zero at a household income of around $190,000 per year (“Child and family 
benefits calculator” 2016). 
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benefits to twenty-two billion dollars (1.3% of GDP) (Fekete 2015b)—marking a dramatic 
reorientation for a party that once dismissed such payments as ‘beer and popcorn’ money.  
 NDP leader and Leader of the Official Opposition Thomas Mulcair promised to maintain 
the UCCB at its increased payouts while, at the same time, pledging to implement a five billion 
dollar per year national framework for fifteen dollar a day child care—all while consistently 
running balanced budgets (Dehaas 2015). Mulcair’s budget math was widely questioned by 
experts (see Raj 2015) and his daycare plank did little to drum up enthusiasm for a campaign 
that many viewed as a disappointment.137 Mulcair’s cause was further hindered by press 
coverage that emphasized the negative aspects of Québec’s daycare system (see Sec. 3.6). 
 The fall 2015 campaign concluded with a surprising majority government victory for the 
third-party Liberals; who were able to exploit voter complacency with Harper, reverse the 
NDP’s previous gains in Québec, and capitalize on their new leader’s camera-friendly image. 
Trudeau delivered on the CCB in his first budget—financing the program, in part, by scrapping 
the Conservative UCCB, income splitting, and child activity tax credit programs.138 Legitimately 
one of the most significant humanitarian measures in Canada’s history, the CCB has thus far 
helped lift around 300,000 children out of poverty. The government plans to index the benefit 
to inflation during the summer of 2018, which will help sustain this impact (“Backgrounder: 
Strengthening the Canada Child Benefit” 2018). 
 
                                                          
137 the 2015 federal election was the first in history where the NDP was portrayed, from the outset, as a legitimate 
contender to form government. The party instead wound up losing fifty-one seats, 10.9% of the popular vote and 
its status as the Official Opposition. 
  




While Harper’s UCCB-centered strategy was not as effective this time around as it had 
been in 2006, the 2015 campaign nevertheless had substantial and quite possibly irreversible 
effects for the trajectory of Canadian family policy. In his willingness to devote as much as one 
percent of Canada’s GDP to child benefit programs, Harper made it politically impossible for 
either of the opposition parties to repurpose this spending to facilitate the creation of more 
daycare spaces. Doing so would literally entail taking money out of the hands of millions of 
Canadian parents. With about 1.3 percent of the country’s GDP now devoted to the Trudeau 
government’s CCB—and the program not going anywhere anytime soon—there is no longer 
sufficient space in the federal budget to sustain any serious national framework supporting 
universal child care. Even using the conservative figure of nine thousand dollars per child, the 
rough amount that Québec spends each year to sustain its daycare program (Eisen and Geloso 
2017, p. 1), a national program subsidizing spaces for half of all children aged five and under 
would cost the federal government nearly ten billion dollars per year (Friendly et al. 2018, Table 
9). Accordingly, for the foreseeable future, all substantial action on child care will have to be 
pursued at the provincial level.  
  
3.11. Conclusion and Key Takeaways 
 If the preceding discussion of evolution of family policy in the Canada over the past 
century has one clear takeaway, it is that the trajectory of policy has been shaped to the 
greatest degree by the character of concomitant policy discourses. It is no coincidence that 
universal daycare came closest to becoming a reality when the national discourse involved the 
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status of women in Canada and the question of how to reduce the economic and cultural 
barriers that precluded women from participating fully in society. After the influence of the 
organized women’s movement faded, progressives struggled to construct a new narrative that 
would justify substantial federal involvement in the provision of child care. The effort to shine a 
light on the growing problem of child poverty in the 1990s, while commendable, lent itself to 
means-tested measures and targeted casework interventions (versus universal programs that 
would also benefit families living above the poverty line). Moreover, the effort to emphasize 
the long-term developmental benefits of ‘early childhood education’ in the early 2000s now 
appears short sighted as data indicating the opposite comes out of the country’s sole 
comprehensive political program. Finally, with the partial exception of Québec at various points 
in its history, Canada’s political culture appears antithetical to demographic philosophy of 
pronatalism. As such, the country’s relatively low birth rate (1.6bpw) is unlikely to be 
constructed as a political crisis, so long as native-born Canadians continue to hold to hold their 
historically sunny disposition toward immigration.   
 After being gifted the ‘beer and popcorn’ soundbite from the Liberals, Stephen Harper 
steadily remade Canada’s family policy landscape to lock-in his preference for direct payments 
to parents over using federal funds and leadership to increase access to regulated child care. 
Harper’s subsequent family policy maneuvers reflected both innovative efforts to broaden his 




CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY POLICY IN GERMANY 
FROM ‘CRISIS’ TO OPPORTUNITY 
 
 As the archetypal conservative (or Bismarckian) welfare state, Germany has historically 
been characterized by social policies that perpetuate a traditionalist ‘male breadwinner, female 
caregiver’ model of the nuclear family and assume a male industrial worker centered job 
environment. However, following the unification process of the early 1990s and an ensuing 
unemployment crisis that delegitimized the established paradigm of economic governance (see 
Esping-Andersen 1996), Germany has embarked on a radical transformation of welfare state 
institutions, experimenting with both neoliberal and collectivistic policy solutions during this 
timeframe (Hinrichs 2010). 
 Several of the most dramatic of these changes have been initiated in the domain of 
family policy. Responding to widespread anxieties about an aging population (Henniger et al. 
2008, stubbornly low birth rates (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011), and middling educational 
outcomes (Waldow 2009), German policymakers have forged a broad consensus on the 
favorability of the “Nordic model” of dual earner and early childhood education supporting 
family policies. This has given way to, over the past decade, a dramatic overhaul of the 
preexisting policy paradigm; highlighted by a new system of income-related, medium-length 




substantial investments towards universalizing access to center-based daycare for children 
aged one and older. The new focus on family policy also reflects the increased participation of 
women in the policymaking process, especially since the election of Angela Merkel as 
Germany’s first female chancellor (see von Wahl 2011; Morgan 2013). As women (traditionally 
expected to play the primary caregiving role in child rearing) generally face the most severe 
tradeoffs between family and career aspirations, it follows that family policy (the primary 
mechanism that policymakers can utilize to moderate such tradeoffs) would become a more 
immediate priority as women gain greater influence over the policy agenda (see: Atchison and 
Down 2010; Morgan 2013). 
 Germany’s recent family policy reforms have been subject to a great deal of academic 
inquiry, with scholars especially fixated on the anomaly that the reform agenda has been led (or 
at least accelerated) by the Christian Democrats, historically the primary defender of the male 
breadwinner family (see, e.g.: Fleckenstein 2011; Morgan 2013; von Wahl 2008, 2011). 
However, less attention has been paid to the linkages between family policy and Germany’s 
longstanding struggles with the social and economic incorporation of various migrant 
communities, which I argue here is a neglected consideration that helps to explain why the 
trajectory of family policy has shifted so dramatically and with such a broad, cross-partisan base 
of support. The family policy – migration nexus was particularly evident in the debate over the 
proposed care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) for the stay-at-home parents of children between 
the ages of one and three.  
 This chapter follows the same basic structure of the preceding one, tracing the general 
history of German family policy to the Merkel premiership and demonstrating that the 
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prevailing opportunity structure made it most politically expedient for the Christian Democrats 
to coopt the family policy of the rival Social Democrats. This was central to an overarching 
rebranding process designed to make the party more palatable to key electoral 
constituencies—including, but not limited to, younger women. The Christian Democrats 
resembled the Conservative Party of Canada in this respect. However, unlike Harper’s 
Conservatives, Merkel’s Christian Democrats were motivated by political circumstances to 
embrace a more universalistic set of reforms. The chapter is informed primarily by a broad 
reading of the secondary literature, party manifestos, coalition treaties, and other political 
documents. It also draws from a more systematic content analysis of coverage from two of 
Germany’s leading daily newspapers (see Chapter 5).  
  
4.1. Early History 
 Germany is a widely recognized pioneer in social insurance, with national social policies 
dating back to the early 1880s (Hinrichs 2010, p. 47). Yet it would be fair to place the genesis of 
modern (West) German family policy at the early 1950s, when the Allied Powers that had 
occupied the country since the end of World War II handed control over to domestic 
authorities. Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first chancellor, established a federal Ministry 
of Family Affairs in 1953 to oversee the development of the new regime’s family policy (Mätzke 
and Ostner 2010c, p.137). The political dominance, at the federal level, of the Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) during this critical juncture139 meant that 
                                                          
139 The CDU/CSU governed continuously between 1949 and 1969. 
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West Germany’s first generation of family policies served to prop up the archetypal male-
breadwinner family model and perpetuate an overarching culture of familialism.  
This logic was reflected most directly in the structure of the country’s first family 
allowance (Kindergeld), created in 1954. The allowance was made available, on a per child 
basis, to families with three or more children (Haanes-Olsen 1972, p. 20). The Kindergeld was 
initially paid out at a flat rate of 40 Deutsche Marks (DM) per month (around five percent of the 
average monthly manufacturing wage) for each child from the third onward but was later 
converted to an escalating bonus—paying 50, 60, and 70DM for the third, fourth, and fifth (and 
each subsequent) child, respectively. The Kindergeld was paid for by private employers for the 
first decade of its existence but the federal government took on this burden in 1964 (Hanes-
Olsen 1972, p. 22). 
Although similar in form to the pronatalist family allowance found in Québec during the 
late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s, the German allowance was itself designed to promote social 
solidarity and interdependence. The Kindergeld was established on the premise that (with 
employers doing their part by paying fair wages) the typical male industrial worker ought to 
earn a sufficient income to support a conventional four-member family—consisting of a 
husband, wife, and two children. As such, the rationale of having the family allowances only 
kick in with the birth of the third child was that there existed a social imperative for families 
with two (or fewer) children to support larger families financially (Mätzke and Ostner 2010c, p. 
140). The governing CDU/CSU later showed some sensitivity to the problem of socio-economic 
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inequality by extending a reduced benefit of 25DM per month to the second child of low-
income families in 1961 (Hanes-Olsen 1972, p. 22).140 
Per the foundational Christian-democratic ‘subsidiarity principle’,141 direct services to 
families were decentralized to the greatest degree possible and, in practice, left largely to 
religious authorities.142 This meant a near total absence of consideration for families that 
deviated from the conventional nuclear structure. For instance, public daycare was virtually 
non-existent and school-days typically ended in the early afternoon—with few after-school 
programs to keep the children of employed parents occupied until the end of a standard 
workday (Augustin-Dittmann 2010). 
 However, West Germany’s pre-unification family policy paradigm was somewhat more 
contested than is often portrayed. At various points in time, actors sought to challenge the 
primacy of male breadwinner sustaining social institutions (Mätzke and Ostner 2010c). Such 
contestations were most visible through the 1970s and early 1980s, when Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) dominated the chancellorship and the Green Party emerged as a conduit for 
postmaterialist values. These challenges, while not strong enough to alter the general policy 
trajectory, nevertheless gave way to some non-trivial, if incremental, changes. For instance, the 
Kindergeld was made available to first-born children (irrespective of parental income) in 1975; a 
reform that lessened the expectation that employers would deliver a “family wage”. Four years 
                                                          
140 This part of the program was financed solely by the federal government. 
 
141 A cornerstone of Catholic social thought, the ‘subsidiarity principle’ holds that social matters should be dealt 
with at a local level, and without the intervention of the central government, whenever possible.  
 
142 Still fresh memories of Germany’s recent experience with totalitarianism led to a common sentiment of 
“privatism” among the German population, leading citizens to aggressively reject any intrusion of the state into the 
‘private sphere’ of family life (Joosten 1990 found in Mätzke and Ostner 2010c). 
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later, in 1979, the SPD-Free Democrat government introduced a modest maternity leave 
benefit. The benefit entitled working mothers to a paid leave-of-absence of up to six months 
following childbirth, with a maximum payout of 750DM143 per month (Geisler and Kreyenfeld 
2012, p. 4).  
 Just as importantly, this period was characterized by a perceptible change in the 
discourse surrounding family policy as prevailing norms relating to marriage and gender roles 
began to soften (Mätzke and Ostner 2010c, p. 141). This discursive shift even extended to the 
CDU/CSU—historically a champion of the traditional family. By the mid-1980s the Christian 
Democrats (at this point under the leadership of modernizer Helmut Kohl) adopted the rhetoric 
of parental “choice” (not unlike the Harper government in Canada) and proposed a 
corresponding “sequential” model of family policy accommodative of part-time employment of 
mothers with school-aged children (Fleckenstein 2011, p. 549-50; Mätzke and Ostner 2010c, p. 
144). The cornerstone of this philosophy was a set of alterations to parental leave and parental 
benefits introduced in 1986. The new system entitled working mothers to stay at home for up 
to ten months after childbirth144 but also extended the flat-rate benefit (600 DM for each of the 
first six months)145 to non-working mothers (Ondrich et al. 2002, pp. 7-8). The 1986 reforms 
also, for the first time in the country’s history, established a right to paternity leave, entitling 
new fathers to take up to nine months off work—although few chose to exercise this right 
                                                          
143 The Deutsche Mark to US Dollar exchange rate was around 2:1 at the time (Marcuse 2005). 
 
144 The maternity leave period was increased several times, ultimately reaching three years (with eighteen 
compensated months) in 1992 (Ondrich et al. 2002, p. 4).  
 
145 From the seventh month onward, benefits were calculated on a sliding scale based on family income and 
phased out for higher income households (Ondrich et al. 2002, p. 8). 
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(Ejrnæs and Kunze 2013, p. 860). For working parents, time spent on care leave would also 
count toward future old age insurance benefits (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002, p. 33). One objective of 
these reforms was to "place family and paid work on an equal footing" by giving stay-at-home 
caregivers monetary compensation (Jurczyk et al. 2004, p. 716).146 
Thus, while the major challenges to the status quo would come following unification 
(discussed in the next section) West Germany had, by this point, already taken some small but 
collectively meaningful steps away from the male breadwinner model. In fact, at the time of 
unification, roughly half of all West German married couples could be classified broadly as dual 
earner, with wives mostly taking up part time work (Rosenfeld et al. 2004, p. 110).  
 
4.2. Unification 
 Over the four decades between the post-World War II partition of Germany and the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, East and West Germany had each adapted radically different political, 
economic, and social institutions. One of the most dramatic differences between the two 
Germanies concerned the prevalence of women in each country’s domestic labor force. While 
West Germany, as discussed above, was a quintessential male-breadwinner economy with jobs 
for women concentrated in the part-time labor pool, East Germany boasted a near parity of 
women and men who were active in the labor force (Rosenfeld et al. 2004, p. 111).147 
                                                          
146 Recipients of parental leave benefits were authorized to work part time for a maximum of nineteen hours per 
week (Jurczyk et al 2004, p. 716).  
 
147 Part-time employment was still more prevalent among women than men in East Germany. By 1989, 27% of 
employed women worked part-time jobs (versus just 2% of employed men) (Rosenfeld et al. 2004, p. 114). 
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 With women much more heavily engaged in the formal economy, East Germany 
unsurprisingly developed a more comprehensive set of employment-supporting family policies. 
Pivotally, center-based child care for infants, toddlers, and even older children was culturally 
accepted and made widely available by the state.148 In fact, a solid majority of East German 
children aged eleven and younger were enrolled in child care facilities at the time of unification 
(Ahnert and Lamb 2001, p. 1843). East Germany’s expansive system of nursery schools, 
kindergartens, and after-school programs was available to virtually all parents, who paid only 
nominal fees. Daily hours of operation ran from 6am to 6pm, which comfortably 
accommodated most standard work schedules (Ahnert and Lamb 2001, p. 1846).149 
 With unification came the monumental task of attempting to harmonize the highly 
disparate policies of the two German republics. The economically superior West Germany was 
ultimately able to project most of its core political institutions and policies onto its former 
neighbor but, in one notable concession to the East, the parties agreed to a constitutional 
guarantee of part-time child care for all children between the ages of three and six (Bredtmann 
et al. 2009, p. 7).150 Although symbolically meaningful, the child care guarantee (which came 
into effect in 1996) was something of an empty gesture—over eighty percent of three to six-
year-olds in the West and virtually all children within this age range in the East were already 
                                                          
148 East German parents who chose to raise their children exclusively at home were often criticized for their “petit 
bourgeois” aspirations (Ahnert and Lamb 2001, p. 1844). 
 
149 Due to its unique geographical position, West Berlin adapted several aspects of the Eastern model of child care. 
For instance, nearly 20% of West Berliner children under the age of three attended child care facilities at the time 
of unification (versus 2% in the country as a whole). After-school programs were also more widely available in 
West Berlin (Ahnert and Lamb 2001, pp. 1847-8).   
 
150 The child care promise was, in part, a concession to East Germany in exchange for the continuation of West 
Germany’s more restrictive abortion policies in the unified republic (Goldberg 1995, p. 541).  
134 
 
enrolled in a formal child care program at the time of unification (Ahnert and Lamb 2001, p. 
1846).151 The new constitutional amendment did nothing to address the real problem of a lack 
of full-time child care and neglected the prevailing gap in provisions for children under the age 
of three. 
 Of greater significance to the long-run trajectory of family policy (and the German 
welfare state as a whole) was the severe jobs crisis that was set off by unification. The euphoria 
surrounding the long-awaited reunion of East and West Germany had blinded policymakers to 
the logistical challenges that would come with merger of two vastly different economies, 
particularly within the respective domains of monetary policy and wage-setting (see Lindlar and 
Scheremet 1998). This led to a chaotic post-unification period in which millions of workers were 
displaced. Although concentrated in the former East Germany, which lost over a third of its 
preexisting jobs within two years (Lindlar and Scheremet 1998, p. 5), the job losses placed a 
severe strain on [West] Germany’s now unified system of social insurance—already under 
stress prior to unification (see Esping-Andersen 1996).152 Public finances were further squeezed 
by the annual subsidies that the former West Germany was now obligated to pay the East, 
which comprised an average of seven percent of its total GDP per year (Lindlar and Scheremet 
1998, p. 1).   
 After a period of impasse policy elites ultimately came to the realization, by around the 
middle of the decade, that major structural reforms would be necessary to salvage the national 
                                                          
 
151 The concept of early childhood education has a long history in Germany, rooted primarily in the research of 
pedagogue Friedrich Fröbel (1782 – 1852).  
152 The Unification Treaty specified that West Germany's social insurance programs would be made available to 
citizens of the former East Germany (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002, p. 29).  
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economy. Above all, it was understood that Germany’s male breadwinner supporting social 
insurance regime would need to be dramatically restructured. The system, which was designed 
to enable male wage earners to continue to support their families through periods of 
temporary and longer-term unemployment (i.e.: sickness, disability, layoffs), placed a major 
financial burden on employers, who per the longstanding social contract matched worker 
contributions to social insurance schemes on a fifty-fifty basis (Hinrichs 2010, p. 48). The model 
also created problematic incentives within the labor market as displaced workers faced little 
pressure to find new jobs right away (Berthold and Fehn 2002, p. 14). Accordingly, governments 
led by both major parties instituted a series of controversial measures designed to activate 
able-bodied workers and pare down “non-wage labor costs to employers” (Hinrichs pp. 46-7).  
 However, while acknowledging the need for greater competitiveness in the economic 
realm, both major parties maintained the normative conviction that the state ought to play a 
substantial role in protecting wage earners and their families from social risks. Accordingly, an 
effort was made to offset retrenchment measures implemented in the labor market during the 
1990s and early 2000s with more generous direct subsidies to families. Calling this shift a “dual 
transformation” of the German welfare state, Seeleib-Kaiser (2002, p. 35) observed, 
“Increasingly, support for the family through public policies has become the ‘new’ normative 
reference point for [German] social policy, whereas in the past it was primarily related to the 






4.3. The Red-Green Coalition (1998 – 2002) 
 Despite the reorientation of the German welfare state observed by Seeleib-Kaiser, one 
area where Germany continued to lag was in the provision of institutional child care services for 
children under the age of three. In fact, by the time the Red-Green government led by Gerhard 
Schröder came to power in 1998, just seven percent of under threes had a place in a child care 
facility. The enrollment rate was less than three percent in the former West Germany (Seeleib-
Kaiser 2002, p. 34). 
 The Red-Green coalition remained focused on attempting to roll-back the ongoing 
unemployment crisis through its first term, but child care appeared on the political agenda as 
the government’s first reelection campaign approached in 2002.153 In their pre-election 
coalition treaty, the SPD and Greens promised to introduce ‘sufficient’ child care infrastructure, 
covering at least twenty percent of children under the age of three by 2010 (Jüttner et al 2011, 
p. 97). Child care was subsequently one of the defining issues of the 2002 campaign (Rüling 
2010, p. 162) as Edmund Stoiber, the Bavaria-based chancellor candidate for the Christian 
Democrats,154 countered with a promise to quadruple the existing child benefit, bringing it to 
600 euros per month for each child under three years of age (“Giant Steps” 2002).  
Despite a still anemic economy and internal discord, the Red-Greens managed to retain 
a narrow majority in the Bundestag, with the CDU only improving its standing by a 
disappointing three seats. Stoiber’s child benefit pledge was viewed in retrospect as a 
                                                          
153 The SPD-Green coalition made modest enhancements to parental leave and child tax credit programs during its 
first administration (Fleckenstein 2011, p. 551). 
 
154 In an unusual move, the party chose to run CSU chair Stoiber as its chancellor candidate instead of then CDU 
chair Angela Merkel.  
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miscalculation that reinforced his image as a hardline traditionalist, thus perpetuating the 
CDU/CSU’s problematic trend of alienating women and young urbanites (Fleckenstein 2011, p. 
557-8). 
Following the 2002 election, veteran SPD legislator Renate Schmidt inherited the Family 
Affairs portfolio. Schmidt immediately commissioned multiple scientific studies of Germany’s 
extant child care regime and potential directions for future reform (Rüling 2010, p. 169). On the 
basis of this research—which presented an evidence base supporting the expansion of child 
care services, citing potential upsides for child development and long-run population stability—
Schmidt was able to get a substantial reform package through the Bundestag by the end of 
2004. The act, titled the Day Care Cost Sharing Law155, legislated that 1.5 billion euros saved 
annually by the German Länder due to recent labor market reforms be reinvested in child care 
for children under three (Jüttner et al 2011, p. 98)156. In proposing a direct transfer of public 
funds from (passive) labor market policies to family policy, the Day Care Cost Sharing Law was a 
clear continuation of the “dual transformation” of the German welfare state identified by 
Seeleib-Kaiser (2002). The Law set a target of 230,000 new spaces by 2010, which would serve 
roughly twenty percent of the target population (39% in the East and 17% in the West) (Rüling 
2010, p. 161). 
In addition to her successful efforts to increase the supply of child care spaces, Schmidt 
made the important discursive contribution of introducing the concept of ‘sustainability’ to 
                                                          
155 Tagesbetreuungskostenbeteiligungsgesetz. 
 
156 Over two-thirds of Germany's child care facilities are run by either local councils (33%) or churches (35%) (Bird 




frame the proposed reforms (see Ahrens 2010). Specifically, Schmidt drew from analytical 
research of family policies in Germany and elsewhere to draw a causal link between her 
modernization agenda and the intergenerational sustainability of the German welfare state.157 
Pivotally, this gave her a depoliticized, evidence-based angle from which to address the 
country’s low domestic birth rate—heretofore a sensitive topic for obvious historical reasons 
relating to the climate of hypernatalism (within white, Christian families) that prevailed during 
the Nazi years. Schmidt’s “sustainable family policy” agenda even included a formal medium-
term birth rate target of 1.7 births per woman, a gesture which would have been unimaginable 
just a few years earlier (Rüling 2010, p. 171). 
 
4.4. Family Policy and the CDU’s Rebranding 
 Notwithstanding the well-received child care reforms crafted by Minister Schmidt, 
Gerhard Schröder’s Red-Green coalition went into yet another election campaign as the 
underdog—having failed to turn around the national economy and alienating much of its 
progressive base with cuts to unemployment assistance. A disastrous showing for Schröder’s 
SPD in spring 2005 elections held in traditional party stronghold North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany’s most populous Land) motivated the chancellor to schedule a surprise early election 
for that fall, claiming that his coalition needed a new mandate to restore its credibility (Hawley 
2005). 
                                                          
157 Schmidt also utilized the results of the first cross national Program for the International Student Assessment 
(PISA) study (published in 2001)—which placed Germany outside of the top twenty in math, science, and reading—
to advocate for greater investments early childhood education (“Making Germany Child- Friendlier” 2005). The 
PISA report found that the German school system was especially ineffective for children from disadvantaged social 
backgrounds (Bird 2016, p. 83).  
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  This time, Schröder faced off against CDU Chair Angela Merkel. Merkel, who had been 
active in CDU politics since unification, was something of an anomaly as a Protestant, East 
German woman in a party historically dominated by Catholic, West German men.158 She had 
nevertheless steadily built a reputation among her co-partisans as a capable (if less than 
dynamic) party manager and electoral organizer (Williarty 2010, pp. 171-2). At the time of 
Chancellor Schröder’s unexpected election call, Merkel held the posts of CDU party chair and 
leader of the joint CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus, making her the logical choice to stand as the 
bloc’s candidate for chancellor. This marked the first time in history that either major party had 
nominated a woman for the position.  
 Merkel’s CDU/CSU alliance headed into the campaign with a commanding lead over the 
SPD in the public opinion polls, but the race tightened considerably as the mid-September 
election date loomed closer. In contrast to her party’s previous chancellor candidate, Edmund 
Stoiber, Merkel was conspicuously tight-lipped on family policy. Moreover, the CDU/CSU 
electoral manifesto took no position on either child care or family leave (Fleckenstein 2011, p. 
558).159 The CDU/CSU ultimately won a narrow plurality of both seats (by four) and the popular 
vote (by less than one percent) but fell well short of attaining the requisite number of seats 
necessary to form a majority coalition with its favored partner (The Free Democrat Party [FDP]).  
                                                          
158 Williarty (2010, p. 166-7) points out that Merkel’s ‘triple outsider’ status arguably helped her in the early going 
of her political career as, in the period immediately following unification, the Christian Democrats made a 
concerted effort to place members of demographics that were historically underrepresented within the party into 
“positions that were at least symbolically important.” 





With no other viable options available (outside of running a new election), the CDU/CSU 
and SPD looked to form a Grand Coalition government. Following nearly a month of 
negotiations, the parties came to terms on a coalition agreement that would make Merkel the 
country’s new chancellor. The CDU/CSU – SPD coalition treaty of 2005 notably endorsed the 
latter’s Day Care Cost Sharing Law and proposed (unspecified) sanctions for Länder that failed 
to expand child care capacity at a fast-enough pace (Rüling 2010, p. 161). The document also 
cited child care enrollment as an important tool for “strengthening [the] intercultural skills” of 
“migrant children” (Working together for Germany 2005, p. 114). 
 
Enter Ursula von der Leyen  
 Somewhat unexpectedly given the coalition treaty’s endorsement of the SPD’s child care 
strategy, Merkel assigned the Family Affairs portfolio to physician Ursula von der Leyen, a high-
profile CDU deputy representing Lower Saxony. Von der Leyen had substantial appeal to the 
party base as a married mother of seven and a scion of one of the country’s leading Christian 
Democrat dynasties.160 Notwithstanding this pedigree, she surprised many by accelerating her 
predecessor’s efforts to modernize German family policy—drawing substantial attention to 
herself in the process.  
 Von der Leyen’s first major project at Family Affairs was an effort to make the country’s 
parental leave system better-suited to women who worked full-time.161 The predecessor Red-
                                                          
160 Von der Leyen’s father, Ernst Albrecht, served as prime minister of Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990. 
 
161 The idea of adopting a Swedish-style wage-related system of parental leave was first proposed by the SPD in 




Green coalition had made a few modest alterations to the system during its time at the helm, 
notably extending a larger monthly benefit for parents who chose to take shorter leave 
times.162 However even at this increased rate (topping out at 450 euros per month), parental 
leave payments were still far too modest to provide most professional women with adequate 
compensation to offset time spent outside of the labor force (Williarty 2010, pp. 179-80).  
 Before the year 2005 was out, von der Leyen unveiled a radical new blueprint for a 
wage-related parental leave system. The new proposals, which were expressly patterned 
around the system that existed in Sweden (Fleckenstein 2011, p. 561), included: twelve months 
of paid leave (providing 67% of previous earnings up to a maximum of 1,800 euros per month) 
for the primary caregiver (usually the mother); an additional two months, compensated at the 
same rate, for the non-primary caregiving parent (usually the father); and a tax write-off for up 
to 3,000 euros in annual child care expenses (Harding 2006). Single parents would also be 
entitled to fourteen months of wage-related paid leave under the new law (Kluve and Tamm 
2012, p. 988). Paradoxically (for a policy championed by a CDU-affiliated minister), the 
proposed changes to parental leave offered the least upside for two parent families where just 
the primary caregiver took time away from work. In such circumstances, the participating 
parent would be eligible for just twelve months of leave. Collectively, the changes to the 
parental leave law were expected to cost the federal government an additional four billion 
euros per year (Wiliarty 2010, p. 180). 
                                                          
162 Under the Red-Green law parents who chose to take twelve months of leave were eligible for up to 450 euros 




 The proposed changes to parental leave were criticized on multiple fronts. Much of this 
criticism was directed at the notion of two additional months of family leave for the non-
primary caregiver, which was ridiculed as a “diaper changing internship” by one prominent CSU 
member. Some social conservatives voiced more serious allegations that the new family leave 
law was an exercise in social engineering intended to marginalize the role of the traditional 
family in society (Benhold 2010). For its part, the SPD criticized the plan for benefitting 
relatively affluent women the most and doing less for low-income parents, noting that the 
minimum monthly benefit was slated to go down by 150 euros (Williarty 2010, p. 180).163 Von 
der Leyen’s reform package nevertheless prevailed after receiving the endorsement of the 
chancellor in mid-2006. The new parental leave law cleared the Bundestag that fall, coming into 
effect at the beginning of 2007 (Wiliarty 2010, p. 182; “New Year Babies” 2007).   
 The Family Affairs minister next went to work on continuing her predecessor’s efforts to 
increase the national supply of child care spaces for children under the age of three.164 In early 
2007, von der Leyen announced a new target of 750,000 additional child care spaces for under-
threes by 2013—over three times the number proposed by the SPD’s Schmidt (Rüling 2010). 
The expansion, which would create spaces for roughly thirty-five percent of all German children 
under the age of three, was to be accompanied by an extension of the existing legal guarantee 
of child care to cover children aged one and older, starting in 2013 (Blum 2010, p. 95). This 
                                                          
163 From 450 euros to 300 euros (Williarty 2010, p. 180). 
 
164 Von der Leyen retained several of the staff members who had worked at Family Affairs under her predecessor 
Renate Schmidt (von Wahl 2011, p. 397). This included SPD-affiliated civil servant Malte Ristau-Winkler, who has 




entailed a four-billion-euro direct federal contribution, with the rest of the initiative to be 
financed by the Länder165 
Von der Leyen once again courted controversy—this time with some of the most 
stinging attacks coming from prominent Catholic religious leaders. One prominent Bavarian 
cleric, Archbishop Walter Mixa of Augsberg, warned that the proposed expansion of child care 
would harm children emotionally and “reduce women to breeding machines” (Crossland 
2007).166 The plan was also criticized by Cologne Archbishop Joachim Meisner (“German Bishop 
Slammed” 2007). Von der Leyen’s co-partisans in the CDU/CSU caucus were less vocally critical, 
but the Family Minister’s actions created a tense internal environment. One prominent news 
outlet characterized her as “the most hated woman in the Christian Democracy.” (Zeit online 
2007 found in Fleckenstein 2011, p. 560). 
Von der Leyen’s child care plan was much better received in the national media—as was 
the minister herself. By this point, the notion that the birth rate posed a threat to Germany’s 
future economic well-being was virtually taken for granted (see Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 
2011) and the minister’s plan was presented accordingly as a long-overdue effort to adapt the 
German welfare state to match the reality of the dual earner economy.  Even the center-right 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented: “[The child care debate] is not about faith but 
about finding pragmatic solutions to the everyday problems of many parents." Adding, “What 
families (let alone single-parent families) living in one of Germany's conurbations can still 
                                                          
165 The Länder received an increased share of revenue from the federal value-added tax to help finance their end 
of the child care agreement (Heiland 2012, p. 30). 
 
166 Interestingly, “breeding machine” (Gebärmaschine) was also a term used by feminists, during the 1960s and 
1970s, as a pejorative slang for ‘stay-at-home mother’.  
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survive on a single income?” (Crossland 2007). Von der Leyen was widely viewed as the ideal 
person to lead this initiative, particularly given her own experience with raising a large family 
while concurrently pursuing a career in medicine (See Bennhold 2010). Pivotally, von der Leyen 
appealed to voters outside of the Christian Democrats’ base. As a columnist for the center-left 
Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote: “Von der Leyen is dusting off the conservative image of the family. 
The conservatives need such role models to become electable for young women in big cities. 
The SPD has recognized this as a danger, but there is little it can do.” (Crossland 2007). This 
surfeit of positive coverage led to von der Leyen placing second in a 2008 list of Germany’s 
most popular politicians (based on public opinion surveys), finishing behind only the chancellor 
(von Wahl 2008, p. 43).  
 
Behind the von der Leyen Reforms 
 While von der Leyen was the face of the CDU’s family policy reorientation, the shift 
reflected a longer-term strategy initated by Merkel nearly a decade earlier in her then capacity 
as CDU’s General Secretary. Following 1998’s election—where the party had fared worse with 
female voters than with male ones for just the second time in its history (Wiliarty 2010, p. 
171)—Merkel and other party elites surmised that the party’s continued adherence to 
traditional, male breadwinner supporting family policies had become a political liability. This led 
Merkel herself to establish an intraparty commission to explore possible avenues for family 
policy reform. The panel released an internal position paper in 1999 calling for the adoption of 
policies that give parents “real” choice between the traditional and dual earner paradigms. This 
meant supporting both generous family allowances and the expansion of child care facilities. 
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This theme resurfaced in the party’s 2002 election manifesto but was overshadowed by 
Bavarian chancellor candidate Edmund Stoiber’s persistent image as a hardline social 
conservative. This characterization contributed to a second consecutive loss at the hands of 
Gerhard Schröder’s Red-Green coalition as the CDU/CSU’s woes among younger women and 
urbanites continued (Fleckenstein pp. 557-8).  
 The 2002 defeat was especially deflating for the CDU/CSU as the embattled Schröder 
government had appeared vulnerable going into the campaign (Clemens 2009, p. 129; 
Fleckenstein 2011, p. 558). In preparation for the next election, Merkel (by then party chair, 
leader of the party caucus, and presumptive nominee for chancellor) set up two subsequent 
commissions: one on “Parents, Family, and Employment” and another on how to appeal to 
voters in large cities. Each of these bodies recommended that the CDU/CSU work to create 
more child care spaces for children under three and related family-friendly infrastructure 
(Fleckenstein 2011, p. 558).  
 The internal shift on family policy failed to produce any immediate electoral dividends. 
In fact, the CDU/CSU share of the popular vote in 2005 was down over three percent from 2002 
and only two-tenths of a point higher than it had been in 1998 (Morgan 2013, p. 90). However, 
once the Grand Coalition was in place, it put Merkel in a position to “steal themes – as well as 
younger, urban, and female swing voters – from the SPD,” (Clemens 2009, p. 131). Von der 
Leyen’s experience at Family Affairs is perhaps the purest example of this strategy in action. 
Thus, while Merkel herself has often stayed mum on family policy—generally striving to 
maintain a balance between modernizers and social conservatives in her caucus (Fleckenstein 
2011, p. 560; Wiliarty 2010, p. 182)—the reform agenda promoted so masterfully by von der 
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Leyen was the culmination of an electorally-motivated reorientation engineered by the now 
chancellor years earlier. 
 To this point, we see a similar pattern in Germany to what was observed in Canada. In 
both cases, right-of-center parties utilized family policy innovations to bolster their respective 
levels of support within targeted ‘swing’ demographics. Moreover, the Christian Democrats and 
Conservative Party of Canada each managed to ‘steal’ the issue from a rival progressive party 
claiming ‘ownership’ of family policy for a certain period of time (Petrocik 1996). However, the 
differences between the two cases come to light when examining the unexpected intensity of 
the debate surrounding the Betreuungsgeld, a monthly child benefit not unlike Stephen 
Harper’s Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB). I turn to this controversy in the next section.  
 
4.5. The Betreuungsgeld Debate 
 With her approval rating holding steady, Merkel led the CDU/CSU to a gain of fifteen 
new seats in the 2009 federal elections. This put the alliance in a position to form a majority 
governing coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the party closest to them 
ideologically. While this would ostensibly place fewer obstacles in the way of the chancellor’s 
preferred governing agenda, the liberal-conservative coalition faced an early stumbling-block 
on the issue of child care. 
 The Bavaria-based CSU was adamant that it would only participate in the governing 
coalition on the condition that the parties introduce the Betreuungsgeld: a monthly child 
allowance for parents of one to three year olds who chose not to enroll their children in 
publicly funded child care. CSU officials argued that the reforms previously secured by von der 
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Leyen solely benefitted parents who sent their children to state-subsidized daycare facilities 
and held that a direct monthly cash benefit was necessary to offset the relative loss to parents 
who cared for their children at home (Bird 2016, pp. 82-3).167 The CSU was able to secure the 
inclusion of the care allowance in the CDU/CSU – FDP coalition treaty after party leader Horst 
Seehofer threatened to break off negotiations if the proposal fell through (Henninger and von 
Wahl 2014, p. 392).   
 Although ostensibly consistent with the long-running German (and more directly 
Christian-democratic) principle of recognizing the monetary value of household caregiving 
work, the Betreuungsgeld set off an unexpected level of public squabbling within Merkel’s 
second coalition. Moderates from the CDU, noting that the Merkel government was already 
falling behind on its promise to create 750,000 new child care spaces by 2013, questioned the 
wisdom of rerouting nearly a billion euros per year to a program that would do nothing to 
increase fertility, discourage women’s labor market participation, and potentially deprive 
toddlers of essential early childhood education. At one point, twenty-three CDU-affiliated 
Bundestag deputies threatened to vote against the Betreuungsgeld. The junior coalition partner 
FDP also objected to the child allowance, expressing a general desire to limit social entitlements 
and instead pursue tax cuts (“Pay to stay at home” 2012). 
 The chancellor ultimately intervened on the part of the CSU, whipping her coalition 
allies into supporting the Betreuungsgeld bill as it reached the floor of the Bundestag in 
November 2012. The legislation, which passed by a comfortable margin of twenty-eight 
                                                          
167  At the urging of the CSU, an endorsement of a ‘home-care-benefit’ was tacked on to von der Leyen’s child care 
reform package. However, the relevant legislation gave the government until 2013 to decide what form this 
benefit would take (Heiland 2012, pp. 30-1).  
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votes,168 authorized the federal government to begin circulating checks in August 2013. The 
monthly payments were slated to start at 100 euros per child and increase to 150 per child one 
year later (“Bundestag beschließt umstrittenes Betreuungsgeld” 2012).  
 However, the battle over the Betreuungsgeld did not end here as the SPD and allies 
elected to challenge the benefit’s constitutionality. The legal challenge culminated in a summer 
2015 Federal Constitutional Court hearing, in which the SPD government of northwestern Land 
Hamburg was the principal plaintiff. The court sided unanimously with the plaintiff, ruling that 
the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to unilaterally impose a nationwide 
child allowance.169 The decision drew the endorsement of SPD-affiliated federal Minister of 
Family Affairs Manuela Schwesig, who commented, “it shows that the care allowance was the 
wrong approach and has no future.” (Gesley 2015).170  
 It was one thing for the SPD to oppose the Betreuungsgeld during the legislative process 
and quite another for the party to actively kill the benefit nearly two years after it had already 
started going out to families. At the time of the constitutional court decision, the monthly 
allowance was being received by over 455,000 families, with the largest number based in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (see Figure 4.1). It is curious that the SPD would be willing to risk alienating 
                                                          
168 Six coalition members (two from the CDU and four from the SPD) voted against the bill. Two more abstained 
(one from each party) (“Bundestag beschließt umstrittenes Betreuungsgeld” 2012).  
 
169 The constitutional court reserved comment on the plaintiff’s more contentious claim that the Betreuungsgeld 
violated the principle of ‘equal treatment’ by reinforcing gender divisions between men and women (Gesley 2015). 
 
170 The federal government stopped taking new Betreuungsgeld applications immediately after the constitutional 
court announced its verdict but families who were already enrolled continued to receive payments through part of 
2016 (Breining 2016).   
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over 100,000 families in such a strategically vital part of the country, especially given the role 
that early elections in North Rhine-Westphalia played in ending the last SPD-led government. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Betreeeungsgeld recipients by Land (From “Muss ich mein Betreuungsgeld jetzt zurückzahlen?” 2015) 
 
 The answer to this puzzle may lie in how opposition to the Betreuungsgeld was 
framed—especially by the SPD and progressive elements within the CDU. Anti-Betreuungsgeld 
arguments tended to take a paternalistic tone, emphasizing the benefit’s disproportionate 
appeal to less well-educated, lower income parents. Opponents of the allowance often voiced 
concerns that, in tempting such parents to choose money over child care, the availability of the 
benefit would exacerbate the already problematic ‘parenting gap’ between privileged and non-
privileged children. Many were especially anxious about the potential effect of the allowance 
on minority families, where both women and children may face cultural barriers to learning 




Here we see the attitude towards disadvantaged families: they ought to send their  
children to state institutions as early as possible so that they, firstly, escape the bad 
influence of these poor parents and, secondly, start being educated properly from an 
early age.  
 
 The framing obviously contained both racial and class implications, but it would 
nevertheless be difficult to envision this rhetorical tack having the same level of success if it 
were not (at least implicitly) directed at an ‘othered’ minority community—think back to Liberal 
Party communications director Scott Reid’s remarks about “beer and popcorn”. Unsurprisingly, 
headscarf-clad women and other migrant caricatures figured prominently in political cartoons 
lampooning the Betreuungsgeld (see Figure 4.2 for an example). 
      Figure 4.2 – “Betreuungsgeld” (political cartoon) 
 
Translation: “100-euro Betreuungsgeld? Cash in hand? It’s a really good deal! 
And the kids can learn German from home.” (Stuttman 2012) 
 
Such arguments differ importantly from the selectivist claims associated with welfare 
chauvinism.171 They instead accept migrants as a fixture of German society and support 
generous social policies that would best help migrants integrate with the cultural mainstream. 
In this respect, such benign appeals to helping migrants and their children mirror arguments 
                                                          
171 It is worth noting that the right-populist Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) was in favor of the Betreuungsgeld 
(“Families need replacement for childcare allowance” 2015). 
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that have been made by integrationist center and left parties in Scandinavia (Grødem 2017). 
This suggests a budding progressive migrant-centered political discourse in parts of Europe 
that, given this project’s focus, I can only scratch the surface of here. In this context, it would 
suffice to say that this discourse played a role in delegitimizing the Betreuungsgeld and therein 
helped to keep Germany’s family policy trajectory moving in the Nordic direction.  
 
4.6. Conclusion and Key Takeaways  
 As compared to her counterpart Stephen Harper, Angela Merkel’s management of 
family policy presents a useful contrast. In both cases, leaders utilized new family policy 
proposals as a means of courting key ‘swing’ demographics. However, the German historical, 
institutional, and discursive context led the strategically-minded Merkel (See Wiliarty 2010, 
chap. 7) to gravitate towards a Nordic, dual earner supporting package of reforms—namely 
medium-length, wage-related parental leave and substantial enhancements to the availability 
of institutional child care for children under three.  
 Three specific variables stand out in this story. These are: Grand Coalition governance, 
the visibility of women in elite policy discourses, and the availability of issue linkages between 
family policy and migration. Regarding the first variable, it is critical that the family policy ideas 
that Merkel’s Christian Democrats would ultimately capitalize on were first developed within 
the SPD. The ‘cross-pollination’ of these ideas to the CDU would likely not have taken place 
outside of the context of a Grand Coalition government. Further, the delicate points about 
Germany’s birth rate raised by the issue’s “spokeswomen” (see Mohamed 2013) as a device to 
frame family policy as a matter of national importance would not have been utilized as 
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effectively by male politicians. Such rhetoric coming from a man—essentially asking women to 
bear more children for the good of the nation’s future—would undoubtedly have come off as 
paternalistic and demeaning. Finally, the political discourse tying the Betreuungsgeld to migrant 
families worked in tandem with other arguments to delegitimize the benefit (which, at face 
value, was consistent with the longstanding Christian democrat tradition of ascribing monetary 
value to household labor). The thrust of this objection to the child allowance, at least implicitly, 
was “the state knows how to raise your toddler better than you do.” This argument would not 
have been viable if directed squarely at the general population—as evidenced by the “beer and 
popcorn” episode in Canada.  
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CHAPTER 5: A TOPIC MODEL OF MEDIA FRAMING OF THE UCCB AND BETREUUNGSGELD  
In this chapter, I use a statistical topic modeling technique to parse out dominant frames 
in media coverage of family policy in Germany and Canada, respectively. My specific focus here 
is on the contrast between discourses surrounding the Harper Government’s Universal Child 
Care Benefit (UCCB) and the Merkel Government’s short-lived Betreuungsgeld (care 
allowance).172 This comparison is central to my general argument because, as stated earlier, I 
view the failure of the Betreuungsgeld as emblematic of a broader cultural shift away from 
familialism in Germany and toward a Nordic-style dual earner paradigm (see Hinrichs 2010). 
Moreover, a side-by-side comparison of these coeval discourses reveals telling aspects of the 
normative dimensions of the debate in each country. 
I analyze a sample of 467 news stories published on the UCCB and the Betreuungsgeld 
between 2005 and 2015. I do so via an automated topic model, which uses a statistical 
algorithm to classify text documents thematically. My empirical findings are largely consistent 
with my ex-ante hypothesis that the German debate was a more gendered and racialized one. 
173 Discourses on ‘traditional versus modern’ gender roles and the cultural integration of
                                                          
172 Both policies offered a flat-rate monthly stipend to parents. The UCCB entitled parents to receive $100 per 
month for each child under the age of six. Similarly, German Betreuungsgeld claimants received 100 euros per 
month for each child between the ages of 15 and 36 months. The stipends were later increased to $160 per child 
and 150 euros per child respectively.   
 
173 A complete breakdown of topics and exemplar documents for each sample can be found in APPENDIX 2. 
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 migrant communities were each perceptible in the German media framing. By contrast, the 
Canadian articles focused primarily on the significance of the UCCB to the Harper Government’s 
broader electoral strategy and party politics more generally. Secondary frames involved the 
UCCB’s budgetary impact and its relevance to the related political debate over universal 
daycare. Canadian newspaper coverage sometimes touched on the UCCB’s unique effect on 
women, but this narrative was generally subsumed within a larger ‘social investment’ tinted 
discourse that emphasized the economic losses incurred from inadequate public investments in 
child care (See Jenson 2009). Moreover, although a handful of stories in the centrist Globe and 
Mail documented reports of fraudulent child benefit claims made by foreign nationals, 
immigration and cultural integration were largely absent from the Canadian discourse.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief, non-technical introduction to topic 
modeling and its recent applications in political sciences. I then present my Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation (LDA) oriented topic model, the data, and my results. I conclude with a broader 
discussion of my findings and what they say about the politics of family policy reform in each 
country.  
  
5.1. Topic Modeling in Political Science 
 The term ‘topic modeling’ encompasses a suite of statistical algorithms that 
computationally discover textual patterns in large sets of documents (hereafter referred to as 
‘corpus’ or ‘corpa’) and organize their contents thematically. Topic models do this by analyzing 
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the content words174 of source texts to identify the themes that run through the corpus, how 
these themes relate to one another, and how they evolve over time (Blei 2012a, p. 77).  
Topic modeling was developed by a group of computer scientists in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s for the purpose of enabling researchers to condense large collections of textual 
data while, at the same time, preserving the “essential statistical relationships” necessary for 
more sophisticated forms of quantitative analysis (Blei et al. 2003, p. 993). The technique has 
subsequently been utilized for a number of substantive purposes, which include gene 
sequencing (Barnett and Jaakkola 2007; La Rosa et al. 2015), historical document archiving (Blei 
2013), and search engine optimization (Song et al. 2009). Although relatively new to the social 
sciences, topic modeling is a potentially powerful tool that gives social scientists the 
opportunity to organize, summarize, and annotate textual data on an unprecedented scale (Blei 
2012, p. 88). 
 Statistically speaking, a “topic” is defined as a probability distribution over terms in a 
vocabulary (McAuliffe and Blei 2008, p. 1). Topics can be understood more simply as clusters of 
frequently co-occurring words (Reed 2012, p. 11). For instance, a topic that’s focused on 
election campaigns would likely contain the words “voter”, “candidate”, and “poll”—for the 
simple reason that these words are likely to appear together in campaign-related texts. Topic 
modeling is essentially a method of working backwards from a set of documents to 
approximate the unobserved topics that generated them (Underwood 2012). The implicit 
assumption here is that the topics are pre-specified before any of the observable data is 
generated (Blei 2012, p. 78).  
                                                          
174 As opposed to ‘function words’, which serve grammatical purposes and have little meaning of their own.  
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Topic models utilize a hierarchical (three-level), mixed membership structure that allows 
the documents in a corpus to share information with one another (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 
pp. 17-18). Topic modeling is a probabilistic, iterative process that becomes more consistent as 
the number of iterations increases. This means that, over time, words will become more 
common in topics where they are already common and topics, in turn, will become more 
common in documents where they are already common (Underwood 2012). 
Operationally, topic models work by transforming the corpus into a Document Term 
Matrix (DTM), wherein rows correspond to documents in the corpus and columns correspond 
to words. The DTM is essential “input data” for topic models because it plainly displays the 
unique words used in the corpus and how often they appear in each document (Hornick and 
Grun 2011, p. 6; see Table 3). This gives the topic modeling algorithm the information it needs 
to sort the documents into discrete topics based on their lexical structure. Like most statistical 
text analysis techniques, topic models rely on the bag of words assumption (Blei et al. 2003, p. 
994), meaning that word order is assumed to be irrelevant.    
         Table 3 – Sample Document Term Matrix 
Docs                    forc  foreign   form     formal    format   former 
2009.10.29.txt    0         0           0            0              1                0 
2009.11.01.txt    0         0           0            0              1                1 
2009.11.04.txt    0         4           0            0              0                0 
2009.11.22.txt    0         0           0            0              0                0 
2009.11.28.txt    1         2           0            0              0                2 
2010.05.17.txt    1         0           2            0              0                0 
 
Applications of topic modeling to political science are rare and largely confined to the 
American Politics subfield. Two influential studies (Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer 2010) use topic 
models to operationalize the attention and legislative priorities of United States Senators (see 
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also: Grimmer and Stewart 2013, pp. 18-19). Examples from comparative politics are harder to 
come by, although Lucas et al. (2015) offer a compelling look at the potential of topic modeling 
within the subfield—especially as it pertains to processing multilingual text data. I accordingly 
make use of a number of their suggestions here.      
To my knowledge, topic modeling has yet to be applied to any substantive issue in social 
policy.175 I nevertheless view the technique as a promising avenue to help scholars uncover the 
values, attitudes, and frames that underpin cross-national social policy discourses. I offer a first 
step here by using a simple topic model to illustrate the differences between family policy 
discourses in Germany and Canada, respectively.  
  
5.2. Methodology and Data  
Latent Dirichlet Allocation  
The specific topic modeling technique I utilize here is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), 
which is the most straightforward and widely used of the topic models (Blei 2013; Grimmer and 
Stewart 2013, p. 284). Loosely speaking, LDA is built on two assumptions. First, that there is a 
finite and fixed number of patterns of word use, and thematically-related groups of words 
(“topics”) tend to appear together in documents; and second, that each document in the 
corpus will exhibit some combination of multiple topics (Blei 2013). The second assumption is a 
key distinguishing feature of LDA as preexisting text classification methods restricted each 
document to just a single topic (Blei et al. 2003, p. 997). As such, LDA is able to capture 
                                                          
175 This stated, the present study builds on several more conventional content analyses of the framing of Canada’s 
child care debate (see: Thériault 2006; Rinehart 2008; Albanese et al. 2010; Wallace 2016). 
158 
 
previously neglected intra-document statistical structure and, ultimately, produce a more 
sophisticated evaluation of the documents in a corpus. In practice, LDA generates a unique set 
of topic probabilities for each document, thereby giving the researcher a sense of the 
uncertainty of the estimates.  
At a more theoretical level, LDA can be understood as a generative probabilistic model, 
meaning that it uses observable data to estimate a set of hidden parameters, in this case the 
latent topics that underlie the corpus. It does so via an iterative maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation process that uses the information drawn from words and documents to compute an 
approximated log-likelihood of the latent variables (Reed 2012, p. 7).   
Figure 5.1 is a simplified graphical representation of LDA. The basic intuition here is that 
the hidden Dirichlet prior parameters (β and α) create a topical structure that regulates the 
distribution of documents (θ) and words (z and w). In essence, the model works backwards 
from the observed (shaded) word “w”, to approximate the latent (unshaded) variables that 
generated it (Blei et al 2003, p. 997).     
 







I apply LDA to a sample of 467 news stories published between December 2005 and October 
2015.176 The German articles were obtained from the websites of Süddeutsche Zeitung, based 
in Munich, and Frankfort based Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. I chose these sources in part 
because they are the two most widely-circulated daily newspapers in Germany and partly for 
pragmatic reasons. The respective website of each paper features a well-organized, 
chronologically-ordered feature section on the Betreuungsgeld, each consisting of around 190 
relevant articles.177 Moreover, this pairing gives me a partisan balance as Süddeutsche Zeitung 
is generally perceived as center-left and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as center-right.  
I used a widely available machine translation application178 to transcribe the stories 
from German to English.179 As expected, this created some issues with grammatical structure, 
syntax, and improperly translated words. This is no cause for serious concern, however, as I 
removed most conjunctions, prepositions, pronouns, and other grammatical words in the 
preprocessing stage (explained below). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the bag of words 
assumption means that topic models take word order as irrelevant, so improper syntax should 
not bias my results. Finally, I dealt with the possibility of error created by mistranslation by 
closely vetting my translated articles. I was generally able to infer the meaning of mistranslated 
                                                          
176 My Canadian articles begin in December 2005 and my German ones begin in May 2007. Both samples end in 
October 2015. 
 
177 My sample consists of 188 stories from Süddeutsche Zeitung and 191 stories from Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, comprising a total of 379 documents. 
 
178 Google Translate. 
 





words from the context in which they were used. For instance, a June 2015 Süddeutsche 
Zeitung article about the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Betreuungsgeld was titled, 
“The Federal Constitutional Court has tilted180 care benefit – but only for reasons of 
jurisdiction.” “Tilted” in this context clearly means “overturned”.  
My Canadian articles come from The Globe and Mail and National Post, both based in 
Toronto. The Globe and Mail (centrist) and National Post (conservative) are widely viewed as 
rival papers (see Cobb 2004) and each has a strong national profile. They are, in fact, the only 
two English-language Canadian newspapers that are directly targeted at a Canada-wide 
audience (Newspapers Canada 2015). While both papers are headquartered in Toronto, it 
should be noted that the National Post is closely associated with Canada’s reform conservative 
movement, which is intellectually rooted in Western Canada.181 This gives my analysis at least 
some sensitivity to differing regional perspectives.  
I identified relevant articles by entering the search terms “universal child care benefit” 
“uccb” and “child benefit” into a digital archive of Canadian newspapers.182 Once again, I 
encountered some ambiguity as the term “child benefit” may also refer to the Canadian 
National Child Benefit (NCB), which was a preexisting federal-provincial program that provided 
financial support to low-income families. I dealt with this by paying close attention to the 
context in which the term “child benefit” was used. For instance, articles that focused on 
                                                          
180 Emphasis added. 
 
181 Canada’s reform conservative intellectual vanguard is known colloquially as “The Calgary School” for its 
association with the University of Calgary. Stephen Harper himself was a graduate student in economics at the 
University of Calgary during the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s. See Rovinsky 1997. 
 
182 Print edition. 
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poverty were generally referring to the NCB when they used the term. Finally, following 
Wallace’s earlier content analysis of print media coverage of the UCCB (2016), I excluded 
articles that mentioned the benefit as part of a general overview of party platforms and 
budgets.   
This left me with a corpus of 88 articles in total: 46 from the National Post and 42 from 
the Globe and Mail. While significantly smaller than my German sample—reflecting the lower 
profile of child care in the Canadian media—this corpus nonetheless sufficient for my topic 
model, which uses words, not documents, as its observations. 
 
Preprocessing the data 
In order to extract the most possible substantive meaning from my corpa, it was 
necessary to run each through a data cleansing process that removed low value text.183 This 
‘preprocessing’ included removing punctuation marks, numbers, unnecessary spaces, and 
commonly used filler words.184 I also ran the data through a ‘stemming’ algorithm that broke 
down related words into a common base form. For instance, the stemming process would 
simplify the words “large”, “larger”, and “largest” into the common root word “larg”.  
Preprocessing resulted in greatly condensed texts that consisted primarily of 
substantively important words. Here is one example from a Süddeutsche Zeitung article: 
Unfamiliar unity: employers and trade unions have criticized the planned care be
nefit in a joint statement. Also within the coalition, the project remains  
controversial - CDU General Secretary Hermann Gröhe admitted that there is  
                                                          
183 The statistics and visualizations used in this paper were computed using R (Version 3.31). All relevant R code can 
be obtained from the author by request.   
 
184 The dictionary of English ‘stopwords’ in the R package tm (text mining) includes most conjunctions, articles, and 
prepositions, as well as a number of generic words like “ask”, “good”, and “small”.  
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still a "need for clarification" 
 
Becomes:   
  
unfamiliar uniti employ trade union critic plan care benefit  joint statement also 
within coalit project remain controversi cdu gener secretari hermann gröhe          
admit still need clarif 
 
 This still left me with the problem of sparsity, which refers to computational difficulties 
created by a preponderance of zero-valued cells in a given matrix. Sparse matrices are 
problematic for most statistical operations, which waste memory and time by superfluously 
processing the uninformative zeros. Unfortunately, sparsity is virtually inevitable in LDA as, 
given the structure of the DTM (see Table 3 above), there are bound to be a high number of 
zero-valued cells (cells where a given word appears zero times in a document). Unsurprisingly, 
both of my corpa were over 95% sparse. Dealing with sparsity often involves a trade-off, 
however, as some infrequent words may have significant analytical value when used in a 
specific context. For instance, the term “career” only appears three times in my Canadian 
sample but may be an operative word in a handful of articles that discuss work-family 
reconciliation issues.  
Erring on the side of caution, I removed the sparsest185 three percent of words in each 
corpus. This ended up being terms used fewer than three times in my corpus of Canadian 
articles and those used fewer than twelve times in the German corpus, reducing the overall 
sparsity of both corpa to 87%. I then removed a few of the most frequently used words, which 
were in some cases so ubiquitous that they added little unique meaning to the corpus. For 
                                                          
185 Sparsity refers to the threshold of relative document frequency of a term. The higher the level of sparsity the 
less salient the term is to the corpus. 
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instance, I removed the words “care” and “allow”—which each occurred on over 1,000 more 




Using a spatial LDA visualization technique,186 I determined that each corpus contained 
five non-overlapping topics. Attempts to generate topics beyond this point led to overlapping 
topics and, in several cases, illogical or overly-narrow categorizations. My first task was to infer 
topic labels187 from my word clusters. Following Lucas et al. (2015, pp. 18-19), I did this by both 
examining the most frequent words in each topic and reading a set of exemplar documents—
those that were a ‘top match’ for each topic. For instance, the topic I labeled “court challenge” 
(Germany) was composed as such: 
Table 4 – Keywords and Exemplar Documents for “court challenge” 
KEYWORDS EXEMPLAR DOCUMENTS 
federal, govern, state, 
länder, law, constitution, 
question, court, money 
1.The FCC has overturned child allowance (FAZ, 7/21/2015) 
2.A federal law is white-blue [Bavarian] (SZ, 4/14/2015)  
3.The pince-nez of Karlsruhe188  (SZ, 4/15/2015) 
 
This was one of the more straightforward topics for me to label, given both the abundance of 
keywords related to judicial procedure (law, constitution, question, court, etc.) and the 
substantive focus of each of my exemplar documents. Some of the other topics were more 
difficult to pin down, but I was consistently able to infer general themes from the available 
data. 
                                                          
186 The LDAvis package in R, created by Carson Sievert and Kenny Shirley. 
 
187 Computer scientists are beginning to experiment with automated topic model labelling methods (see Lau et al. 
2011) but it is still the norm for analysts to manually infer topic labels based on content.   
 
188 Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court is based in Karlsruhe, Baden-Württemberg. 
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 The labelling process left me with the following categorizations: 
Table 5 – Distribution of ‘Topics’ by Country 
 
In the remainder of this section, I unpack these topic distributions and explain how they reflect 
substantial differences in the framing of family policy discourses in each country.  
Germany 
 
    Figure 5.2 – Intertopic distance map: Germany 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, German news coverage of the Betreuungsgeld broke down into five 
broad topics. These are: 
 Implementation (26.1% of words): This includes stories about the number of child 
allowance claims, the demographics of claimants, and problems related to the 
distribution of claims (i.e.: applicants being denied benefits). Some of these articles raise 
COUNTRY TOPICS 
Germany Implementation (26.1%); Social Change (21.3%); Coalition 
Infighting (18.4%); Court challenge (17.9%); Budget (16.3%) 
Canada Electoral Strategy (22.1%); Taxation (20.6%); Daycare Debate 
(19.8%); Scandal/Controversy (19%); Fraud/Waste (18.4%)  
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concerns that the child allowance was being claimed disproportionately by migrant and 
low-income families.  
 
 Social Change (21.3% of words): These are mostly negative stories about how the 
Betreuungsgeld reflects an antiquated notion of the traditional male 
breadwinner/female caregiver family model. Several include personal attacks on Family 
Minister Kristina Schroeder. A few of these articles express concerns that the 
Betreuungsgeld would reinforce the cultural oppression of women in migrant 
communities.   
 
 Coalition Infighting (18.4% of words): These stories covered divisions over the 
Betreuungsgeld within the governing coalition. The benefit pit Bavaria’s traditionalist 
CSU against a heavily female group of modernizers within the CDU and FDP. 
 
 Court Challenge (17.9% of words): These pertain to the ultimately successful legal 
challenge to the Betreuungsgeld and the fallout of the decision for the government. 
 
 Spending/Budget (16.3% of words): These articles criticize the adverse budgetary 
impact of the Betreuungsgeld and other frivolous government spending.  
 
 
A closer look inside the topics reveals telling normative dimensions of the debate that 
contributed to the ultimate failure of the Betreuungsgeld. Two re-occurring themes are (1) the 
incompatibility of the care allowance with the modern dual earner family model and (2) its 
disproportionate appeal to poorly integrated migrant communities.  
Both of these themes are, in fact, present in the number-one exemplar document in the 
‘social change’ category: a November 2012 Süddeutsche Zeitung article titled “But yet they 
need the money not”. The article, which my topic model categorizes as 56% social change 
related, is set in Neukölln, an immigrant-heavy borough of Berlin. Its author interviews a 
number of community leaders about their views on the imminent Betreuungsgeld, revealing a 
general pessimism about the program’s potential effect on migrant women and children. One 
interviewee remarks,  
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Let’s take a 26 year-old woman who cleans toilets for 350 euros a month. Why 
should she continue if she will get a 300 euro care benefit for her second child?... 
Then over her three years at home her husband’s bad temper is exposed.189 
Another Neukölln resident quoted in the article voices concerns about the quality of German 
language education available to his son: “‘Why is your German so poor?’ He recently asked his 
son. ‘Because there are no Germans sitting with me in the class,’ the son responded.”  
 This theme is hit on even more directly in the third most salient news story in the 
‘implementation’ topic, June 2012 a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung piece titled “Integration 
begins in early childhood education.” As its title indicates, the article focuses on concerns that 
the Betreuungsgeld may impede the cultural and linguistic integration of migrant children by 
incentivizing their parents to care for them at home, versus sending them to a daycare center 
to interact with children from other ethnic backgrounds. The article makes reference to the 
implementation of a similar family cash transfer program in Norway which, according to an 
OECD study, led to a fifteen percent reduction in the proportion of working immigrants. One 
domestic source quoted in the article calls non-participation in daycare a "significant 
socialization and integration disadvantage" for children from migrant backgrounds. 
 The topic analysis also uncovered a number of high salience articles that characterized 
the Betreuungsgeld controversy as a flashpoint in a larger debate over the proper role of 
women in society. Several singled-out Family Minister Kristina Schröder (CDU), who was at 
times a lightning rod for partisan vitriol. One especially harsh Süddeutsche Zeitung write up 
(7/16/2012)190 referred to Schröder as the “punching bag of Berlin politics”. Schröder, the 
                                                          
189 Author’s translation. 
 
190 This article was the number-eight match within the ‘social change’ topic. 
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author writes, “is not smart enough to make deals, [she] fights the wrong battles, and [she] 
lacks the brazen chutzpah of her predecessor [Ursula von der Leyen].” Another Süddeutsche 
Zeitung article (4/19/2012) reads,  
What Family Minister Schröder says does not fit the lifestyle of her peers: In 
reality, women do not suffer under the yoke of feminists, but the glass ceilings in 
the company and the lack of work-life balance. And this is precisely why they feel 
in especially bad hands with Schröder. 
 
The unrelenting—and at times unwarranted—ad hominem against Schröder is consistent with 
extant research that finds that media coverage of female politicians tends to be more personal 
and ‘trait-driven’ than the coverage of their male colleagues (Dunaway et al. 2013). It also 
evidences my general argument that the elevated profile of female politicians in Germany 









As Figure 5.3 indicates, Canadian media coverage of the Harper Government’s UCCB 
focused on the following five topics: 
 Electoral strategy (22.1% of words): These stories discuss the significance of the 
UCCB to Stephen Harper’s broader electoral strategy. Several characterize the 
UCCB, and especially the pre-election UCCB expansion (2015), as a shrewd political 
initiative that will help Harper win over middle-class families. 
 
 Taxation (20.6% of words): These articles discuss the UCCB as part of the Harper 
Government’s broader ‘tax relief’ agenda. 
 
 The Daycare Debate (19.8% of words): This topic covers the pros and cons of 
universal daycare. Several of these articles debate the merits of the ‘Québec 
model’, where parents pay a small daily fee (~$7 dollars) to send their children to 
publicly run daycare centers. Another common theme is the spiraling cost of 
center-based daycare in large cities. 
 
 Scandal/Controversy (19% of words): These document a number of scandals 
involving the cost of the UCCB and its promotion. The conduct of Social 
Development Minister Pierre Poilievre, who was accused of promoting the UCCB 
in an inappropriately partisan manner, is a prominent theme here.   
 
 Fraud/Waste (18.4% of words): These articles deal with various misappropriation 
issues involving the child benefit. Four of the top ten articles in this topic are about 
fraudulent child benefit claims made by foreign nationals.   
 
From this summarization alone, it should be apparent that the debate over the UCCB 
was largely devoid of the volatile identity politics that animated the German discourse. To the 
contrary, Canada’s child care debate was a rather sterilized affair that focused on electoral 
politics and, to a lesser extent, the policy tradeoffs between the UCCB and universal daycare. In 
the absence of a robust dialogue on its normative dimensions, the child benefit galvanized few 
and was generally framed as ‘free money’ doled out to potential supporters by the Harper 
Government. Accordingly, three of the top hits in the ‘electoral strategy’ category were: “If this 
election can be bought, the Tories will win easily” (Globe and Mail, 8/2/2015); “Have I got a 
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bribe (er, cheque) for you!” (Globe and Mail, 7/20/2015); and “Child care cheques give Tories a 
big boost; Lead in new poll” (National Post, 7/24/2015).  
When the Canadian articles touched on the unique effect of the UCCB on women, they 
generally did so from a broad ‘social investment’ perspective that emphasized the possible 
long-run economic benefits of public spending on child care. Such benefits may stem from both 
the increased labor force participation of mothers and the early intellectual stimulation that 
children receive in daycare programs. This viewpoint is expressed directly in one exemplar 
document titled “The case for publicly funded daycare” (Globe and Mail, 10/21/2013), where 
the author writes: 
Universal child care is a three-way economic stimulus program – it helps parents 
work (and reduces poverty)191, directly creates jobs for early childhood educators, 
and, if the early learning is good enough, gives a boost to the next generation of 
skilled labour. 
 
Another exemplar document is titled “no greater investment.” Yet another “The daycare trade-
off; Universal childcare lets more women go to work but could have a negative effect on their 
children”. These articles are representative of the general framing of the Canadian child care 
debate, which was couched in narrowly economic cost-benefit terms. More normative 
commentary on evolving gender roles is glaringly absent from this discourse. 
 Finally, in stark contrast to my results for Germany, I found no discussion of the cultural 
integration of immigrant groups in the Canadian media coverage of the UCCB. In fact, 
immigration and citizenship issues only came up in the context of a handful of stories that dealt 
with fraudulent child benefit applications made by foreign nationals. One story worth noting 
                                                          
191 Parentheses in the original. 
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documented the Québec government’s efforts to block child benefit payments to 
Abousfian Abdelrazik, a Sudanese-Canadian dual citizen who’d been placed on the United 
Nations’ al-Qaeda blacklist (Globe and Mail, 6/1/2011). The absence of a ‘cultural integration’ 
discourse here reflects Canada’s generally successful history of incorporating immigrant 
communities.  
 
5.4. Discussion  
In this chapter, I applied a novel statistical topic modeling technique to a collection of 
newspaper articles documenting child care discourses in Canada and Germany. I obtained 
generally encouraging results, which were largely consistent with my ex-ante expectations of 
how each discourse broke down. My results speak positively to the potential of topic modeling 
as a tool for analyzing public discourses on social policy and other political topics. 
Substantively, my results support the view that the German discourse was a more value-
laden one that invoked normative commentary on both the role of women in society and the 
integration of minority communities. Such frames were useful for the opponents of the 
Betreuungsgeld, who had a larger set of arguments to draw from than the Canadian critics of 
the UCCB. This evidences my broader argument that the Betreuungsgeld’s failure reflects a 
cultural shift away from German familialism; one that’s been intensified by changes in gender 
expectations and the growth of ethnic minority communities.  
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CONCLUSION: ‘GETTING IN BED’ WITH THE SILENT REVOLUTION 
Summary of Findings 
Building off an empirical literature that documents, since around the mid-1990s, a 
steady growth of public spending on family-related policies across the affluent OECD countries 
(see Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015), this project has asked how right parties in particular 
have adapted to the political context created by this still unfolding “silent revolution”. By 
comparing the behavior of two right party-led governments over approximately the same 
timeframe (2005 – 2015), I have reached the conclusion that this new political landscape has 
generated novel opportunities for conservative political actors to utilize new family policy 
spending initiatives in politically advantageous ways. However, how such entities choose to do 
so will depend, more than anything, on the prevailing political discourses that are available for 
policy entrepreneurs to choose from. In short, discourses matter. 
To be more precise, the respective family policy trajectory observed in each country 
during the period in question can ultimately be traced back to the victorious domestic policy 
narrative. In Canada, the Harper government’s favored ‘parental choice’ narrative has won out 
due to the failure of progressives and feminists to present a countervailing rationale for 
universal child care. This reflects a failed strategy, on the part of child care advocates, of 
downplaying the stakes for women and instead emphasizing the potential developmental
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 benefits of formal ‘early childhood education’—a perspective that clashes with the middling 
performance of Québec’s provincial daycare program over its two decades in operation. The 
would-be reformers dug themselves into an even deeper hole by expressing condescension 
towards parents who favored familial and informal caregiving arrangements over center-based 
daycare.  By contrast, Germany presented a more favorable discursive environment for daycare 
and other female-friendly policies as policy entrepreneurs tapped into public anxieties 
surrounding the lagging birth rate and, less directly, a perceived failure to incorporate migrants 
into mainstream society. Furthermore, the ‘spokeswomen’ who sold Germany’s reforms were 
far from bashful with respect to the gendered dimensions of the debate—arguing persuasively 
that Germany’s antiquated framework of male-breadwinner oriented family policies left 
women to grapple with the impossible choice of ‘career or family’. However, while the 
prevailing discursive context in each country is an important part of the story, it was ultimately 
Harper and Merkel, respectively, who identified and seized opportunities for political gain 
through the creation of new family policies. In doing so, each meaningfully altered their 
respective country’s family policy regime.  
 
Canada 
 Starting with Canada, the Harper government quite ingeniously picked up on feminist 
themes relating to ‘choice’ and self-determination, in the run up to the 2006 election, to sell 
what was effectively a pittance for stay at home mothers. When a Liberal operative pointed out 
(correctly) that the $100 per month offered through Harper’s child benefit amounted to little 
more than “beer and popcorn” money, the Conservatives received yet another opportunity to 
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characterize the Liberals as a group of overbearing “old white guys” who were trying to tell 
parents (and especially mothers) what to do—as one female Conservative MP phrased it. With 
virtually no organized national women’ s movement to speak of,192 this brand of faux feminism 
went largely unchallenged (Rinehart 2008). The Conservatives undoubtedly ‘won’ the issue of 
child care, which ultimately helped them claim victory in the 2006 election.   
 Once in office, Prime Minister Harper recognized that small, targeted family benefits 
and tax credits were an effective mechanism for reaching key niche demographics and filling 
the media cycle (Interviewee no. 25, 28 May 2018). While Harper’s proclivity for ‘boutique’ 
micro-policies alienated some of his closest ideological kin, it was universally recognized as 
good politics and spawned a number of imitators (of all partisan stripes) at the provincial level. 
For instance, while child activity tax credits were virtually non-existent193 before Harper took 
office, such credits could be found in most of Canada’s provinces by the time he left—
collectively accounting for nearly $270 million in public spending (Sauder 2014, p. 76).194    
 Harper’s more lasting contribution to Canada’s family policy regime came in his 
willingness to pour substantial sums of money into the national child benefit system, 
particularly toward the tail end of his time in office. Hoping to recapture the magic that the 
UCCB brought for his Conservatives in the 2006 campaign, Harper pushed all of his chips into 
the center of the table in the lead up to the fall 2015 election—cutting a child benefit check for 
every household dependent under the age of eighteen in Canada. While this ‘vote buying’ 
                                                          
192 Due in part to the failure of the first push for a national daycare program in the mid-1980s. 
 
193 At this point one child activity tax credit existed, in the small Atlantic province of Nova Scotia, costing the 
provincial government around one million dollars per year (Sauder 2014, p. 76).  
 
194 This figure includes both federal and provincial child activity tax credits.  
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gambit proved unsuccessful, it drove total federal child benefit spending to an effectively 
irreversible one percent of GDP, greatly limiting the family policy options available to the 
incoming Liberals. With twenty-three billion dollars per year (1.3% of GDP) now devoted to the 
Trudeau government’s sliding scale child benefit, and payouts slated for indexation this coming 
summer (2018), Canada will remain a benefits centric family policy regime for the foreseeable 
future. This makes it highly unlikely that the federal government will get involved, in any 
meaningful way, in helping the provinces generate a sufficient number of high-quality 
subsidized daycare spaces. Parents outside of Québec will have to get used to paying some of 
the highest child care fees in the OECD (Luxton 2016). 
 
Germany 
 Moving over to Germany, Chancellor Merkel was fortuitous to come into office at a time 
when talking about the nation’s low birth rate was no longer taboo and even more fortunate to 
have found, in Ursula von der Leyen, the ideal spokeswoman for her party’s family policy 
modernization project. Owing to her unassailable conservative lineage and her own image as a 
Supermutter, von der Leyen was deftly able to sell a radical package of Nordic-style family 
policy reforms while, at the same time, embodying a traditional conservative iconography of 
maternalism. It is unlikely that anybody else would have been able to put together such a broad 
consensus in favor of the reforms. Following the lead of her predecessor, SPD-affiliated family 
minister Renate Schmidt, von der Leyen effectively constructed Germany’s anemic domestic 
birth rate as a potential threat to the country’s long-run economic vitality and, therein, built a 
compelling case for unprecedented public investments in dual earner supporting family 
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policies. This would have been a difficult narrative for any male politician to construct, 
especially given Germany’s unique historical baggage with pronatalism. Given her personal 
popularity and the overwhelming level of support she obtained for her family policy agenda, 
von der Leyen could claim substantial credit for the Christian Democrats regaining their 
historical edge among female voters (Wiliarty 2013, p. 175).   
While Merkel found the perfect surrogate in von der Leyen, the change in direction on 
family policy reflected years of groundwork put in by Merkel herself in an effort to make the 
CDU’s agenda more palatable to a new generation of voters. It was also significant that the 
reforms took place under a Grand Coalition government, which limited the sway of the socially 
conservative CSU, and were largely consistent with a preestablished policy blueprint developed 
within an SPD-controlled family ministry. The longer-term political ascension of women is also 
an important part of the story as, with three of Germany’s major political parties having 
established formal targets for women’s representation in the 1980s and 1990s,195 a critical 
mass of female legislators and backroom players has since materialized. This bloc, which spans 
the political spectrum, has collectively ensured that matters which disproportionately affect 
women—such as child care and parental leave—receive the appropriate amount of political 
attention.  
 Finally, the heated discourse surrounding the Betreuungsgeld reveals just how far away 
Germany has moved from the male breadwinner paradigm during the Merkel years. In the not 
too distant past, the monthly allowance for stay-at-home mothers would have been a no-
brainer for the CDU—in keeping with the well-established Christian-democratic practice of 
                                                          
195 The Greens, SPD, and CDU respectively.  
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recognizing the (monetary) value of household work. The fact that the allowance drew such a 
strong backlash, and was even divisive within the CDU’s own caucus, is a striking testament to 
the decline of traditional German familialism.  
However, it would be a mistake to attribute this shift entirely to evolving gender 
relations as it is clear (from both my review of the relevant literature and the results of my 
statistical model reported in chapter 5) that several criticisms of the Betreuungsgeld invoked its 
potentially detrimental effects on children from less well-educated households, and especially 
children from migrant backgrounds. Interestingly, these concerns were most commonly 
articulated by well-intentioned moderate and left-of-center actors who generally embraced the 
view of Germany as a modern, multi-ethnic society. As such, we see in the Betreuungsgeld 
debate an important example of a migrant-centered social policy discourse that differs 
considerably from the selectivist rhetoric associated with welfare chauvinism—and in fact 
favors more comprehensive social programs. This indicates a more complicated interplay 
between migration and the welfare state than is commonly presented by scholars.   
 
Theoretical Contribution, External Validity, and Avenues for Further Research 
 This study makes a palpable contribution to scholarship on the recent and ongoing 
family policy reforms observed across the OECD (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015; Mätzke 
and Ostner 2010a; Thévenon 2011)  and the role of partisanship therein. While periods of left 
party rule continue to present the most favorable conditions for reform (Huber and Stephens 
2001; Mahon 2012; O’Connor 2015), a cross-partisan consensus in favor of more ‘modern’ 
family policies is undeniably beginning to take shape. Here, I show that the prevailing cross-
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national political climate presents right-of-center parties in particular with new opportunities to 
expand their respective electoral bases through the strategic priming of family policies. This 
reflects a longer-term secular transformation of political contestation wherein contemporary 
parties now rely less on traditional partisan cleavages and actively seek out novel issues that 
will appeal to strategically valuable segments of the electorate (Green-Pedersen 2007; Hobolt 
and De Vries 2015; Carmines and Stimson 1989). I make a more modest contribution to the 
heretofore “remarkably silent” scholarly discourse on the intersection between migration and 
family policy (Grødem 2016) by documenting, in my discussion of Germany, an instance where 
migrant-centered arguments were used to advocate more comprehensive and inclusive welfare 
state policies. 
If the dynamics observed here extend beyond my two chosen cases, we should expect 
parties from across the ideological spectrum to continue to pitch new family policies as a tactic 
for building viable electoral coalitions. Following Morgan (2013) I envision that family policy will 
continue to be a fecund terrain for issue competition between parties of the right, left, and 
center. This should bode well for the continued expansion of family policy across the rich OECD 
countries, at least in terms of aggregate spending.  
 An intensification of partisan contestation with respect to family policy can already be 
observed across multiple jurisdictions. For instance, Donald Trump emphasized the unmet 
needs of working American mothers at several points during his unorthodox presidential 
campaign. Work/family reconciliation was an especially common theme in campaign-related 
statements made by Trump’s daughter Ivanka, who notably gave a prime-time televised 
address focused on women’s issues at the 2016 Republican National Convention. A Republican-
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sponsored paid parental leave plan, championed by Ivanka herself,196 has since materialized in 
the United States Senate, with draft legislation expected for the fall of 2018 (Jagoda et al. 
2018). Similarly, the United Kingdom’s governing Conservative Party has made a consistent 
effort to match, and in some respects exceed, the commitments to subsidized child care made 
by the predecessor Labour government. The Conservatives have, in fact, doubled the 
preexisting number of free child care hours available for three and four year olds, extending the 
period to thirty hours per week in the fall of 2017 (Weale 2017).  
 However, in both cases, a continued ideational primacy of neoliberalism promises to 
dampen any substantive contribution that conservative actors make to the modernization of 
family policy. The Republican advocates of paid parental leave insist that their plan will be 
“budget neutral” (Shapiro 2018) and, while Britain’s Conservatives have sustained (and even 
expanded) formal commitments to subsidizing child care, they have more clandestinely sought 
to reduce the financial burden of such commitments by relaxing caregiver qualifications and 
expanding the role of large private chains in the delivery of services (Lewis and West 2017). The 
residual pull of neoliberal considerations on these otherwise reorienting conservative entities is 
cause for concern, as the experience of Québec shows that a myopic focus on cost containment 
may result in ineffective—or even counterproductive—family policies.  
  This study has, of course, raised (at least) as many questions as it has answered, which 
leaves open several avenues for further research. The most underexplored (and potentially 
most fruitful) of such pathways is more systematic research at the intersection of family policy 
and migration. As observed by Grødem (2016), family policies embody cultural norms that 
                                                          
196 Ivanka Trump now serves as an unpaid senior advisor to the president.  
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other social policies do not and, as such, will likely come under increasing pressure as advanced 
democracies continue to grapple with multiculturalism. The German case, along with the 
Scandinavian family policy narratives documented by Grødem, demonstrates that the effects of 
continued migration on family policies are likely to be contingent upon framing strategies 
utilized by opinion leaders. The evolution of such frames is worth tracking as migration and 
multiculturalism promise to remain salient issues across affluent countries in the years to come.  
 Canada’s experience with child care, and particularly the divergence between Québec 
and the other provinces, provokes several interesting questions with respect to federalism and 
the (non-)diffusion of social policies. It is indeed curious that a single province can sustain a 
popular standalone daycare program for over two decades with no spillover to its neighbors. 
What’s even more peculiar is that critics have (with some success) cherry-picked shortcomings 
of Québec’s system in a concerted effort to sour the rest of the Canadian public on the idea of 
universal child care. The state of affairs clashes dramatically with prior scholarly accounts of the 
province-to-province diffusion of major social policies (see, e.g., Maioni 1998). Perhaps 
Québec’s anomalous identity as a ‘culturally distinct society’ has limited the appeal of its 
signature family policy to the other provinces. In any event, my findings suggest that Canada’s 
child care legacy presents an intriguing case of ‘negative policy diffusion’—a possibility that 
warrants more systematic investigation.  
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Date Interviewee Position Format Medium Length 
6/17/2016 No. 1 
MP (federal), Fmr. Cabinet 
Minister Semi-Structured Telephone 25 min 
11/8/2016 No. 2 
Pollster (private), Fmr. 
Conserative staffer Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
11/15/2016 No. 3 
CPC Director of Comms, Party 
Spokesperson Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
8/24/2017 No. 4 
Fmr. Chief of Staff to Cabinet 
Minister (Liberal) Semi-Structured Telephone 90 min 
11/17/2017 No. 5 
Executive with provincial child 
care advocacy group 
(Manitoba) Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
11/22/2017 No. 6 
Senior civil servant (retired) 
Prov. of Manitoba Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
11/23/2017 No. 7 
Spokesperson for provincial 
child care advocacy group 
(British Columbia), Fmr. School 
Board Trustee Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
1/3/2018 No. 8 
Economics Professor at Univ. 
of British Columbia Semi-Structured 
In-person 
(Vancouver
, B.C.) 90 min 
3/8/2018 No. 9 
Population Health researcher 
at Univ. of British Columbia, 
affordability advocate Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
3/15/2018 No. 10 
Labor union rep. for non-profit 
child care workers Semi-Structured Telphone 60 min 
3/15/2018 No. 11 
B.C.-based independent social 
policy consultant Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
3/26/2018 No. 12 
Researcher, R.E.A.L. Women of 
Canada Semi-Structured Telephone 30 min 
3/27/2018 No. 13 
B.C.-based child care policy 
researcher Semi-Structured Telephone 30 min 
3/29/2018 No. 14 
Professor, Early Childhood 
Development researcher at 
Univ. de Québec à Montreal Semi-Structured Skype 60 min 
3/29/2018 No. 15 
Sociology Professor at Univ. of 
Manitoba, expert on history of 
child care policy in Canada Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
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4/5/2018 No. 16 
P.E.I.-based child care 
researcher, fmr. Provincial civil 
servant Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
4/5/2018 No. 17 
Professor of Public Policy at 
Univ. of Toronto Semi-Structured Skype 45 min 
4/17/2018 No. 18 
Director of national child care 
research institute Semi-Structured Telephone 80 min 
4/17/2018 No. 19 
Ottawa-based journalist and 
political correspondent Semi-Structured Telephone 30 min 
4/19/2018 No. 20 
Professor of Political Science at 
Univ. of Toronto Semi-Structured Skype 45 min 
4/20/2018 No. 21 
Professor of Public Finance, 
Simon Fraser University Semi-Structured Telephone 30 min 
4/24/2018 No. 22 
President of national child care 
advocacy group Semi-Structured Telephone 60 min 
5/4/2018 No. 23 
Fmr. senior policy advisor to 
Prime Minister Harper Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
5/14/2018 No. 24 
Fmr. policy director at 
Canadian chapter of major 
global humanitarian org. Semi-Structured Telephone 40 min 
5/28/2018 No. 25 
Fmr. Provincial Director 
(Ontario) with Canadian 
Taxpayer's Federation Semi-Structured Telephone 45 min 
Total         1285 min 
 
Individuals who declined or did not reply to my interview request (in alphabetical order): 
Rona Ambrose, Morna Ballantyne, Ken Battle, Candice Bergen, Ian Brodie, Gordon Cleveland, 
Susan Delacourt, Carolyn Ferns Stephen Harper, Anita Khanna, Rachel Langford, Kellie Leitch, 




APPENDIX 2: TOPICS, KEYWORDS AND EXEMPLAR DOCUMENTS (Chap. 5) 
 
GERMANY 
TOPIC Keywords Exemplar docs 





Coalition crisis due care allowance 
Hasselfeldt sees "no solo" of the Union 
Vote postponed again in the Bundestag 
Vote on care allowance after the summer break 
The coalition never dies 
 
CHILDREN children, educ, child, 





"Integration begins in early childhood education" 
New education report warns of care money 
Money instead of early childhood education 
Education report strengthens opponents of allowance 
Scientists correct details of care allowance 
 
PARENTS women, work, polici, 
mother, state, need, 




The care allowance gives parents freedom 
A golden apron for the stove premium 
Stove premium 
Holding what parents from raising allowance 
 
CONSTITUTION feder, govern 
state, law, 
constitute 
spd, country, court 
applic, question 
 
The counterweight from the north 
Why the federal care allowance is not paid 
What families need to know now 
Constitutional Court has overturned care benefit  
What happens if the care allowance falls 
 
BARGAINING Parti, minist, cdu 




Coalition talks unlikely 
Waiting for the big bang 
Black and green, the unlived dream 
The SPD will require six key ministries  
control of the dance SPD 
 
FISCAL euro, benefit, billion, 
money, plan, cost, 
financ, pension, 
govern, budget  
 
 
The federal government is about to balance budgets 
Tell me where the scratch lists are 
“Bankruptcy for the Merkel Government” 
Election gifts exacerbate rigor 









TOPIC Keywords Exemplar docs 
ADMIN benefit, plan, program, 




Government leery of providing cost details on child- 
care plan 
Not all child-care cheques in mail 
Provinces challenge Ottawa on child care 
Liberals rethinking child care: Party denies it will kill  
Tory program if in power 
Couples plan to invest child-care allowance: Education 
savings plan 
 
TAXATION tax, income, family, 
benefit, credit, cutsplit, 
increase, pay, less 
 
Coming Tax Relief 'Oversold': Watchdog 
Tax package corrects inequity; Ottawa's changes  
net out on progressive side 
Want a federal tax break? Settle down 
Different approach to child benefits; Tories opt for  
tax credit instead of payment 
Child care benefit comes with a catch; Cheques not  
as attractive once taxes factored in 
 
STRATEGY conserv, liber, parti, 
harper, elect, ndp, 
voter, polit, cheq, 
support 
 
Childcare cheques give Tories big boost; Lead in  
new poll 
If the election can be bought, the Tories will win easily 
Liberals can't win on Tories' turf 
Stephen Harper's slow-mo summer 
Canada finds its 'inner Conservative' 
 
DAYCARE parent, daycar, work, 
famili, children, polic, 
home, Quebec, singl, 
kid  
 
No greater investment 
Meet the new daycare-poor 
The forgotten moms 
The case for publicly funded child care 
The daycare trade-off 
 
SCANDAL govern, minist, polievr, 
hous, public, video, 
social, applic, Ottawa, 
depart 
 
More than 300 people linked to suspected case of  
citizenship fraud 
Poilievre film raises fresh concerns over Tories'  
use of public funds 
Minister promises crackdown on consultants who  
counsel fraud 
Opposition seeks clarity regarding MP's 'vanity video'  
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